| 1. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
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Political Competition, Policy and Growth : Theory and Evidence from the US
- 2010
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In: The Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 77:4, s. 1329-1352
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.
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| 2. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
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State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
- 2010
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In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 78:1, s. 1-34
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
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The Logic of Political Violence
- 2011
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In: Quarterly Journal of Economics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0033-5533 .- 1531-4650. ; 126:3, s. 1411-1445
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war. We formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one-sided or two-sided violence (repression or civil war). The model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war; and suggests a natural empirical approach. Exploiting only within-country variation in the data, we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid. As in the theory, these effects are only present where political institutions are noncohesive.
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| 5. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
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FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY
- 2011
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In: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 9:3, s. 371-398
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states.
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