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Search: LAR1:lu > Peer-reviewed > Turkish

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  • Gezgin, Elif (author)
  • Türkiye'de Neoliberal Devletin İnşa ve Muhafazasında Çanakkale Savaşı Söyleminin Rolü Üzerine Bir Tartışma
  • 2019
  • In: İdealkent: Journal of Urban Studies. - 1307-9905. ; 10:26, s. 340-373
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • Extended AbstractIn this paper, I examine why the Gallipoli War narrative has become increasingly important in the discourse of the JDP (Justice and Development Party) governments over the last two decades, and how this visible tendency is related to the construction and protection of the neoliberal government in Turkey. I frame the discussion by utilizing Loïc Wacquant’s concept of the “centaur state” and focus on how Gallipoli narratives meet the requirements of the neoliberal order in contemporary Turkey. I argue that in the Turkish case, there is an ideological incarceration, in addition to incarceration, which helps the centaur state to obtain and protect its legitimacy. The Gallipoli War narrative acts as a significant historical reference to enable this current ideological incarceration of Turkish society, specifically by: i) supporting anti-Western ideologies; ii) creating enemies; and iii) providing political support for the dominant regime. Like many other countries, Turkey since the 1980s has suffered the devastating effects of neoliberalism, especially in respect of labor rights and working conditions. This process served to gradually diminish the living conditions of lower- and working-class citizens. Over the course of the last two decades in Turkey, this trajectory has been exacerbated by more aggressive privatizations and harsher deregulations. Currently, these developments have resulted in a deeply unequal distribution of resources alongside a shift in the political regime and an economic crisis. In such an atmosphere, where the centaur state has been ‘fatherly’ pampering the upper classes and ill-treating the lower classes, one of the government’s priorities has been to control the lower-class masses and to keep them under constant surveillance. Against this background, I analyze the functions of the Gallipoli War narrative. I seek to answer my research question by studying a local case and drawing on the scholarship on neoliberalism, as well as interrogating the relationship between the power relations and the way history is passed down from one generation to the next and from the state to the public. Populist discourses, which appeal to the emotions of the majority or mainstream, play a significant role in the construction and protection of neoliberal governments. Historical narratives are vital elements in this respect and they always come to the rescue while shaping these populist discourses in accordance with the expectations and requirements of the dominant regimes. The Gallipoli War narrative is significant in a variety of ways in the context of contemporary Turkey. First of all, the narrative forms a very fruitful ground on which to build up anti-Western sentiment. Considering the growing power of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in recent decades, we see that this ideological perspective is intertwined with and gaining strength from the historical feeling of being under threat from Western powers. The Gallipoli narrative perfectly taps into these feelings as clear proof of the historical existence of this threat. It simultaneously reinforces the sense of being under threat and evokes pan-Islamist sentiments. Like all authoritarian regimes, the current government in Turkey seeks to govern in a way that creates a climate of fear, which sends ripples through society. Creating enemies is also important in this respect – especially in times of crisis. The nationalist and Islamist spirit – empowered by ‘Çanakkale spirit’ – does not just target the West per se; it also attacks opposition groups/political parties, academics, journalists, and intellectuals who are frequently labeled as ‘servants of the West’, ‘spies of the West’, or ‘mon chers’. Such anger and rage – that is reinforced by the invocation of the Gallipoli narrative – is politically useful on three counts. First, it helps to criticize and repel opponents while legitimizing the practices of the state of emergency (at the same time targeting academics, journalists, etc.). Second, it creates an atmosphere of imminent threat, which puts citizens on the lookout for an attack by external powers or the latter’s co-conspirators within (who constitute the regime’s internal scapegoats). As a result of this typical paranoid style of politics – which permeates society with the conditions of a police state – frightened masses seek out powerful leaders – those who are willing to defend them against all these enemies. As a result, the masses unequivocally support such figures and regimes for the sake of stability. Third, this discourse is useful for creating and strengthening alternative discourses that serve to absolve the government of any responsibility for the country’s economic crisis. Stressing that all these economic problems are merely part of a game that the West plays with our country both relieves the government of taking responsibility for its neoliberal policies and deceives the masses about the structural problems related to the economic crisis.Another role of the Gallipoli War narrative is to act as a tool to provide political support to the dominant regime. There has been a kind of discursive battle over the Gallipoli War, which has emerged between supporters of the Turkish secular/Kemalist groups and those of the current conservative government. The war was presented to society as a chiefly secular struggle and as a complementary part of today’s Republican ideology; today, it is presented as a religious struggle and as a complementary part of an unfinished story of the great Ottoman power in a pan-Islamist mode. In the contemporary context, the war is served as a kind of jihad of Muslims instead of one of the first victories of Mustafa Kemal, which opened the way to a secular Turkish Republic. This kind of religious narration of the Gallipoli War clearly supports the image of the president and the JDP’s conservative regime (similarly to how the same war’s secular narrative was used to support the image of the Kemalist regime in the past). A careful analysis of news, promotional online videos, and the electoral speeches of Erdoğan (which were used for the JDP’s electioneering campaigns and campaigns during the presidential elections) clearly demonstrates that the Gallipoli War narrative features prominently in such campaigns.All in all, this paper argues that the way in which the neoliberal government achieves domination in Turkey is not just limited to the extension of the penal state and incarceration. It also happens through a kind of ideological incarceration of the society, by constructing discourses with the help of historical narratives – like the Gallipoli War. This war narrative –which reinforces nationalist, conservative, and militarist states of mind – is an inevitable part of this ideological incarceration as religion and nationalism – as the country’s main building blocks – are easily fused together under the umbrella of this narrative. Thus, they garner consent and support from society up to the required standard, despite the extremely volatile conditions that would otherwise have the potential to create civil disorder. As such, the Gallipoli War narrative becomes one of the most important sources for the government in order to meet the requirements of building both religious and nationalist citizens who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the continuity of the state (and of capital) and ignore the state’s role in the daily economic and social challenges they face. Fueling rage and fear in these populist discourses misleads society and distracts the public’s attention, and as a result, society continues to give consent to the authoritarian regime which works hand in hand with the market economy and serves the interests of particular lobbying groups (most of which have connections with members of the government). In this atmosphere, whereby the masses are kept under ideological and authoritarian control, the only “trouble-making” groups left are journalists, academics, and other intellectuals who have the potential to break the silence, unveil the illusions, and force the government to fix the problems rather than creating and targeting enemies. In response to this threat, the neoliberal penal state in Turkey mostly targets these groups instead of directly imprisoning the poor. It severs Turkish society’s connection to the outer world by preventing people from accessing alternative news and information sources, thereby ensuring the sustainability of the ideological incarceration of the society. What is ironic in this scene is how conservatism, nationalism, and anti-Western strategies are utilized as mechanisms to protect a cruel, neoliberal order, which derives from the West and merely serves global – that is, international – powers.
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  • Result 1-6 of 6
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