| 1. |
- Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
(författare)
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Agency Costs in the Process of Development
- 1996
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which posesses better ex post information. The degree of ex post information depends on the number of projects and entrepreneurs in the economy; the more projects, the better the information. This implies that at the early stages of development, the range of projects and the amount of information are limited and agency costs are high. Since the information created by a project is an externality on others, the decentralized economy is constrained inefficient; in particular, it does not 'experiment' enough. The analysis of the role of information also opens the way to an investigation of the development of financial institutions. We contrast the information aggregation role of stock markets and information production role of banks. Because the amount of available information increases with development, our model predicts the pattern of financial development observed in practice; banks first and stock markets later.
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| 2. |
- Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
(författare)
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Information Accumulation in Development
- 1998
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We propose a model in which economic relations and intritutions in advanced and less developed countries differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. The lack of information in less developed economies makes it hard to evaluate the performance of manager, and leads to high "agency costs". Differences in the amount of information have a variety of sources. As well as factors related to the informational infrastructure, we emphasize that societies accumulate information partly because the scarcity of capital restricts the repetition of various activities. Two implications of our model are: (i) as an economy develops and generates more information, it achieves better risk-sharing at a given level of effort, but because agents are exerting more effort and the types of activities are changing, the overall level of risk-sharing may decline; (ii) with development, the share of financial intermediation carried out through market institutions should increase.
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| 3. |
- Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
(författare)
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Productivity Differences
- 1998
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Many technologies used by the LDCs are developed in the OECD economies, and as such, are designed to make optimal use of the skills of these richer countries' workforces. Due to differences in the supply of skills, some of the tasks performed by skilled workers in the OECD economies will be carried out by unskilled workers in the LDCs. Since the technologies in these tasks are designed to be used by skilled workers, productivity in the LDCs will be low. Even when all countries have equal access to new technologies, this mismatch between skills and technology can lead to sizable differences in total factor productivity and output per worker. Our theory also suggests that productivity differences should be highest in medium-tech sectors, and that the trade regime and the degree of intellectual property right enforcement in the LDCs have an important effect on the direction of technical change and on productivity differences.
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| 4. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Asset Markets, Tax Arbitrage, and the Redistributive Properties of Progressive Income Taxation
- 1988
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It is commonly believed that tax arbitrage is anti-egalitarian. The present paper shows that this is not necessarily true; tax arbitrage might actually reduce inequality as well as increase efficiency. It is also shown that the introduction of tax arbitrage will linearize the tax system. Thus complicated, non-linear tax scedules in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971) cannot be sustained.
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Egalitarianism and Growth
- 1991
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Are competitive wage premia an obstacle to growth? The answer of the architects of the Scandinavian "model" in the 1950s and 60s was in the affirmative: By punishing expansive and growth enhancing sectors of the economy competitive wage premia put an unwarranted drag on the rate of structural change. We formalize this intuition using a two sector endogenous growth model, considering both open and closed economy cases. We also show that egalitarian pay compression, combined with active labor market policies, works exactly in the same way as an industrial policy of subsidizing sunrise industries.
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| 7. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Fiscal Policy when Monetary Policy is Tied to the Mast
- 1994
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper analyses the time inconsistency problem of both exchange rate and fiscal policy in a small open economy. The equilibrium under discretion is characterised by inflation and a deficit. Commitment of the exchange-rate instrument only, e.g., through membership in a European monetary union with low inflation, contributes to price stability but increases the deficit. Whether the government will prefer this outcome to the discretionary one depends on the structure of the economy: commitment appears more favourable, the more open is the economy. The time-consistency arguments strengthen the case for simultaneous commitment of monetary and fiscal policy for inflation-prone countries joining a monetary union.
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| 8. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Labor Supply Prediction when Tax Avoidance Matters
- 1999
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the emipircal study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when predicting how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue, and the welfare cost of taxation. in conclusion we argue that our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of tax payer response.
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| 9. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Macroeconomic Externalities : Are Pigovian Taxes the Answer?
- 1991
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Basic welfare economics tells us that many types of externalities can be remedied by proper use of corrective taxes and subsidies. This paper shows that this notion also extends to the macroeconomic externalities discussed in recent Keynesian literature on nominal price rigidities. The derived policy rules are lindred in spirit to standard Keynesian policy prescriptions: Progressive income taxes may serve a useful role in combating wasteful economic fluctuations. However, unlike older fix-price models of automatic stabilizers, progressive taxes work in our monopolistic economy because they directly affect the pricing mechanism.
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| 10. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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On the Analytics of the Dynamic Laffer Curve
- 2000
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we analyze government budget balance within a simple model of endogenous growth. For the AK model, simple analytical conditions for a tax cut to be self-financing can be derived. The critical variable is not the tax rate per se, but the "transfer-adjusted tax rate". We discuss some conceptual issues in dynamic revenue analysis, and we explain why previous studies have arrived at seemingly contradictory results. Finally, we perform an empirical study of the transfer-adjusted tax rates of the OECD countries to see which country has the highest potential for fiscal improvements; it turns out that only a few countries have any potential for such "dynamic scoring".
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