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| 54. |
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| 55. |
- García, Jorge H., 1972, et al.
(författare)
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Carbon Taxes
- 2021
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Ingår i: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Environmental Science. - : Oxford University Press.
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Economists argue that carbon taxation (and more generally carbon pricing) is the single most powerful way to combat climate change. Since this is so controversial, we need to explain it better, and to be precise, the efficiency gains are largest when the costs of abatement are strongly heterogeneous. This is often—but not always—the case. When it is not, standards can fill much the same role. To internalize the climate externality, economic efficiency calls for a global carbon tax (or price) that is equal to the global damage or the so-called social cost of carbon. However, equity considerations as well as existing geographical and sectoral differences in the effectiveness of carbon taxation at reducing emissions, suggest earlier implementation of relatively high taxation levels in some sectors or countries—for instance, among richer economies followed by a more gradual phase-in among low-income countries. The number of national and subnational carbon pricing policies that have been implemented around the world during the first years following the Paris Agreement of 2015 is significant. By 2020, these programs covered 22% of global emissions with an average carbon price (weighted by the share of emissions covered) of USD15/tCO and a maximum price of USD120/tCO The share of emissions covered by carbon pricing as well as carbon prices themselves are expected to consistently rise throughout the decade 2021–2030 and beyond. Many experts agree that the social cost of carbon is in the range USD40–100/tCO . Anti-climate lobbying, public opposition, and lack of understanding of the instrument are among the key challenges faced by carbon taxation. Opportunities for further expansion of carbon taxation lie in increased climate awareness, the communicative resources governments have to help citizens understand the logic behind carbon taxation, and earmarking of carbon tax revenues to address issues that are important to the public such as fairness.
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| 56. |
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| 58. |
- García, Jorge H., 1972, et al.
(författare)
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Which firms are more sensitive to public disclosure schemes for pollution control? Evidence from Indonesia's PROPER Program
- 2009
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Ingår i: Environmental Resource Economics. - 0924-6460. ; 42:2, s. 151-168
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper analyzes differences in firms’ responsiveness to PROPER, Indonesia’s public disclosure program for industrial pollution control. The overall effectiveness of this program at achieving emissions reductions and its low regulatory costs have earned it a good reputation around the world. PROPER had no deterrents or incentives other than those that arose indirectly from publicly disclosing information about the environmental performances of firms. We analyzed plant-level data to relate short- and longer-term environmental responses to facility characteristics. The results revealed that foreign-owned firms were consistently more likely to respond to the environmental rating scheme, compared to private domestic firms. This is a clear and important insight with consequences for a number of issues, such as understanding the pollution haven debate. Also, firms located in densely populated regions, particularly in Java, responded more positively to the public disclosure of PROPER ratings. The main observed effect was however given by the initial level of environmental performance of firms. Those firms that had bad environmental performance records felt pressure to improve, but if the initial abatement steps had already been taken, the incentives to improve further appeared to diminish.
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| 59. |
- Gerlagh, Reyer, et al.
(författare)
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Rio+20: Looking Back at 20 Years of Environmental and Resource Economics
- 2013
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 54:2, s. 155-159
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Twenty years on from the Rio '92 conference, we must face the fact that there have been a few successes but more failures. Scientific complexity, uncertainty, short-termism inherent in politics, the free-rider problem, and issues of fairness are part of the explanation for the lack of progress, but we point to more fundamental motivational problems. It is time to assess our responsibility as economists in the field of environment and resources. Our scientific contribution has been misleading because our models are structurally incapable of addressing major concerns. The cost-benefit test is not fit to assess large-scale resource conservation projects, including climate abatement. This understanding was already present during the Rio '92 summit, but the problems, while identified, have not been resolved twenty years later. The contribution from theory, through the sustainability paradigm of non-decreasing welfare, has turned out ineffective. It does not provide us with tools for designing a better future for our children. Instead, it risks choosing a constant welfare path, with knowledge increasing but natural resources deteriorating, while not properly analyzing the richer possibilities for a better future that nature and creativity imply. It is time for our profession to search for a more constructive contribution in theory and practice.
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| 60. |
- Green, Jessica, et al.
(författare)
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A balance of 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' in linking climate policies
- 2014
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Ingår i: Nature Climate Change. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1758-678X .- 1758-6798. ; 4:12, s. 1064-1067
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Top-down climate negotiations embodied by the Kyoto Protocol have all but stalled, chiefly because of disagreements over targets and objections to financial transfers. To avoid those problems, many have shifted their focus to linkage of bottom-up climate policies such as regional carbon markets. This approach is appealing, but we identify four obstacles to successful linkage: different levels of ambition; competing domestic policy objectives; objections to financial transfers; and the difficulty of close regulatory coordination. Even with a more decentralized approach, overcoming the ‘global warming gridlock’ of the intergovernmental negotiations will require close international coordination. We demonstrate how a balance of bottom-up and top-down elements can create a path toward an effective global climate architecture.
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