| 91. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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The Price in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel - 1969-1998
- 1999
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In conjunction with its tercentenary celebration in 1968, Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) instituted a new award, "The Central Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel" in the basis of an economic commitment by the bank in perpetuity. The award is given by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences according to the same principles as for the Nobel Prizes that have been awarded since 1901. The procedures for selecting the laureates are also the same. Each year the Academy receives some 250 nominations, usually covering a little more than one hundred nominees. (Unsolicited suggestions from persons who have not been asked to submit nominations are not considered.) The Economics Prize Selection Commitee of the Academy (with five to eight members) commissions expert studies of the most prominent candidates, sometimes by Swedish experts but usually by foreigners. The prize committee presents its report, with an extensive survey of the main candidates that are considered for a prize. The report motivates the proposal and includes all the solicited expert studies. Finally the entire Academy meets to take the final award decision, usually in October. Which critera have guided the awarts so far? And what have been the main problems when selcting the laureates? It is useful to start a discussion of these issues with a rough classification of the various types of economics prize awards given so far. It should be kept in mind, however, that all such classifications are rather arbitrary since the multidimensional nature of scientific contributions makes it difficult in avoid overlap.
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| 92. |
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| 93. |
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| 94. |
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| 95. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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The Welfare State and the Employment Problem
- 1994
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Social security, provision of public sector services, job security legislation, minimum wages and centrally regulated (bargained) relative wages are important elements of the modern welfare state -- each designed, often quite successfully, to enhance economic security and to redistribute income. The consequences of these policies for the unemployment issue are the topic of this paper.
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| 96. |
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| 97. |
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| 98. |
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| 99. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Unemployment and Labor Market Imperfections
- 1989
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper deals with the role of various types of labor market imperfections for employment and unemployment. On the demand side for labor, the paper analyzes the consequences of labor turnover costs for wage formation and employment, showing that such costs may generate persistent unemployment due to the market powers which they create for incumbent workers ("insiders"). On the labor supply side, the paper emphasizes the role of alternative types of unemployment benefit systems. There is also a discussion of various imperfections of the interaction between demand and supply labor, resulting in relative wage distortions and mismatches between demand and supply for labor.
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| 100. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Unemployment - Structural
- 1999
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Structural unemployment differs from cyclical unemployment by not disappearing in cyclical booms. In economic theory, structural unemployment is usually analyzed in terms of the concept of equilibrium unemployment (the "natural unemployment rate" in Friedman's terminology). Two elaborate concepts of equilibrium unemployment - the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (the NAIRU) and the unemployment rate that induces firms and workers to accept the same real wage (the PS-WS-model) are used as analytical framework for the paper. These models are also related to search models of the labor market, in which unemployment equilibrium is defined as a situation where the number of individuals finding jobs equal the number of individuals who are separated from jobs. But it is argued in the paper that it is reasonable to widen the concept of structural unemployment to also include unemployment persistence, that is, a tendency for unemployment to continue to be high for quite a while also after temporary unemployment-creating shocks. The paper pinpoints various factors that influence the level of structural unemployment, which differs in time and place. It ends with a discussion of how structural unemployment is influenced by policy actions.
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