| 1. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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Optimal income taxation and social norms in the Labor market
- 2010
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In: International Tax and Public Finance. - : Springer. - 0927-5940 .- 1573-6970. ; 17:1, s. 67-89
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.
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| 2. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-
(author)
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Welfare measurement, green accounting and distortionary taxes
- 2011
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In: Green national accounting and sustainability. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing. - 9781848446915 - 1848446918 ; , s. 630-652
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper concerns welfare measurement in the presence of distortionary taxes. One purpose is to explain why the traditional green NNP measure fails as a welfare indicator when distortionary taxes are present. Another is to derive a green NNP analogue in a second best environment. In the second best optimum, the efficiency cost of taxation will affect both the form of the national welfare measure and the proper principles of accounting for pollution.
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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An introduction to the theory of social accounting
- 2010
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In: Handbook of environmental accounting. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing. - 9781847203847 - 9781849805704 ; , s. 1-27
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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An optimal tax approach to alcohol policy
- 2010
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In: Finanzarchiv. - : Mohr Siebeck. - 0015-2218 .- 1614-0974. ; 66:2, s. 153-169
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported, or produced illegally. Border trade alone implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities that are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. The income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. Furthermore, although the effects of adding illegal production are ambiguous in general, a realistic outcome is, nevertheless, that it reduces both the optimal alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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National product related welfare measures in the presence of technological change, externalities and uncertainty
- 2011
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In: Green national accounting and sustainability. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing. - 9781848446915 - 1848446918 ; , s. 178-189
-
Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The purpose of this paper is to discuss under what conditions welfare can be measured by observables related to the national product (or Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory). Under nonattributable technological or environmental change, welfare will depend on time itself, meaning that the Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory will be a biased measure of welfare. This result will also hold if we make the time dependence of welfare endogenous, by replacing technological change will externalities that are not internalized during optimization. On the other hand, if we take the externalities fully into account, then the Hamiltonian will represent the appropriate measure of welfare. Similar results also hold in the case of uncertainty, where we show that a ‘generalized’ Hamiltonian provides a welfare measure, and that the deterministic measures are special cases of their stochastic counterparts.
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| 8. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-
(author)
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Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism
- 2010
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In: Regional Science and Urban Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0166-0462 .- 1879-2308. ; 40:4, s. 187-195
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision under asymmetric information, which are here ingredients of a policy-problem facing each member state (nation) of an economic federation with decentralized leadership. Each member state is assumed to have its own redistributive policy and pattern of public consumption, whereas the federal level redistributes (ex-post) between the member states. The results show how and why federal ex-post redistribution may modify the use of income taxation and public good provision at the national level, relative to the policy outcome in the absence of a federal government, as well as how the national policy incentives depend on whether or not the federal government uses distortionary taxes.
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| 9. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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Optimal tax progression : does it matter whether wage bargaining is decentralized or centralized?
- 2011
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Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- We study how the optimal use of labor income tax progression depends on whether the wage bargaining system is decentralized or centralized. Assuming a nonlinear labor income tax and an unrestricted profit tax, we show that a Utilitarian government is able to implement the first best resource allocation with a zero marginal labor income tax rate under decentralized wage bargaining, whereas centralized bargaining typically implies a progressive tax as well as unemployment. However, if the government and a (central) wage-setter bargain over wage formation and public policy, the resulting equilibrium is characterized by full employment and a zero marginal tax rate.
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| 10. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(author)
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Positional concerns in an OLG model : optimal labor and capital income taxation
- 2010
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In: International Economic Review. - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0020-6598 .- 1468-2354. ; 51:4, s. 1071-1095
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two-type OLG model when individuals' relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low-ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within-generation and upward comparisons.
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