| 26021. |
- Coe, Anna-Britt, 1967-, et al.
(author)
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Youth politics as multiple processes : how teenagers construct political action in Sweden
- 2016
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In: Journal of Youth Studies. - : Routledge. - 1367-6261 .- 1469-9680. ; 19:10, s. 1321-1337
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Alternative approaches to power in youth politics are needed to overcome the conceptual dichotomy between youth political action that is either linked to – or delinked from – state institutions. This paper offers an alternative drawn from a study that sought to empirically explore, and build theory upon, how teenagers construct their political action. Our qualitative study among 10 activists aged between 17 and 19 in a medium-size city in Northern Sweden found that youth constructed their political action as four different processes: moving from consciousness to action, moving from personal experience to shared goals, moving from social activities to political activities, and moving from single to multiple arenas. We integrated these processes in the concept Youth Politics as Multiple Processes. Youth efforts to bring about these processes were not always fruitful because, as their political action gained complexity, youth faced greater constraints for recognizing, addressing and challenging power from age-based exclusion, state-centered definitions of politics, and adult disinterest in youth demands. According to our findings, youth constructed political action based in an approach to power that was not state-centered. We linked our findings to youth politics research and social movement theory that similarly proposed alternative approaches to power.
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| 26022. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Against Computational Perspectivalism
- 2021
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In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0007-0882 .- 1464-3537. ; 72:4, s. 1129-1153
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Computational perspectivalism has been recently proposed as an alternative to mainstream accounts of physical computation, and especially to the teleologically-based mechanistic view. It takes physical computation to be partly dependent on explanatory perspectives and eschews appeal to teleology in helping individuate computational systems. I assess several varieties of computational perspectivalism, showing that they either collapse into existing non-perspectival views or end up with unsatisfactory or implausible accounts of physical computation. Computational perspectivalism fails, therefore, to be a compelling alternative to perspective-independent theories of computation in physical systems. I conclude that a teleologically-based, non-perspectival mechanistic account of physical computation is to be preferred.
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| 26023. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Are There Teleological Functions to Compute?
- 2019
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In: Philosophy of science (East Lansing). - : Cambridge University Press. - 0031-8248 .- 1539-767X. ; 86:3, s. 431-452
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- I analyze a tension at the core of the mechanistic view of computation generated by its joint commitment to the medium independence of computational vehicles and to computational systems possessing teleological functions to compute. While computation is individuated in medium-independent terms, teleology is sensitive to the constitutive physical properties of vehicles. This tension spells trouble for the mechanistic view, suggesting that there can be no teleological functions to compute. I argue that, once considerations about the relevant function-bestowing factors for computational systems are brought to bear, the tension dissolves: physical systems can have the teleological function to compute.
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| 26024. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne
- 2015
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In: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:3, s. 687-699
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content. Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and desires: I will use the expression ‘representational content’ to refer to it. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. I claim that neo-Cartesians can, on the one hand, help account for the nature of representational content and clarify what makes representational states contentful. On the other, besides explaining the natural origins of Ur-intentionality, neo-Cartesians should also take the role of accounting for the natural origins of contentful states that fall short of beliefs and desires. Finally, I argue that the only alternative for the authors is to embrace some form of non-representationalism, as Hutto elsewhere does. The success of the proposal thereby turns on the fate of the radical non-representationalist position that it accompanies.
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| 26025. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri, et al.
(author)
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Conceptual Combinations - Benchmark Task for BIG-Bench
- 2021
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Other publication (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This is a task accepted in July 2021 as part of Google’s “Beyond the Imitation Game collaborative benchmark for measuring and extrapolating the capabilities of language models”. It is published at https://github.com/google/BIG-bench/tree/main/bigbench/benchmark_tasks/conceptual_combinations. Links to the collection of queries are below, followed by the ReadMe file that explains the task, its justification, and its performance with existing AI language models.
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| 26026. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Content Pragmatism Defended
- 2017
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In: Topoi. - : Springer. - 0167-7411 .- 1572-8749. ; 39:1, s. 103-113
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken across the conceptual landscape: robust realism, primitivism, and eliminativism. Recently, a fourth alternative that tries to avoid the shortcomings of traditional views has been proposed: content pragmatism. My aim is to defend pragmatism about content against some recent objections moved against the view. According to these objections, content pragmatism (a) fails to capture the role played by representation in the cognitive sciences; and/or (b) is an unstable view that ends up collapsing into one of the traditional alternatives. I argue that those arguments fail. I show that content pragmatism has as much claim to descriptive adequacy as the traditional theories. Moreover, I defend the robustness of the view by arguing that it does not collapse into any of the traditional positions. Content pragmatism therefore offers a valid and coherent account of the nature of representational content.
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| 26027. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science
- 2021
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In: Mind and language. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0268-1064 .- 1468-0017.
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, while keeping allegiance to realism.
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| 26028. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
-
Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: the proper way of seeing the mechanistic view of concrete computation
- 2017
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In: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 195:8, s. 3477-3497
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- I examine a major objection to the mechanistic view of concrete computation, stemming from an apparent tension between the abstract nature of computational explanation and the tenets of the mechanistic framework: while computational explanation is medium-independent, the mechanistic framework insists on the importance of providing some degree of structural detail about the systems target of the explanation. I show that a common reply to the objection, i.e. that mechanistic explanation of computational systems involves only weak structural constraints, is not enough to save the standard mechanistic view of computation—it trivialises the appeal to mechanism, and thus makes the account collapse into a purely functional view. I claim, however, that the objection can be put to rest once the account is appropriately amended: computational individuation is indeed functional, while mechanistic explanation plays a role in accounting for computational implementation. Since individuation and implementation are crucial elements in a satisfying account of computation in physical systems, mechanism keeps its central importance in the theory of concrete computation. Finally, I argue that my version of the mechanistic view helps to provide a convincing reply to a powerful objection against non-semantic theories of concrete computation: the argument from the multiplicity of computations.
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| 26029. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
(author)
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Intelligent Behaviour
- 2024
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In: Erkenntnis. - : Springer. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420. ; 89:2, s. 705-721
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The notion of intelligence is relevant to several fields of research, including cognitive and comparative psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, among others. However, there is little agreement within and across these fields on how to characterise and explain intelligence. I put forward a behavioural, operational characterisation of intelligence that can play an integrative role in the sciences of intelligence, as well as preserve the distinctive explanatory value of the notion, setting it apart from the related concepts of cognition and rationality. Finally, I examine a popular hypothesis about the underpinnings of intelligence: the capacity to manipulate internal representations of the environment. I argue that the hypothesis needs refinement, and that so refined, it applies only to some forms of intelligence.
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| 26030. |
- Coelho Mollo, Dimitri, et al.
(author)
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The formats of cognitive representation : a computational account
- 2023
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In: Philosophy of science (East Lansing). - : Cambridge University Press. - 0031-8248 .- 1539-767X.
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
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