| 91. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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Vad är begreppsanalys?
- 1980
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Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift. - 0348-7482. ; 1, s. 30-42
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 92. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945, et al.
(författare)
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Var sitter minnet?
- 2012
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Ingår i: Kognitionsvetenskap [J. Allwood och M. Jensen (red)]. - Lund : Studentlitteratur. - 9789144051666 ; , s. 203-218
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Detta kapitel handlar om hur minnet, i dess olika former, är förankrat i hjärnan. Först förmedlas några grundläggande fakta om neuroner (nervceller) och de signaler som neuroner skickar och tar emot. Sedan sammanfattas en del av de senaste decenniernas forskning om synaptisk plasticitet, det vill säga förändringar i effektiviteten hos nervcellernas förbindelser. Några fakta från den kliniska neurologin och psykiatrin av relevans för vår förståelse av minnets bas i hjärnan refereras. Till sist diskuteras i vilken mening, och i vilken mån, som olika former av minne kan sägas vara ”lokaliserade”.
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| 93. |
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| 94. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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Vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet – begreppens möjliga innebörder : Science and proven experience – possible meanings of the concepts
- 2011
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Ingår i: Svenska Läkaresällskapets och Svenska Läkarförbundets gemensamma etikdag, 2011-11-07.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Vad är vetenskap, och vad har den med beprövad erfarenhet att göra? Annan beprövad erfarenhet – hur skiljer den sig från och hur liknar den vetenskap? Två skilda betydelser av ”erfarenhet”. Perceptuell inlärning och intuitiv kunskap. Praktisk kunskap och ”läkekonst”. Är kritisk, vetenskaplig prövning av alla dessa moment är möjlig? Kan en åtgärd vara oförenlig med vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet? – etikens roll.
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| 95. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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What is Not a Disorder of Consciousness?
- 2014
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Ingår i: XVI World Congress of the World Psychiatry Association, Madrid 14–18 sept 2014.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In few areas is the lack of communication between psychiatrists, neurologists and philosophers more evident than in the classification of disorders or disturbances of consciousness. In the tradition of classical psychopathology (Jaspers 1913), two major kinds of such disorders are often distinguished: 1. lowering of consciousness as in coma, obtundation/somnolence and related states, and 2. clouding of consciousness as in delirium or confusional states. The terms “lowering” and “clouding” are far from always used, or used in this way, but the same or a very similar conceptual distinction is made by a majority of authors. Today’s neurological science focuses strongly on the first kind, lowering of consciousness. Psychiatrists, on the other hand, usually do not show any great interest in the states related to the coma–wakefulness dimension and tend to be more familiar with delirium and confusion. Finally, philosophers and philosophically minded scientists may be bewildered by the idea that only some kinds of psychopathology should be classified as disorders or disturbances of consciousness. Do not all psychiatric ailments lead to some disturbance of the patient’s consciousness (cf. Zeman 2008)? However, few psychiatrists or neurologists are willing to classify all psychiatric disorders as disorders of consciousness; Henri Ey (1963, 1978) is one exception. This poster is an attempt to clarify the conceptual situation.
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| 96. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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Why Husserl’s ’retention’ is not a form of memory
- 2004
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Ingår i: Time, Memory and History: 7th International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychopathology. Heidelberg, September 23-26, 2004.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper presents and discusses some conceptual, phenomenological and neuropsychological arguments pertaining to the issue whether the phenomenon which Husserl names ”retention” is a kind of memory, or if it is rather a kind of retroactive perception. My conclusion is that retention is a direct perception of a temporally extended and mainly past event, i.e., it is a kind of perception of the past. A structurally similar argument is then presented for the case of protention. It is argued that a human being often apprehends her own action plans in a phenomenologically direct act, which is a direct perception of the future in all respects except that it is not caused by the future event which is its object.
