| 11. |
- Balafoutas, L., et al.
(författare)
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Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a natural experiment
- 2012
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Ingår i: Kyklos. - 1467-6435. ; 65:4, s. 425-441
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many tournaments are plagued by sabotage among competitors. Typically, sabotage is welfare-reducing, but from an individual's perspective an attractive alternative to exerting positive effort. Yet, given its illegal and often immoral nature, sabotage is typically hidden, making it difficult to assess its extent and its victims. Therefore, we use data from Judo World Championships, where a rule change in 2009 basically constituted a natural experiment that introduced one costless opportunity for sabotage. In Judo, competitors can break an opponent's attack in an unsportsmanlike manner; these are seen as acts of sabotage. Based on a unique dataset of 1,422 fights, we find that the rule change in 2009 has led to a large increase in the use of sabotage. Moreover, sabotage is more likely to be employed by relatively less qualified individuals, and to be targeted at more qualified ones. From a survey among spectators, we show that sabotage is welfare reducing.
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| 12. |
- Balafoutas, L., et al.
(författare)
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What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods
- 2013
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Ingår i: The Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527. ; 80:3, s. 876-891
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behaviour by sellers. This article presents a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on significantly longer detours, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage points. Passengers' perceived income seems to have no effect on fraud.
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| 13. |
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| 14. |
- Beck, Adrian, et al.
(författare)
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Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.
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| 15. |
- Beck, A., et al.
(författare)
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Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options
- 2013
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256. ; 81, s. 145-164
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expertʼs behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path. Experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of (i) but fail to confirm (ii).
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| 16. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Household decision making and the influence of spouses’ income, education, and communist party membership: A field experiment in rural China
- 2009
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We find that spouses’ individual risk preferences are more similar the richer the household and the higher the wife’s relative income contribution. A couple’s joint decision is typically determined by the husband, but women who contribute relatively more to the household income, women in high-income households, women with more education than their husbands, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on the joint decision.
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| 17. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Household Decision Making in Rural China: Using Experiments to Estimate the Influences of Spouses
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. This raises the question about spouses’ relative influence on joint decisions and the determinants of relative influence. Using a controlled experiment (on inter-temporal choice), we let each spouse first make individual decisions and then make joint decisions with the other spouse. We use a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. In general, husbands have a stronger influence than wives. However, in richer households and when the wife is older than the husband, we find a significantly stronger influence of the wife on joint decisions.
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| 18. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Household decision making in rural China: Using experiments to estimate the influences of spouses
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 84:2, s. 525-536
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. Running an experiment on intertemporal choice, we investigate the relative influence of spouses on joint household decisions. We let each spouse first decide individually and then jointly with the other spouse. We propose the use of a random parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. We find that joint choices are in between husbands' and wives' choices with respect to impatience, indicating that both spouses have an influence on joint decisions. However, we estimate that in 99% of households husbands have a stronger influence than wives.
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| 19. |
- Carlsson, Fredrik, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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The influence of spouses on household decision making under risk: An experiment in rural China
- 2013
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - 1386-4157. ; 16, s. 383-401
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately and then jointly. We find that spouses' individual risk preferences are more similar the richer the household and the higher the wife's relative income contribution. A couple's joint decision is typically very similar to the husband's preferences, but women who contribute relatively more to the household income, women in high-income households, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on the joint decision.
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| 20. |
- Charness, Gary, et al.
(författare)
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Groups make better self-interested decisions
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Perspectives. - : American Economic Association. - 0895-3309. ; 26:3, s. 157-176
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less "behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation.
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