Equal Treatment of Shareholders – Can There be Too Much of it?

• Article 3.1 (a) of the EU Takeover Bids Directive (2004/25/EC) expresses the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, which has been applied as a prohibition on price differentiation between share classes with different voting rights in the context of takeover bids in Sweden. With the increasing use of dual voting class structures in companies such as Google, Facebook and Snapchat in mind, we raise the question whether the Swedish application is in line with the rising global demand for active, long-term shareholders in our article ‘Equal Treatment of Shareholders – can there be too much of it?’.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Juridik -- Juridik (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Law -- Law (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

EU Takeover Bids Directive

Equal treatment

Shareholders

Sweden

Publikations- och innehållstyp

vet (ämneskategori)

ovr (ämneskategori)