| 16461. |
- Spaak, Torben
(författare)
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Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.) Natural Law and Modern Moral Philosophy Cambridge University Press, 2001
- 2002
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Ingår i: Theoria. - Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell. - 1755-2567 .- 0040-5825. ; 68:1, s. 74-81
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Recension (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Natural law theory should be of interest to scholars in a number of distinct disciplines, such as law, philosophy, and political science. If the reader has any doubts on that score, a perusal of Natural Law and Modern Moral Philosophy, which is a collection of nine essays dealing with various aspects of natural law theory, will clarify the interdisciplinary relevance of natural law theory. In this review, I am going to concentrate on one of the nine essays in this fine book, namely Michael Moore’s Law as Justice, which critiques (what the author calls) the functionalist argument for law’s binding force, advanced by a number of natural lawyers through the years. Moore’s central claim is that the functionalist argument for law’s binding force (to be explained below), is too weak to guarantee the binding force of law assumed by natural lawyers. Instead, Moore suggests that the binding force of law may be established by a non-functionalist argument: law will hold our practical interest only if it obligates. While not exactly concise, Moore’s analysis is well worth the reader’s while. As for the central claims and arguments of Moore's essay, I agree that the functionalist argument is too weak to guarantee the binding force of law assumed by natural lawyers. I also find the non-functionalist argument adduced by Moore – that law will hold our practical interest only if it obligates – appealing. I do not, however, find it as compelling as Moore does. For while there are indeed reasons to conceive of law and morality as conceptually connected, as natural lawyers do, there are also reasons to conceive of them as conceptually distinct, as legal positivists do. Since Moore does not consider any of the latter arguments, I would like to conclude this review by pointing to a few of them.
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| 16462. |
- Spaak, Torben, 1960-
(författare)
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Ingvill Helland and Sören Koch, eds., Nordic and Germanic Legal Methods, 461 pp. (Mohr-Siebeck, 2014)
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Nordicum-Mediterraneum. - 1670-6242. ; 11:1
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book on Nordic and Germanic legal methods includes contributions from a number of German, Swiss, and Nordic legal scholars and is a welcome contribution both to the national and the international debate on legal reasoning. Clearly, we have reason to compare not only solutions to substantive legal problems, as comparative legal scholars usually do, but also the methods for the interpretation and application of the law used in different legal orders. Reading through these essays, then, the reader is likely to acquire some interesting information about the similarities and differences between the so-called legal methods used in the relevant legal orders and about the reasons why there are certain similarities and differences between those methods. What the reader will not get, however, is (i) a systematic discussion of whether there is anything specific enough to deserve the name of ‘legal method’ and, if so, what, exactly, this might be, or (ii) any general conclusions about the similarities and differences between the legal methods used in the various legal orders or about the reasons for the relevant similarities and differences. Moreover, the reader will not get (iii) a systematic discussion of the relation between the two aims of the collection, that is, (a) to describe and compare the legal methods in the different legal orders and (b) to explain any similarities and differences regarding the methods that may turn up in the comparison. For these reasons, although I do welcome the book, I am not entirely satisfied with it.
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| 16463. |
- Spaak, Torben
(författare)
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Legal Theory (Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 40, 2000; PeterWahlgren, ed.)
- 2002
-
Ingår i: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. - Stuttgart : Franz Steiner Verlag. ; 88:2, s. 298-304
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Recension (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- LEGAL THEORY aims to ”provide interesting material for further discussions concerning legal theory also outside the Scandinavian countries.” The essays are divided into five categories: (1) On the Nature of Law; (2) On Legal Concepts and Legal Principles; (3) On Legal Reasoning; (4) Legal Rules and the Development of the Legal System; and (5) Perspectives on Legal Science. In this review, I consider Jes Bjarup's analysis of Axel Hägerström’s meta-ethical non-cognitivism. In his essay, Bjarup makes several claims. First, he claims that the received view, according to which Hägerström was concerned in his inaugural lecture with meta-ethics and nothing else, is mistaken. According to Bjarup, Hägerström also advanced a thesis in the field of normative ethics, which Bjarup dubs the ideal of self-realization, according to which ”an actual autonomous morality is within us, determined only by direct regard for what we esteem most of all.” ng of its citizens.” Second, he maintains that there is a place for law under Hägerström’s theory. For to pursue the ideal of self-realization, the individual needs a stable social framework, which positive morality cannot provide. Third, he claims that Hägerström’s theory leaves no room for ”substantial normative or ethical inquiries into the law and its application,” nor for legal reasoning conceived as practical reasoning. However, I question all of Bjarup's main claims.
