| 1. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(author)
-
Vad är optimal beskattning?
- 2010
-
In: Framtider. - 0281-0492. ; :3, s. 18-21
-
Journal article (pop. science, debate, etc.)abstract
- Hur tar man in skatter utan att det nämnvärt påverkar individernas ochföretagens agerande? Artikeln handlar om optimal beskattning som en vägatt skapa skatteintäkter för att finansiera omfördelningen till samhälletsbehövande – utan att samhällsekonomin störs. Ekonomerna ThomasAronsson, Spencer Bastani och Sören Blomquist presenterar forskningsfältetoch diskuterar samspelet mellan inkomstskatter och varuskatter.
|
|
| 2. |
- Bastani, Spencer, et al.
(author)
-
Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs
- 2010
-
Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfareenhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents dier only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/dierences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: rst, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievableby introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; nally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.
|
|
| 3. |
- Bastani, Spencer, et al.
(author)
-
The Welfare Gains of Age Related Optimal Income Taxation
- 2010
-
Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income.
|
|
| 4. |
|
|
