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| 2. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
- 2010
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Ingår i: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 100:4, s. 1695-1724
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 x 2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 x 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.
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| 3. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- 2018
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 107, s. 153-181
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.
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| 4. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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Puritanical moralism may signal patience rather than cause self-control
- 2023
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Ingår i: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0140-525X .- 1469-1825. ; 46
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.
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| 5. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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A Model of Social Duties
- 2022
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a formal model of social duties. Duties to respect entitlements (duties of justice) differ from duties to promote well-being (duties of charity). A situation- specific version of our model takes entitlements as primitives. A fully portable ver- sion derives entitlements from situational characteristics. Utility functions obtain kinks where duties of justice and charity are exactly satisfied. Actions at these kinks are candidates for descriptive social norms. Empirically, duties are identified using Krupka-Weber appropriateness ratings, with negative ratings indicating entitlement violations. The model’s predictions are confronted with established regularities and new survey evidence in seven pre-registered applications.
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| 6. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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Decency
- 2019
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We develop a formal theory of decency. Shared values and understandings give rise to social norms. Norms may mandate collectively optimal behavior, but they need not do so. Furthermore, behavior can be affected by social values even if it stops short of norm compliance. Seeking stronger predictions, we propose a structural model of social values; society endorses efficiency and equality, but condemns ill-gotten gains. The model implies that decent people will tend to avoid situations that encourage prosocial behavior. It also rationalizes the existence of willful ignorance, intention-based negative reciprocity, and betrayal aversion.
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| 7. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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2020 års Ekonomipris till Paul Milgrom och Robert Wilson
- 2020
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; 48:8, s. 5-12
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien har beslutat dela ut årets Ekonomipris till Paul Milgrom och Robert Wilson, båda från Stanford University, USA, för ”förbättringar av auktionsteorin och uppfinningar av nya auktionsformat”. Årets pristagare har i sin forskning sammanfört teori och praktik, till nytta för enskilda individer, företag och samhällen världen över.
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| 8. |
- Andersson, Tommy, et al.
(författare)
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2022 års ekonomipris till Ben Bernanke, Douglas Diamond och Philip Dybvig
- 2022
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646 .- 2002-4231. ; 50:8/2022
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Forskningsöversikt (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien har beslutat dela ut årets ekonomipris till Ben Bernanke (verksam vid The Brookings Institution), Douglas Diamond (verksam vid University of Chicago) och Philip Dybvig (verksam vid Washington University, St. Louis) ”för forskning om banker och finanskriser”. Med hjälp av forskningsinsikterna från årets ekonomipristagare har senare finanskriser kunnat hanteras bättre.
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| 9. |
- Broberg, Tomas, et al.
(författare)
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Is generosity involuntary?
- 2007
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Ingår i: Economics letters. - : Elsevier B.V. - 1873-7374 .- 0165-1765. ; 94:1, s. 32-37
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We estimate the distribution of exit reservation prices in a dictator game. The mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment and only 36% of subjects have exit reservation prices consistent with selfish or social preferences.
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| 10. |
- Burkart, Mike, et al.
(författare)
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What you sell is what you lend? Explaining trade credit contracts
- 2011
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Ingår i: Review of Financial Studies. - : Oxford University Press. - 0893-9454 .- 1465-7368. ; 24:4, s. 1261-1298
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We relate trade credit to product characteristics and aspects of bank–firm relationships and document three main empirical regularities. First, the use of trade credit is associated with the nature of the transacted good. In particular, suppliers of differentiated products and services have larger accounts receivable than suppliers of standardized goods and firms buying more services receive cheaper trade credit for longer periods. Second, firms receiving trade credit secure financing from relatively uninformed banks. Third, a majority of the firms in our sample appear to receive trade credit at low cost. Additionally, firms that are more creditworthy and have some buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts.
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