| 1. |
- Gustafsson, Anders, 1985-, et al.
(författare)
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The “sugar rush” from innovation subsidies : a robust political economy perspective
- 2016
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Ingår i: Empirica. - : Springer. - 0340-8744 .- 1573-6911. ; 43:4, s. 729-756
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The governments of most advanced countries offer some type of financial subsidy to encourage firm innovation and productivity. This paper analyzes the effects of innovation subsidies using a unique Swedish database that contains firm level data for the period 1997–2011, specifically informa tion on firm subsidies over a broad range of programs. Applying causal treatment effect analysis based on matching and a diff-in-diff approach combined with a qualitative case study of Swedish innovation subsidy programs, we test whether such subsidies have positive effects on firm performance. Our results indicate a lack of positive performance effects in the long run for the majority of firms, albeit there are positive short-run effects on human capital investments and also positive short-term productivity effects for the smallest firms. These findings are interpreted from a robust political economy perspective that reveals that the problems of acquiring correct information and designing appropriate incentives are so complex that the absence of significant positive long-run effects on firm performance for the majority of firms is not surprising.
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| 2. |
- Hallman, Alice, et al.
(författare)
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A theory of hypocrisy
- 2023
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 211, s. 401-410
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explains the occurrence of hypocrisy - when the by-society most despised types pretend to be the most revered types. Real-world phenomena include pedophile priests, sex-offender f eminists and seemingly very busy dispensable office workers. Building on the signaling framework of Bernheim (1994) - where payoffs consist of an intrinsic cost of falsifying yourself, and a concern for social esteem - we show conditions for emergence of hypocrisy in equilibrium. In such equilibria the most despised types along with the most revered types behave normatively, others do not. Thus, in equilibrium there are 'rumors' about those acting the most normatively - society infers that they are either truly normative or despised, but one cannot know who is who. This is to be distinguished from 'conformity' - where the most normative and almost-normative types fully follow a social norm. Whether conformity or hypocrisy will arise in equilibrium depends on the cost of falsification, and the number of hypocrites depends on the weight of social esteem. Our theory thus shows how cultural parameters map into equilibrium culture.
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| 3. |
- Hallman, Alice, 1991-
(författare)
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Hypocrites, Devil's Advocates, and Bandwagoneers : Essays on Costly Signaling
- 2023
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This doctoral thesis contains three essays, all studying different aspects of costly signaling in social interactions. The first chapter explains Hypocrisy as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interactions where society cares about a person's private identity but only observes public actions. When people care about social esteem and the cost of misrepresenting themselves, those with the lowest social standing masquerade as highly respected members of society. Real-world phenomena include pedophile priests, sex-offender feminists, and seemingly busy dispensable office workers. The second chapter studies the acquisition of costly information in sequential voting. Examples include jurors paying attention during trial and board members evaluating the benefits of some technological investment. This paper is the first to explain why late voters sometimes follow the first voter, commonly known as bandwagoneering, and why they sometimes get to cast the deciding vote. When they do not herd, the second voter acts as a Devil's advocate and purposely vote against the first voter without acquiring information. In a lab experiment, more participants act as Devil's advocates when the cost of information is high, as predicted by the theory. The third chapter theoretically and empirically shows that a sequential mechanism of information acquisition and voting is better than a simultaneous mechanism for strategic and myopic voters. When voters are strategic, the sequential mechanism acts as a coordination device, maximizing information aggregation while minimizing the total cost of information acquisition. The one exception is when voters are myopic and information is of low cost and low quality, then total welfare is higher under a simultaneous mechanism. A lab experiment confirms the main result: The round payoff is 22 percent higher in the sequential voting treatment than in the simultaneous treatment.
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