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| 16464. |
- Spaak, Torben, 1960-
(författare)
-
Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality
- 2009
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Ingår i: Ethics. - 0014-1704 .- 1539-297X. ; 120:1, s. 192-197
-
Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This book by the late Neil MacCormick is the fourth and last in a series ‘Law, State, and Practical Reason,’ which began with Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], and continued with Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005] and Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007]. The central question dealt with in the book is “Can reason be practical?”, and MacCormick’s answer to this question is “loudly affirmative” (209). In thus defending the existence of practical reason, MacCormick goes against two of the greatest figures in twentieth century legal philosophy, viz. the legal positivists Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross, and possibly also against a third great figure, viz. the legal positivist H. L. A. Hart. In this short review, I offer a quick overview of MacCormick’s main line of argument, and consider in a little more detail what I take to be MacCormick’s central claim, viz. that the solution to the “riddle of practical reason” is to be found in (what MacCormick calls) the Smithian categorical imperative, that is, Kant’s categorical imperative supplemented with Adam Smith’s idea of an impartial spectator. I argue, very briefly, that MacCormick’s central claim is not as clear as it might be, and that in any case it is not really plausible.
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| 16465. |
- Spaak, Torben, 1960-
(författare)
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Ola Svensson, John Rawls’ teori om rättvisa. Enstudie i rättsfilosofi, Juristförlaget i Lund 2020
- 2022
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Ingår i: Juridisk Tidskrift. - 1100-7761 .- 2002-3545. ; 2022-23:1, s. 201-218
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- John Rawls, som verkar i den liberala tanketraditionen, sägs ofta vara 1900-talets störste politiske filosof och hans bok A Theory of Justice anses av många vara det mest betydande politisk-filosofiska verket som skrivits, åtminstone i någorlunda modern tid. Rawls har senare utvecklat och i viss mån modifierat grundtankarna i sin politiska filosofi i Political Liberalism samt tillämpat dessa på folkrättens område i The Law of Peoples. Få svenska jurister är dock närmare bekanta med Rawls intressanta och omfattande teoribygge, och för dem som inte är det men som skulle vilja veta lite mera har Ola Svensson skrivit en introduktion till Rawls teori om rättvisa. Svenssons bok är kort, kärnfull och välskriven och visar läsaren hur mycket det finns att säga om rättsordningens utformning från normativ synpunkt. Min enda anmärkning är att boken är nästan helt och hållet deskriptiv, trots att det som vi skall se finns många intressanta frågor att diskutera, där läsaren säkerligen skulle ha tjänat på att få ta del av Svenssons uppfattning.
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| 16466. |
- Spaak, Torben
(författare)
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Ola Svensson, Viljeförklaringen och dess innehåll: Om avtalsrättslig begreppsbildning och systematik, akademisk avhandling, 205 s., Nerenius & Santérus förlag, Stockholm, 1996.
