| 41. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Intergenerational Aspects of Public Transfers, Borrowing and Debt
- 1984
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper analyzes intergeneration distributional effects of taxes, transfer payments, public borrowing and debt. A two-period life-cucle model with overlapping generations is constructed. The model has two specific features: private wealth in both periods enter as arguments in the preference function, and the individuals (inelastically) supply labor in both periods. It turns out that some fiscal policy actions favor both of the currently lliving generations, possibly at the expense of future generations, while other actions generate conflicts between the currently living generations. The analysis also shows that it makes considerable difference whether the "burden" of public spending, debt and borrowing is defined in terms of wealth, consumption and utility. The different implications of foreign vs. domestic debt are examined.
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| 42. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Investment, Rational Inattention, and Delegation
- 2017
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no investment made. In "sweet" conditions, investment is made "blindly", i.e. without acquiring costly information. In intermediate, "normal" conditions, the decision-maker acquires information and conditions the investment decision upon the information obtained. We investigate if the investor can benefit from employing an agent when the agent’s effort and information is private. Not even in the case of a risk neutral agent will the principal perfectly align the agent’s incentives with her own at the moment of investment (had the principal known the agent’s private information). Optimal contracts for risk neutral agents not only reward good investments but also punishes bad investments. Such contracts include three components: a fixed salary, stocks and options.
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| 43. |
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| 44. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Job Security and Work Absence : Evidence from a Natural Experiment
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
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| 45. |
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| 46. |
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| 47. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Lärdomar av finanskrisen
- 2010
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk debatt. - Stockholm : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; :4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 48. |
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Nationalekonomi : vad är det?
- 2012
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Ingår i: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens årsbok. - Stockholm : Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien. ; , s. 103-112
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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