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On Axioms Underlying Use of Reserve Price

Mukherjee, Conan, (författare)
Lunds universitet, Lund University, Ekonomihögskolan, Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Department of Economics
Lunds universitet Nationalekonomiska institutionen. (creator_code:org_t)
Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy, 2015
Engelska 21 s.
Serie: Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
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Abstract Ämnesord
  • This paper establishes reserve price as an ethical necessity contrary to its popular interpretation as an instrument of revenue maximization. It provides an axiomatic justification to reserve pricing at Vickrey auction in single as well as multiple objects settings. In particular, it provides a topological interpretation of a reserve price as the infimum of the set of non-negative real numbers satisfying the following property: if all agents bid the same number from this set, then at least one object is allocated. Further, it shows how existence of this reserve price as well as the associated efficiency properties, are implications of ethical and strategic axioms. In particular, for the single object case, it is shown that any anonymous strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies non-bossiness (in decision) must have an allocation rule same as that of a Vickrey auction with reserve price (VARP). Further, two axiomatizations are provided for the class of VARP mechanisms in the single object context. In the multiple objects context, two new complications arise. One, any one agent getting the object no longer implies that all other agents do not get the object and two, at each profile of reports, all objects need not be allocated. To account for these complications, we introduce an ethical axiom called minimal impartiality (which requires that either all objects or no object be allocated at any profile where all agents report the same value) and a technical regularity condition. Under these restrictions, the single object results are shown to hold in the multiple objects case, too. Finally, we generalize the maxmed mechanisms of Sprumont [JET, 2013] to the multiple objects setting and provide an axiomatization.


SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)


strategy-proof mechanism
maxmed mechanisms

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