| 31. |
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| 32. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Psychological pressure in competitive environments: New evidence from randomized natural experiments
- 2012
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Ingår i: Management Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 58:8, s. 1585-1591
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Dynamic competitive settings may create psychological pressure when feedback about the performance of competitors is provided before the end of the competition. Such psychological pressure could produce a first-mover advantage, despite a priori equal winning probabilities. Using data from a randomized natural experiment—penalty shootouts in soccer—we reexamine evidence by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta [Apesteguia J, Palacios-Huerta I (2010) Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(5):2548–2564]. They report a 21-percentage-point advantage for first movers over second movers in terms of winning probabilities. Extending their sample of 129 shootouts to 540, we fail to detect any significant first-mover advantage. Our results are fully consistent with recent evidence from other sports contests.
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| 33. |
- Kocker, Martin G., et al.
(författare)
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Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment: Comment
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (forthcoming) report for a sample of 129 shootouts from various seasons in ten different competitions that teams kicking first in soccer penalty shootouts win significantly more often than teams kicking second. Collecting data for the entire history of six major soccer competitions we cannot replicate their result. Teams kicking first win only 53.4% of 262 shootouts in our data, which is not significantly different from random. Our findings have two implications: (1) Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta’s results are not generally robust. (2) Using specific subsamples without a coherent criterion for data selection might lead to non-representative findings.
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| 34. |
- Lindner, F., et al.
(författare)
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Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game
- 2013
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 120:3, s. 542-545
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to that in equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game. (C) 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 35. |
- Maciejovsky, B., et al.
(författare)
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Teams make you smarter: How exposure to teams improves individual decisions in probability and reasoning tasks
- 2013
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Ingår i: Management science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 59:6, s. 1255-1270
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Many important decisions are routinely made by transient and temporary teams, which perform their duty and disperse. Team members often continue making similar decisions as individuals. We study how the experience of team decision making affects subsequent individual decisions in two seminal probability and reasoning tasks, the Monty Hall problem and the Wason selection task. Both tasks are hard and involve a general rule, thus allowing for knowledge transfers, and can be embedded in the context of markets that offer identical incentives to teams and individuals. Our results show that teams trade closer to the rational level, learn the solution faster, and achieve this with weaker, less specific performance feedback than individuals. Most importantly, we observe significant knowledge transfers from team decision making to subsequent individual performances that take place up to five weeks later, indicating that exposure to team decision making has strong positive spillovers on the quality of individual decisions.
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| 36. |
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