- 1997
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Ingår i: Svensk Juristtidning. - Uppsala : Iustus förlag. - 0039-6591. ; , s. 486-501
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Recension (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Ola Svensson har skrivit en doktorsavhandling med titeln Viljeförklaringen och dess innehåll: Om avtalsrättslig begreppsbildning och systematik. Hans syfte är att bestämma begreppen "viljeförklaring" och "viljeförklarings innehåll" på ett för svensk förmögenhetsrätt lämpligt sätt. Han tänker sig att en person förklarar sin vilja, dvs. avger en viljeförklaring om, och endast om, han ser till att motparten har fog att sluta sig till att han har denna vilja. Vad beträffar viljeförklaringens innehåll hävdar Svensson att detta enligt huvudregeln bör utgöras av vad motparten har fog att uppfatta som den förklarandes vilja.Mitt intryck av Svenssons avhandling är positivt. Jag menar dock att kritik kan riktas mot avhandlingen såväl på det metodologiska som på det materiella planet och jag kommer i det följande att ta upp några sådana punkter till diskussion. Vad beträffar menar jag att Svensson, vilket försvårar bedömningen av hans arbete. För det första säger han väldigt lite om vad arbetet syftar till, hur han tänker gå tillväga, om eventuella problem som är förknippade med hans tillvägagångsätt osv. Sålunda förklarar han inte varför vi behöver en analys av viljeförklaringsbegreppet, vad det innebär att explicera ett juridiskt begrepp, vad det innebär att utgå från viljeförklaringsteorin, hur viljeförklaringsbegreppet förhåller sig till rättshandlingsbegreppet metodologi inte lägger ned tillräckligt med energi på att förklara och försvara de val han gör och kompetensbegreppet eller varför avhandlingen hör hemma i den allmänna rättsläran och inte i civilrätten.Det krävs enligt min mening att frågor som dessa diskuteras i en doktorsavhandling i allmän rättslära - det minsta man kan begära är att författaren ger en kort förklaring till varför han inte säger någonting om dessa frågor. För det andra förklarar han inte varför han bestämmer begreppen "viljeförklaring" och "viljeförklarings innehåll" som han gör, något som påtagligt försvårar läsarens utvärdering av hans förslag.
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| 16467. |
- Spaak, Torben
(författare)
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Phililp Sopher, The Ethics of Deference, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 189 pages, ISBN 0-521-81047-7
- 2006
-
Ingår i: Theoria. - Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell. - 1755-2567 .- 0040-5825. ; 72:2, s. 138-147
-
Recension (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Philip Soper maintains (i) that law does not claim moral authority but has it, and (ii) that the moral authority that law has can be analyzed in terms of a general duty to defer to the normative views of others. In advancing (i), he goes against certain contemporary legal theorists, who maintain that law claims moral authority but does not have it; in advancing (ii), he offers a novel approach to the old problem of political obligation. Soper’s focus in this book is on the problem of political obligation. He explains that his approach to this problem differs from other approaches, inter alia, in that the theory of deference he defends has broader scope – on Soper’s analysis, the obligation to obey the law is just a special case of the general duty to defer to the normative views of others – and is based on a study of the nature of law. I begin with a consideration of Soper’s views on the nature of law. I then comment on the theory of deference and its relation to Soper’s analysis of the nature of law.
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| 16468. |
- Spaak, Torben
(författare)
-
Rex Martin. A System of Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. VII+ 439pp.
- 1995
-
Ingår i: Theoria. - Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell. - 1755-2567 .- 0040-5825. ; 61:1, s. 80-94
-
Recension (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Professor Martin says in his brief introductory chapter that this is a philosophical book on rights, dealing with "their nature, justification, and systematic connection with other political concepts" (p. 1). This, of course, is true; but it is equally true to say that the overarching theme of the book is the justification of political authority (see, e.g., pp. 5 and 22). For the reason Martin offers an analysis of the concept of a right and of its connection with other political concepts, such as democratic institutions', the right to issue rules', allegiance', and the practice of punishment', is that he aims at an internal justification of political authority, that is, a justification grounded in a certain background system of political concepts and institutions. Martin's approach is decidedly holistic, or, perhaps, systematic, in that he continually stresses the systematic connections between the key concepts he discusses (see, e.g., pp. 4, 8, 21, 308 and 321). As he sees it, "the notion of a justified political authority is a systematic one, and the logic of its justification involves establishing systematic connections between [its] . . . elements" (p. 8). In this review, I consider Martin's effort to provide an internal justification of political authority, and his contention that rights are accredited ways of acting.
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| 16469. |
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| 16470. |
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