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Träfflista för sökning "AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) ;pers:(Sutter Matthias 1968)"

Sökning: AMNE:(SOCIAL SCIENCES Business and economics) > Sutter Matthias 1968

  • Resultat 21-30 av 65
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21.
  • Dulleck, U., et al. (författare)
  • The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
  • 2011
  • Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 101:2, s. 526-555
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
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24.
  • Goette, L., et al. (författare)
  • Competition between organizational groups: Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations
  • 2012
  • Ingår i: Management Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 58:5, s. 948-960
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict.
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26.
  • He, Haoran, 1981, et al. (författare)
  • Group Decision Making Under Risk: An experiment with student couples
  • 2011
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • In an experiment, we study risk-taking of cohabitating student couples, finding that couples’ decisions are closer to risk-neutrality than single partners’ decisions. This finding is similar to earlier experiments with randomly assigned groups, corroborating external validity of earlier results.
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27.
  • He, Haoran, 1981, et al. (författare)
  • Group decision making under risk: An experiment with student couples
  • 2012
  • Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 117:3, s. 691-693
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • In an experiment, we study risk-taking of cohabitating student couples, finding that couples’ decisions are closer to risk-neutrality than single partners’ decisions. This finding is similar to earlier experiments with randomly assigned groups, corroborating external validity of earlier results.
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29.
  • Ibanez, Marcela, 1973, et al. (författare)
  • Searching for a better deal - on the influence of group decision making, time presure and gender in a search experiment
  • 2008
  • Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
    • We study behavior in a search experiment where sellers receive randomized bids from a computer. At any time, sellers can accept the highest standing bid or ask for another bid at positive costs. We find that sellers stop searching earlier than theoretically optimal. Inducing a mild form of time pressure strengthens this finding in the early periods. There are marked gender differences. Men search significantly shorter than women. If subjects search in groups of two subjects, there is no difference to individual search, but teams of two women search much longer than men and recall more frequently.
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30.
  • Kocher, Martin G., et al. (författare)
  • Conditional cooperation on three continents
  • 2008
  • Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 101:3, s. 175-178
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the United States than anywhere else.
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  • Resultat 21-30 av 65

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