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| 2. |
- Sutter, Matthias, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Social preferences in childhood and adolescence - A large-scale experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Social preferences have been shown to be an important determinant of economic decision making for many adults. We present a large-scale experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight to seventeen years. Participants make decisions in eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks, allowing us to study the distribution of social preference types across age and across gender. Our results show that when children and teenagers grow older, inequality aversion becomes a gradually less prominent motivating force of allocation decisions. At the same time, efficiency concerns increase in importance for boys, and maximin-preferences turn more important in shaping decisions of girls.
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| 4. |
- Balafoutas, Loukas, et al.
(författare)
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Gender, Competition and the Efficiency of Policy Intervention
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Recent research has shown that women shy away from competition more often than men. We evaluate experimentally three alternative policy interventions to promote women in competitions: Quotas, Preferential Treatment, and Repetition of the Competition unless a critical number of female winners is reached. We find that Quotas and Preferential Treatment encourage women to compete significantly more often than in a control treatment, while efficiency in selecting the best candidates as winners is not worse. The level of cooperation in a post-competition teamwork task is even higher with successful policy interventions. Hence, policy measures promoting women can have a double dividend.
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| 5. |
- Beck, Adrian, et al.
(författare)
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Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.
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| 6. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Household Decision Making in Rural China: Using Experiments to Estimate the Influences of Spouses
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. This raises the question about spouses’ relative influence on joint decisions and the determinants of relative influence. Using a controlled experiment (on inter-temporal choice), we let each spouse first make individual decisions and then make joint decisions with the other spouse. We use a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. In general, husbands have a stronger influence than wives. However, in richer households and when the wife is older than the husband, we find a significantly stronger influence of the wife on joint decisions.
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| 7. |
- Dulleck, U., et al.
(författare)
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The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
- 2011
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Ingår i: American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282. ; 101:2, s. 526-555
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
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| 10. |
- He, Haoran, 1981, et al.
(författare)
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Group Decision Making Under Risk: An experiment with student couples
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In an experiment, we study risk-taking of cohabitating student couples, finding that couples’ decisions are closer to risk-neutrality than single partners’ decisions. This finding is similar to earlier experiments with randomly assigned groups, corroborating external validity of earlier results.
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