| 1. |
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al.
(författare)
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Money, Exchange Rates, Wages, and Games
- 1987
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper is focused on the interaction of monetary policy and wage determination in open economies with strong labor unions. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper views both government and labor as endogenous utility maximizers, and studies the macroeconomic consequences af their interaction. In particular, the paper shows (a) how labor unions adjust wages optimally to prices following monetary expansion or devaluation; (b) how the ultimate effectiveness of policy is reduced (without necessarily being destroyed) by optimal union reactions; and (c) how the interplay of government and labor can create a persistent tendency to unemployment and inflation simultaneously.
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| 2. |
- Gylfason, Thorvaldur, et al.
(författare)
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Wages, Money, and Exchange Rates : With Endogenous Unions and Governments
- 1986
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes the role and macroeconomic impact of monetary and exchange rate policy as well as of wage formation in open economies where wages are primarily determined through collective bargaining among powerful labor unions and relatively weak employers. Applying some elements of game theory, the paper treats the government and unions as endogenous, and explores the macroeconomic consequences of their interaction. In particular, the paper argues, and demonstrates by numerical examples, that the ultimate effects of monetary expansion or devaluation (as well as of exogenous wage hikes) on incomes and prices depend cricually in the reaction patterns of both unions and government.
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| 3. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Balanced-Budget Redistribution as Political Equilibrium
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper considers balanced-budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups of individuals as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. Equilibrium is unique in the present model, and a sufficient condition for existence is given, requiring that there be sufficient "stochastic heterogeneity" with respect to party preferences in the electorate. The validity of Hotelling's "principle of minimum differentiation", as well as of "Director's law", is examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs and voters' possibilities of "exit" adn "voice" in the election process. The policy strategy of expected-plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the parobability of gaining a plurality. Incomes are fixed and known, so lump-sum taxation is feasible. However, constraints on tax/transfer differentitation between individuals are permitted in the analysis.
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Debt-Financed Transfers, Public Consumption and Public Investment in an Open Economy
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper compares the welfare implications for two consecutive generations of debt-financed public spending of three different types - tansfer payments, public consumption and public (infrastructure) investment. The analysis is performed by means of an overlapping generations model with the consumption of a publicly provided good in the utility function of the consumer and the stock of public productive capital in the private sector's production function. The standard overlapping generations model is extended also to include work in the second period of the individual's life and asset holdings in his/her preference function. It is shown how the utility effects on different generations depend not only on the type of spending but also on the implications of the spending for future tax (transfer) payments, as well as on the initial levels of public consumption and public capital.
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