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| 2. |
- Andreasson, Jens, 1978, et al.
(författare)
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Efficient priority rules under default: the case of traditio versus contract principle
- 2021
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Ingår i: European Journal of Law and Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0929-1261 .- 1572-9990. ; 51:1, s. 97-128
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We investigate the economic consequences of the traditio and the contract principle-differing in how they determine the priority rights for an item sold but not delivered. Our results suggest that the two principles are equivalent in terms of the net utilities enjoyed by involved actors. For example, a lower price paid for a forward transaction under a traditio principle can be compensated by better credit terms, implying there is no competitive advantage for either the seller or buyer under any principle. We demonstrate how market prices, incorrectly used, may misleadingly favour a contract principle, and discuss how fraudulent behaviour better supports a traditio regime. We also contribute to the legal discussion on priority regimes of undelivered items basing our discussion on bankruptcy priority laws instead of distribution of ownership.
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| 3. |
- Andreasson, Jens, 1978, et al.
(författare)
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Prioritet för köpare - en fråga om tradition eller princip?
- 2015
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Ingår i: Svensk Juristtidning. - 0039-6591. ; :9, s. 709-748
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Lösöreköpskommittén har i SOU 2015:18 föreslagit bl.a. att traditionsprincipen bör avskaffas. I denna artikel presenteras några resultat av en enkel argumentationsanalys avseende kommitténs argumentation. Analysen indikerar att kommittén haft en normativ ambition snarare än en utredande. Resultaten är därför relevanta för dem som är intresserade av den reella frågan om prioritet för köpare. Möjligen är artikeln också relevant som ett generellt exempel på en kritisk analys av argumentationen i en offentlig utredning.
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| 4. |
- Belissa, T., et al.
(författare)
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Liquidity constraints, informal institutions, and the adoption of weather insurance: A randomized controlled Trial in Ethiopia
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3878. ; 140, s. 269-278
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We report the results of a drought insurance experiment in Ethiopia, and examine whether uptake of index-based insurance is enhanced if we allow farmers to pay after harvest (addressing a liquidity constraint). We also test to what extent uptake can be enhanced by promoting insurance via informal risk-sharing institutions (Iddirs), to reduce trust and information problems. The delayed payment insurance product increases uptake substantially when compared to standard insurance, from 8% to 24%, and leveraging informal institutions results in even greater uptake (43%). We also find suggestive evidence that the delayed premium product is indeed better at targeting the liquidity constrained. However, default rates associated with delayed payments are relatively high and concentrated in a small number of Iddirs – potentially compromising the economic viability of the novel product. We discuss how default rates can be reduced. © 2019 Elsevier B.V.
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| 5. |
- Calis, T., et al.
(författare)
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Does Microfinance Make Households More Resilient to Shocks? Evidence From the Cyclone Phailin in India
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of International Development. - : Wiley. - 0954-1748. ; 29:7, s. 1011-1015
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This research note examines the relevance of microfinance as a means to cope with natural disasters, using the event of the cyclone Phailin, which struck India in 2013. The results indicate that microfinance helps reduce the negative effects of extreme weather-related shocks. In light of the somewhat disappointing outcomes suggested by several recent rigorous impact studies, this research paints a more positive picture of the importance of microfinance as an insurance mechanism to deal with weather-related risks.
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| 6. |
- Chakravarty, Satyaki, et al.
(författare)
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Patents' time to grant - A study of China and India
- 2018
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Ingår i: ASIA-PACIFIC INNOVATION CONFERENCE, DELHI SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, INDIA, DECEMBER 13-14, 2018.
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- China and India reported highest growth in high-tech exports for the past two decades (World Bank) and hence are increasingly becoming the countries to file for protection of intellectual property. This paper examines whether there is a delay in time to grant of a patent when applied by domestic versus foreign applicants in China and India. A delay in time to grant on the basis of nationality violates the TRIPs agreement. Further, delay in grant of a patent generates dead-weight loss for the society, hence effectively deterring future innovation. The results show that China delays foreign patents, however India does exactly the opposite, indicating that there is a significant variation in patent examination times across applicant characteristics, technology fields and countries. Thus invisible trade barriers do exist in these markets. Applicants can use the details in this paper and plan their filing strategies, e.g. taking into account average grant lag.
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| 7. |
- Dimova, Ralitza, et al.
(författare)
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Off-farm labor supply and correlated shocks: New theoretical insights and evidence from Malawi
- 2015
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Ingår i: Economic Development and Cultural Change. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0013-0079 .- 1539-2988. ; 63, s. 361-391
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- New theoretical insights and evidence from Malawi provide evidence of off- farm labor supply and correlated shocks. A large part of the rural landscape of developing countries is dominated by subsistence farmers, operating on small or marginal plots of land. They take recourse to a number of coping strategies to protect themselves from various risks in the absence of insurance markets. Some engage in specialization that involves adoption of production techniques that are resistant to pests, droughts, and other environmental risk factors. Others resort to consumption smoothing via diversification, some of which involves combining farm and off-farm activities within the same household.
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| 8. |
- Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, et al.
(författare)
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Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection
- 2014
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 124:2, s. 185-187
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts. © 2014 .
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| 9. |
- Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, et al.
(författare)
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Cash or In-kind Transfers? Evidence from a Randomised Controlled Trial in Delhi, India
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Development Studies. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0022-0388 .- 1743-9140. ; 51:6, s. 660-673
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article examines a randomised intervention in Delhi, India, that provided unconditional cash transfers to a group of households as a replacement for the food security offered by a below-poverty-level card. The experimental approach can differentiate beneficial effects due to either unconditional cash transfers or newly opened bank accounts. The unconditional cash transfer does not induce a decline in food security; rather, it provides opportunities for households to shift to other nutritious options in non-cereal product categories.
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| 10. |
- Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis, et al.
(författare)
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Collusive Bidding, Competition Law, and Welfare
- 2023
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Ingår i: Review of Law and Economics. - 1555-5879. ; 19:2, s. 213-231
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We explain why competing firms form collective entities to buy patents from other entities, particularly from non-practicing entities (NPEs), and follow a catch and release patent strategy. We show why having competitors bid as a single unit is better than having competitors bid against each other. More important, we show that collusive bidding on patents held by NPEs, even when the patents are not essential for a standard (SEPs), may increase consumer surplus, particularly when technological innovation is drastic, and improve social welfare. This provides a theoretical foundation that explains why competition authorities often allow collusive bidding for patents and why courts employ the "rule of reason"to analyze agreements under competition law. We also show that a cartel of incumbents will always outbid a potential entrant, or a patent assertion entity, over a technology that can destroy the value of the incumbents' existing assets.
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