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| 2. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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The Standard Deviation of Life-Length, Retirement Incentives, and Optimal Pension Design
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we consider how the retirement age as well as a tax financed pension system ought to respond to a change in the standard deviation of the length of life. In a first best framework, where a benevolent government exercises perfect control over the individuals’ labor supply and retirement-decisions, the results show that a decrease in the standard deviation of life-length leads to an increase in the optimal retirement age and vice versa, if the preferences for “the number of years spent in retirement” are characterized by constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. A similar result follows in a second best setting, where the government raises revenue via a proportional tax (or pension fee) to finance a lump-sum benefit per year spent in retirement. We consider two versions of this model, one with a mandatory retirement age decided upon by the government and the other where the retirement age is a private decision-variable.
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| 3. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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Vad är optimal beskattning?
- 2010
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Ingår i: Framtider. - 0281-0492. ; :3, s. 18-21
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Hur tar man in skatter utan att det nämnvärt påverkar individernas ochföretagens agerande? Artikeln handlar om optimal beskattning som en vägatt skapa skatteintäkter för att finansiera omfördelningen till samhälletsbehövande – utan att samhällsekonomin störs. Ekonomerna ThomasAronsson, Spencer Bastani och Sören Blomquist presenterar forskningsfältetoch diskuterar samspelet mellan inkomstskatter och varuskatter.
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| 4. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Vad är optimal beskattning
- 2010
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Ingår i: Framtider. - Stockholm : Institutet för framtidsstudier. - 0281-0492. ; 3, s. 18-21
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 5. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Where Should the Eldery Live and Who Should Pay for Their Care?
- 2010
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Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley. - 0347-0520 .- 1467-9442. ; 112:2, s. 289-314
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons; elderly care is publicly provided. There is one big city, where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work, and a number of small villages. We show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees, and we characterize the second-best solution. Decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages.
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| 6. |
- Bastani, Spencer, et al.
(författare)
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Public Provision of Private Goods, Tagging and Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogeneity in Needs
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Previous literature has shown that public provision of private goods can be a welfareenhancing device in second-best settings where governments pursue redistributive goals. However, three issues have so far been neglected. First, the case for supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with public provision of private goods has been made in models where agents dier only in terms of market ability. Second, the magnitude of the welfare gains achievable through public provision schemes has not been assessed. Third, the similarities/dierences between public provision schemes and tagging schemes have not been thoroughly analyzed. Our purpose in this paper is therefore threefold: rst, to extend previous contributions by incorporating in the theoretical analysis both heterogeneity in market ability and in the need for the publicly provided good; second, to perform numerical simulations to quantify the size of the potential welfare gains achievableby introducing a public provision scheme, and to characterize the conditions under which these welfare gains are sizeable; nally, to compare the welfare gains from public provision with the welfare gains from tagging.
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| 7. |
- Bastani, Spencer, et al.
(författare)
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The Welfare Gains of Age Related Optimal Income Taxation
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Blomquist, Sören, et al.
(författare)
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Marginal Deadweight Loss when the Income Tax is Nonlinear
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Almost all theoretical work on how to calculate the marginal deadweight loss has been done for linear taxes and for variations in linear budget constraints. This is quite surprising since most income tax systems are nonlinear, generating nonlinear budget constraints. Instead of developing the proper procedure to calculate the marginal deadweight loss for variations in nonlinear income taxes a common procedure has been to linearize the nonlinear budget constraint and apply methods that are correct for variations in a linear income tax. Such a procedure leads to incorrect results. The main purpose of this paper is to show how to correctly calculate the marginal deadweight loss when the income tax is nonlinear. A second purpose is to evaluate the bias in results that obtains when the traditional linearization procedure is used. We perform calculations based on the 2006 US tax system and find that the relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is large but less than half of Feldstein’s (1999) estimates for the 1994 tax system.
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| 10. |
- Blomquist, Sören, et al.
(författare)
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Hourly wage rate and taxable labor income responsiveness to changes in marginal tax rates
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 94:11-12, s. 878-889
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recently, a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an important field in empirical public economics. However, to a large extent it is still unknown how the hourly wage rate, an important component of taxable income, reacts to changes in marginal tax rates. In this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that took place in Sweden during the 1980s to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate as well as the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate. We also estimate elasticities with respect to the non-labor income in a way that is novel in the literature. While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates we find a statistically significant response in wage rates both among married men and women. The estimates of the hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate fall in the range of 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 for females, whereas the corresponding taxable labor income elasticity estimates hover between 0.19-0.21 for males and 0.96-1.44 for women. Moreover, for men we find that the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to non-labor income is statistically significant; the point estimate being -0.07. This implies that the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 5 percentage points higher than the uncompensated one. In general, we consider the estimates for males to be more certain and robust than the estimates for females.
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