| 41. |
- Hasson, R, et al.
(författare)
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Treatment Effects of Climate Change Risk on Mitigation and Adaptation Behavior in an Experimental Setting
- 2012
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Ingår i: South African Journal of Economics. - 0038-2280. ; 80:3, s. 415-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the collective action problem as it relates to climate change and develops two models that capture the mitigation–adaptation trade-off. The first model presents climate change as a disaster that will occur with certainty, and where both mitigation and adaptation reduce the size of the loss associated with the disaster (the so-called deterministic model). The second model presents climate change as an uncertain event, where mitigation affects the probability of disaster while adaptation again reduces the size of the loss (this is the so-called stochastic model). Comparing the two models in a one-shot public goods experiment with students, we find no significant differences in subjects' choice to mitigate. The experiments also reveal a relatively low rate of mitigation for both models compared with earlier studies.
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| 42. |
- Hennlock, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Emissions Trading Subject to Kantian Preferences
- 2018
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We study a cap-and-trade market equilibrium where different regions belonging to an emissions trading regime have different ambitions about the stringency of the cap. Specifically, we introduce a segment of consumers with Kantian preferences and show that they would prefer a more stringent cap compared to other regions. When a region sets up a voluntary more stringent cap within a cap-and-trade market, dual carbon markets with dual prices on allowances can emerge with trade against both caps. We then show that labelling a subset of the allowances in a cap-and-trade market captures the higher willingness to pay driven by different ambition levels among agents within a trading scheme. We show under what circumstances a socially efficient outcome from carbon markets can be achieved by labelling allowances when there are heterogeneous preferences among regions about the ambition level in an emissions trading regime. Being voluntary, trade in labelled allowances is consistent with a bottom-up approach where efforts are built up gradually by actors, countries and regions that wants to take leadership in international climate policy.
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| 43. |
- Hennlock, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Prices versus Standards and Firm Behavior: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We conduct an artefactual field experiment in which 164 managers and senior advisors recruited from Swedish industry were presented with a task of maximizing net revenue from abatement investments under three different but equally stringent environmental policy regimes. We find that investment decisions are strongly influenced by type of policy instrument. Economic instruments and performance standards cause different attentional and judgment biases that are inconsistent with standard economic theory. Inconsistencies are larger with economic policy instruments (tax and subsidy) than with performance standards even though subjects’ attention to cost minimization was greater with economic instruments than under performance standards.
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| 44. |
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| 45. |
- Jagers, Sverker C., 1967, et al.
(författare)
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Attitudes to Personal Carbon Allowances: The effect of trust in politicians, perceived fairness and ideology
- 2009
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The idea of Personal Carbon Allowances (PCAs) was presented by the British Environment Secretary David Miliband in 2006. Although no state is seriously developing proposals for them, they have been heavily debated within academia, NGOs and policy making circles. PCAs can be seen as a logical extension of market efficiency underpinning emissions trading schemes, so far only applied at the firm level, to individuals. The purpose of this paper is to analyse some critical aspects of the public’s support for a PCA scheme. We focus on the relations between attitude towards a PCA scheme and trust in politicians, perceived fairness and ideology, respectively. We also analyse the relation between the respective attitudes towards an increase in the current tax rate and towards an implementation of a PCA scheme. We base our study on a mail questionnaire sent out to a random, representative sample in Sweden.
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| 46. |
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| 47. |
- Jagers, Sverker C., 1967, et al.
(författare)
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On the preconditions for large-scale collective action
- 2020
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Ingår i: Ambio. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0044-7447 .- 1654-7209. ; 49:7
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity's most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.
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| 48. |
- Johansson, Markus, 1985, et al.
(författare)
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A risk framework for optimising policies for deep decarbonisation technologies
- 2021
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Ingår i: Energy Research and Social Science. - : Elsevier BV. - 2214-6296 .- 2214-6326. ; 82
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Massive resource infusion and coordination between state and market actors are needed to develop and diffuse deep decarbonisation technologies. This makes wise policy design imperative. Policy-makers are confronted with a plethora of diverging views on which policies are preferable for a low carbon transition, and which interventions, such as R&D funding, information, environmental taxes, or bans, should be employed to achieve necessary and sufficient technological transformation. Focusing on market and technological investment risks, we offer a conceptual framework that explains why no silver bullet policy or single theoretical approach exists in regard to decarbonisation. Our framework highlights that policies need to be designed with these risks in mind and aids in the key task of matching problems and policies, thereby also facilitating judicious use of resources to optimise climate benefits from resources spent.
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
- Löfgren, Åsa, 1972, et al.
(författare)
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A theoretical framework explaining the mechanisms of nudging
- 2019
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we develop a theoretical model to clarify the underlying mechanisms that drive individual decision making and responses to behavioral interventions, such as nudges. The contribution of the paper is three-fold: First, the model provides a theoretical framework that comprehensively structures the individual decision-making process applicable to a wide range of choice situations. Second, we reduce the confusion regarding what should be called a nudge by offering a clear classification of behavioral interventions. We distinguish among what we label as pure nudges, preference nudges, and other behavioral interventions. Third, we identify the mechanisms behind the effectiveness of behavioral interventions based on the structured decision-making process. Hence, the model can be used to predict under which circumstances, and in which choice situations, a nudge is likely to be effective.
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