| 1. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
- 2010
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Ingår i: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 100:4, s. 1695-1724
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 x 2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 x 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.
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| 2. |
- Camerer, Colin F., et al.
(författare)
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Testing Game Theory in the Field : Swedish LUPI Lottery Games
- 2011
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Ingår i: American Economic Journal. - : American Economic Association. - 1945-7669 .- 1945-7685. ; 3:3, s. 1-33
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Game theory is usually difficult to test in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using both laboratory and field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In this game, players pick positive integers and whoever chooses the lowest unique number wins. Equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson distributed population uncertainty. The field and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some deviations can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model. (JEL C70, C93, D44, H27)
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Lindqvist, Erik, et al.
(författare)
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Political Polarization and the Size of Government
- 2010
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Ingår i: American Political Science Review. - DC : The American Political Science Association. - 0003-0554 .- 1537-5943. ; 104:3, s. 543-565
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, we study the relationship between political polarization and public spending using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Political polarization is strongly associated with smaller government in democratic countries, but there is no relationship between polarization and the size of government in undemocratic countries. The results are robust to a large set of control variables, including gross domestic product per capita and income inequality.
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| 5. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
- 2011
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 110:2, s. 90-92
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Within a class of games that we call Blame Games, we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient (strictly) dominance solvable equilibrium.
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