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| 97. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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Why the past is sometimes perceived and not only remembered
- 2004
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Ingår i: Eighth International Conference on Cognitive and Neural Systems, Boston, May 18-23, 2004.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper first advances and discusses the hypothesis that so-called “iconic” or (for the auditory sphere) “echoic” memory is actually a form of perception of the past. Such perception is made possible by parallel inputs with differential delays which feed independently into the sensorium. This hypothesis goes well together with a set of related psychological and phenomenological facts, as for example: Sperling’s results about the visual sensory buffer, the facts that we seem to see movement and hear temporal Gestalts, and the fact that we sometimes seem to hear sounds only after they have stopped. In it most simple form, and formulated in the somewhat misleading information processing idiom, my hypothesis says that each one of a number of parallel input lines with different delays feeds into a spatially separate sensory unit. The set of such units then holds information about the immediate past in what one might call a “chronotopic” sensory map. This contrasts with the idea (common in sensory buffer theory) that the received sensory information is kept (while possibly decaying) in the same unit for some time after it occurred. The hypothesis also contradicts the theory that all sensory information passes through the same unit but is then successively passed through a unidirectional chain of separate units, where the past experiences then become represented (the shift register hypothesis). The main advantage of my theory, beside the natural explanations it offers for the above-mentioned kind of phenomena, is that it postulates a parallel – and therefore robust – rather than a serial mechanism for the registering of temporal information. It can of course easily be modified to fit more complex models of the sensory cerebral code(s) as well as of the chronotopic representation as such. In the second part of my poster, I advance a corresponding hypothesis for those motor commands which control brief movements. At closer inspection, most so-called “ballistic” movements do not seem to be truly ballistic (in the sense in which the movement of a cannonball is so) since the brain must exert some kind of feedforward control over the later part of their trajectory. I suggest that this control is at least sometimes realized by means of differentially delayed output from a chronotopic representation of successive segments of the movement. Not only could this be a biologically natural way of ensuring efficient adaptability of the movement; the hypothesis also explains the not uncommon experience of “seeing the whole movement laid out in advance” when it is initiated.
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| 98. |
- Malmgren, Helge, 1945
(författare)
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Without a proper definition, you do not see the phenomenon
- 1997
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Ingår i: Consciousness and its pathologies. San Diego, CA, May 17-18, 1997.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- At the beginning of the century, pioneer psychiatrists in the classical German school (Kraepelin, Bonhoeffer) had established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a certain organic mental syndrome or “reaction form”, variously named “Reizbare Schwäche” (irritable weakness) or “Emotionell-hyperaestetisches Schwächezustand” (emotional-hypersensitive weakness state). This reaction form is typically manifested by concentration difficulties, mental fatiguability, secondary memory disturbances, irritability and emotional lability. The term “astheno-emotional disorder” (AED) has recently been suggested. Patients showing this constellation of symptoms are very common in all parts of organic psychiatry, for example after moderate trauma to the brain, in chronic intoxications, in certain chronic infectious states, in endocrine disorders, as the initial manifestation of a brain tumour, after an intracranial bleeding, and so on. Mild forms of the same disorder are sometimes met with in which no organic cause can be found but where the patient has instead suffered great mental stress. The condition usually affects the patients’ ability to work and is often socially handicapping. In spite of the importance of AED, and in spite of its being well-known to most practitioners in each of the separate areas where it occurs, academic psychiatry has displayed very little interest in the condition during the last 40 years, and the major diagnostic systems of today do not allow for a unitary classification of these cases. For example, in DSM-IV a certain share of the mild cases would receive the diagnosis “mild cognitive disorder”, which would however fit neither mild cases with dominating emotional lability nor any of the (equally common) more severe cases. In this paper, I suggest the following causes of the present situation concerning the diagnosis of AED: (1) The astheno-emotional syndrome is often complicated by secondary, psychogenic reactions such as anxiety, feelings of tension and depressive mood, which can be difficult to disentangle from the primary symptoms. Many earlier classificatory attempts in this area (often in terms of “neurasthenia”) stumbled on a failure to distinguish the primary from the secondary symptoms. (2) The fact that the primary symptoms can themselves be psychogenic in nature, and the fact that the etiology cannot always be known for certain, entail that the disorder has to be delimited without recourse to causes. Many systems instead prefer seperate diagnoses for psychogenic cases. (3) Clinically, cases of AED form a continuum, ranging from very mild disturbances without clinical import to severe disturbances justifying a global diagnosis of dementia. Most diagnostic systems of today do not allow for such large-scale gradations of the severity of a disorder. (4) The conceptual apparatus which is used to describe symptoms is often too coarse to be able to distinguish typical symptoms of AED from similar symptoms which do not belong to this disorder. A clear examples of this is “memory difficulties”, which can refer either to a primary memory disturbance of the kind seen in Korsakov’s amnestic disorder or to secondary effects of concentration difficulties, as in mild AED. Another example is the term “emotional disturbance”, which does not differentiate between the emotional flattening typically seen in severe frontolimbic injuries and the emotional instability which is very common in AED. (5) The operationalistic bias in several recent systems of psychiatric classification prohibits hypothetical diagnoses based on knowledge of the interaction between different psychiatric disorders. From longitudinal studies of patients it is clear that the emotional lability and the manifest fatiguability of a patient with AED can both be completely neutralized if the same patient also suffers an emotional flattening. This means that the diagnosis of AED cannot be completely operationalized in terms of present symptoms. (6) The isolation of different parts of organic psychiatry from each other and from general psychiatry implies that few psychiatrists have a sufficiently broad experience to see the full spectrum of AED.
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| 99. |
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| 100. |
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