| 1. |
- Ohlsson, Henry, et al.
(författare)
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Inherited wealth over the path of development: Sweden, 1810–2010
- 2014
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Inherited wealth has attracted much attention recently, much due to the research by Thomas Piketty (Piketty, 2011; 2014). The discussion has mainly revolved around a long-run contrast between Europe and the U.S., even though data on explicit historical inheritance flows are only really available for France and to some extent for the U.K. We study the long-run evolution of inherited wealth in Sweden over the past two hundred years. The trends in Sweden are similar to those in France and the U.K: beginning at a high level in the nineteenth century, falling sharply in the interwar era and staying low thereafter, but tending to increase in recent years. The levels, however, differ greatly. The Swedish flows were only half of those in France and the U.K. before 1900 and also much lower after 1980. The main reason for the low levels in the nineteenth century is that the capital-income ratio is much lower than in "Old Europe". In fact, the Swedish capital-income ratio was similar to that in the U.S., but the savings and growth rates were much lower in Sweden than in the U.S. Rap-id income growth following industrialization and increasing savings rates were also important fac-tors behind the development of the capital-income ratio and the inheritance flow during the twenti-eth century. The recent differences in inheritance flows have several potential explanations related to the Swedish welfare state and pension system. Sweden was "un-European" during the nineteenth century because the country was so poor, Sweden is "un-European" today because so much wealth formation has taken place within the welfare state and the occupational pension systems.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Zhang, Lihua, et al.
(författare)
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The Economic Rationale for Business Groups : A comparative study of China, Japan and Sweden
- 2012
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Business groups around the world are remarkable phenomena, and many academic scholars have studied their pros and cons. However, few researchershave analyzedthe economic rationale for the existence of business groups in a systematic way. Furthermore, even fewer scholars have targeteddifferent economic rationale for business groups situated in different institutional and cultural backgrounds. Focusing on business groups from China, Japan and Sweden, this paper is trying to compare different economic rationale for having business groups in three distinctive types of economies: China represents the developing economiesemerging from the late 1980s; Japan represents the developed economiesthat industrialized after World WarII;Sweden represents the developed countrieswith a longhistory of capitalist economic system. We first propose three assumptions to explain the existence of business groups,based on both the related literature and our observation. Then, they are separately analyzed with evidence from selected business groupsin the three countries.Our results show that the economic rationale for business groups in the three countries differs from each other. As for China, due to the active role of government in establishing business groups, business groups are a tool in the hands of the government to help the government to regulate the economy. Business groups in Japan mainly serve to reap economies of scope,while forming close relationshipswith the government to help revitalize the economy in critical times. Swedish business groups also diversify their industry portfolio to gain from economies of scope and at the same time seek cost-effective financing. The differences described above highly reflect the different institutional and cultural backgroundsin the countries respectively. The results might help academic scholars, business managers and government officials to better understand why business groups differ in various countries, and the role they are playing to overcome different social and economic problems.
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| 5. |
- Briggs, Joseph S., et al.
(författare)
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Windfall gains and stock market participation
- 2015
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We estimate the causal effect of wealth on stock market participation using administrative data on Swedish lottery players. A $150,000 windfall gain increases stock ownership probability among pre-lottery non-participants by 12 percentage points, while pre-lottery stock holders are unaffected. The effect is immediate, seemingly permanent and heterogeneous in intuitive ways. Standard lifecycle models predict wealth effects far too large to match our causal estimates under common calibrations. Additional analyses suggest a limited role for explanations such as procrastination or real-estate investment. Overall, results suggest that “nonstandard” beliefs or preferences contribute to the nonparticipation of households across many demographic groups.
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| 6. |
- Cheung, Maria, 1975-, et al.
(författare)
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The Impact of a Food For Education Program on Schooling in Cambodia
- 2011
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Food for Education (FFE) programs, which consist of meals served in school and in some cases take-home rations and deworming programs conditional on school attendance, are considered a powerful tool to improve educational outcomes, particularly in areas where school participation is initially low. Compared to other programs, such as conditional cash transfers and scholarships, school meals may provide a stronger incentive to attend school because children must be in school in order to receive the rations, and have the potential to improve nutritional and general health status as well. In this paper, we find that the Cambodia FFE, that was implemented in six Cambodian regions between 1999 and 2003, increased enrollment, school attendance and completed education. We also ask who benefited the most, and how cost-effective such a program is compared to other types of interventions.
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| 8. |
- Laun, Tobias, et al.
(författare)
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Having It All? Employment, Earnings and Children
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Sweden boasts high fertility and high female employment. However, part-time employmentis very prevalent. There is a notable gender gap in both wages and earnings,which widens substantially after women have children. In this paper we studythe effect of family policies on female employment, fertility and the gender wagegap. To this end, we develop a structural, life cycle model of heterogeneous householdswhich features endogenous labor supply, human capital accumulation, fertilityand home production. We find that family policies, such as subsidized daycare andpart-time work options, promote maternal employment and fertility. Part-time workcontributes greatly to the widening of the gender wage gap following the arrival ofchildren. However, restricting part-time work options would lower maternal employment, and thereby also widen the gender wage gap.
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| 9. |
- Sepahvand, Mohammad H., et al.
(författare)
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Does revolution change risk attitudes? Evidence from Burkina Faso
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A popular uprising in 2014, led to a revolution overthrowing the sitting president of Burkina Faso. We investigate if individuals’ risk attitudes changed due to this revolution. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the revolution on risk attitudes, by gender, age and level of education. The analysis is based on a unique nationally representative panel Household Budget Survey, which allows us to track the changes in the risk attitudes of the same individuals before, during and after the revolution. Our results suggest that the impact of the revolution is short-term. Individuals become risk averse during the revolution but converge back to the pre-revolution risk attitudes, slightly increasing their risk taking, after the revolution is over. Women are more risk taking than the men after the revolution but are more risk averse during the revolution. In general, older individuals tend to have higher risk aversion than the younger individuals. During the revolution, however, the individuals with higher level of education are less willing to take risk.
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