| 11. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms
- 2006
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a “moral hazard constraint” can make the individual abstain from fraud (“mimicking”). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The expansion of welfare-state arrangements is seen as the result of dynamic interaction between market behaviour and political behaviour, often with considerable time lags, sometimes generating either virtuous or vicious circles. Such interaction may also involve induced (endogenous) changes in social norms and political preferences. Moreover, the internationalization process not only limits the ability of national governments to redistribute income; they also increase the political demands for international mobility of welfare-state benefits and social services. I also discuss the dynamics of reforms and retreats of welfare-state arrangements.
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| 14. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
-
Balanced-Budget Redistribution as Political Equilibrium
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper considers balanced-budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups of individuals as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be sufficient "stochastic heterogeneity" with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's "principle of minimum differentiation", as well as of "Director's law", is examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs and voters' possibilities of "exit" adn "voice" in the election process. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the parobability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lump-sum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentitation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.
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| 15. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using eages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
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| 16. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Changing Tides for the Welfare State : An Essay
- 2001
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Socioeconomic conditions and values have changed considerably since the emergence of elaborate welfare-state arrangements during the first decades after World War II. For instance, recent socioeconomic changes have created new needs (justifications) for intertemporal reallocations of income as well as for protection against new types of income risks. Some socioeconomic changes have also undermined the financial viability of a number of traditional welfare-state arrangements. This paper emphasizes developments in the labor market and changes in the structure and preferences of the family. A number of alternative welfare-state reforms are considered in the paper.
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| 17. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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China's Reformed Economy
- 2007
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Ingår i: CESifo Forum. ; 1
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 18. |
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| 19. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Debt-Financed Transfers, Public Consumption and Public Investment in an Open Economy
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper compares the welfare implications for two consecutive generations of debt-financed public spending of three different types - tansfer payments, public consumption and public (infrastructure) investment. The analysis is performed by means of an overlapping generations model with the consumption of a publicly provided good in the utility function of the consumer and the stock of public productive capital in the private sector's production function. The standard overlapping generations model is extended also to include work in the second period of the individual's life and asset holdings in his/her preference function. It is shown how the utility effects on different generations depend not only on the type of spending but also on the implications of the spending for future tax (transfer) payments, as well as on the initial levels of public consumption and public capital.
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| 20. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents
- 2020
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Ingår i: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier BV. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 129
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze an investor who delegates information acquisition and investment decisions to an agent. The investor cannot monitor the agent's effort or information. Optimal pay schemes contain bonuses that increase with the net return rate of the investment, but, unlike conventional contracts, at a decreasing rate. Moreover, investments with low return rates are penalized, again unlike conventional contracts. Nevertheless, it may be optimal for the investor to reward the agent above the agent's reservation utility. We examine the role of the agent's risk attitude for the shape of the pay scheme, and whether firing after bad investments is a more effective threat than reduced pay. We also analyze how the nature of the contract changes if the agent is given bargaining power.
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