| 1. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The expansion of welfare-state arrangements is seen as the result of dynamic interaction between market behaviour and political behaviour, often with considerable time lags, sometimes generating either virtuous or vicious circles. Such interaction may also involve induced (endogenous) changes in social norms and political preferences. Moreover, the internationalization process not only limits the ability of national governments to redistribute income; they also increase the political demands for international mobility of welfare-state benefits and social services. I also discuss the dynamics of reforms and retreats of welfare-state arrangements.
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| 2. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Changing Tides for the Welfare State : An Essay
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Socioeconomic conditions and values have changed considerably since the emergence of elaborate welfare-state arrangements during the first decades after World War II. For instance, recent socioeconomic changes have created new needs (justifications) for intertemporal reallocations of income as well as for protection against new types of income risks. Some socioeconomic changes have also undermined the financial viability of a number of traditional welfare-state arrangements. This paper emphasizes developments in the labor market and changes in the structure and preferences of the family. A number of alternative welfare-state reforms are considered in the paper.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Improving the Performance of the European Social Model : The Welfare State over the Life Cycle
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The achievements of social-welfare arrangements in Western Europe are well known: considerable income security, relatively little poverty and, in some countries, ample supply of social services. But there are also well-known weaknesses and hence considerable scope for improvement. Three types of weaknesses are considered in this paper: social-welfare arrangements are often not financially robust to shocks; individuals make undesirable behavioural adjustments in response to welfare-state arrangements and their financing; and social-welfare arrangements are often poorly adapted to recent changes in socio-economic conditions and preferences of individuals. I discuss these weaknesses, and alternative methods to mitigate them, in the context of various types of welfare-state arrangements that the individual may encounter over the life cycle.
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Improving the SGP : Taxes and Delegation Rather than Fines
- 2004
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an “economic-theory” perspective on optimal corrective measures with the “legalistic” perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss the advantages of replacing the Pact’s rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce.
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| 6. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change
- 2000
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In developed countries, pensions systems emerged as a political response to socioeconomic changes brought about by industrialization and urbanization in the late 19th and early 20th centruries. Today, new socioeconomic changes create both rationales and political forces for revisions of existing pensions systems. Changes in demography, real wage growth and real interest rates are perhaps the most obvious examples. Increased instability of the family, more heterogeneity among individuals, greater internationel mobility of labor and capital, and amibitions to ecourage individual responsibility also have important implications for pensions systems. When discussing these issues, it is useful to set up a more elaborate classification of pension systems than the usual distinction between defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contribution (DV) systems. The choice of an appropriate taxonomy depends, of course, on the issues to be raised. One question that is focused on in this paper concerns the consequences of socioeconomic shocks on the distribution of income and the sharing of income risk among generations. it turns out that the distinction between pensions systems with exogenous and endogenous contribution rates (tax rates) then becomes crucial. Bu the paper also deals with socioeconomic changes that are induced by the pension system itself via behavioral adjustments of individuals - and the feedback of these changes on the pension system. When dealing with such adjustments, highly relevant features of pension systems are the degree to which they are actuarial and funded, respectively - two aspects that are related but not the identical. Six generic pension systems are classified in Section I, highlighting the distinctions mentioned above. The contribution rate is exogenous in two of these systems, while it is endogenous in the other four systems. Each of the six pension systems can ba varied considerably, both by incorporating elements from other systems and by introducing restricitions on contributions or benefits. Section II turns to the consequences of socioeconomic changes for the distribution of income and macroeconomic balance, while sections III and IV examine alternative pension reforms aimed at mitigating some of these consequences. A few of these reforms are "marginal" in the sense that certain rules of a pension system are modified, including both ad hoc policy measures and the introduction of various automatic adjustment mechanisms. Other reforms are "radical" since they imply shift to different types of pensions sytems. Section V concludes. As always when designing social insurance systems, it is necessary to strika balance between conflicting considerations, such as distribution, risk sharing and incentives. But it is also important to be concerned with the balance between paternalism and individual freedom of choice (and hence individual responsibility). This also raises the more general question of the appropriate role of government in society as a whole, including the control of capital markets and government intervention in the management of firms.
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| 7. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Raising Children to Work Hard : Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation. We also examine the formation of norms requiring children to support their parents financially in old age.
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| 8. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
- 2003
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Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 1:2-3, s. 533-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare‐state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
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| 9. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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The European Social Model : Lessons for Developing Countries
- 2002
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Developing countries, in particular the least developed ones, probably have more to learn from special policies in Europe during the early 20th century than from the elaborate welfare-state arrangements after World War II. In addition to macroeconomic growth and stability, the main ambitions must be to fight human deprivation, including illiteracy, malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation – and, in some cases, also weak, incompetent and/or corrupt governments. It is also important that informal systems in the fields of transfers and social services are not destroyed when developing countries embark on more formal systems in these fields in the future. The European experience also warns against the creation of social systems that are so generous that disincentives, moral hazard and receding social norms seriously distort the national economy, including the labor market.
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| 10. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents a new approach to the theory of the firm by identifying factor complementarities as central to the determination of the firm’s boundaries. The factor complementarities may take a variety of forms: technological and informational complementarities, as well as economies of scale and scope. We examine the tradeoff between the gains from these complementarities and transactions costs. In so doing, we must abandon the standard dichotomy between the determinants of plant size and firm size. The influence of factor complementarities on firm size is examined in partial and general equilibrium frameworks.
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