| 1. |
- Hamark, Jesper, 1973, et al.
(författare)
-
Swedish unions and obligatory complementary income insurance: Securing unemployment benefits in a changing welfare state
- 2024
-
Ingår i: Social Policy & Administration. - 0144-5596 .- 1467-9515. ; 58:1, s. 61-77
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Until the 2000s, the Ghent system of state-supported, union-run funds contributed to high union density in Sweden. However, there has been a remodelling of the Ghent system and a gradual erosion of public unemployment insurance. In this new institutional and less universal context, unions have introduced the private complement known as obligatory complementary income insurance (OCII). This article seeks answers to how Swedish unions have thought and argued on OCII, how these thoughts and arguments change over time and whether there are differences across unions within different confederations. The material includes congressional minutes and other internal documents as well as newspapers and union magazines, 2000–2020. There is a myriad of arguments for and against OCII. Many unions highlight the eroded public unemployment insurance—arguably a threat both to individuals and collectives—as the prime trigger of OCII. Yet, for unions with high rates of unemployment and relatively high wages, the OCII premium may be too expensive. Further, some unions argue that high-wage members are subsidised by low-wage members. We also find that OCII enhances sharp competition between unions to keep and recruit new members. The material also reveals different union opinions on how OCII is affecting the future of the welfare model.
|
|
| 2. |
- Lapidus, John, 1973, et al.
(författare)
-
Unions, insurance and changing welfare states: The emergence of obligatory complementary income insurance in Sweden
- 2022
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- How do unions who support universal welfare such as public employment insurance reason when they introduce private solutions such as obligatory complementary income insurance (OCII)? Unions are important actors in shaping the welfare model. Their actions and arguments tell a lot about how and why welfare state changes take place. In this paper, we seek answers to how the unions have acted and argued on OCII, how these actions and arguments have changed over time and whether there are differences across unions within the same confederation and across different confederations. The material includes congressional minutes and other internal documents for the period 2000–2020. Further, a number of newspapers and union magazines are studied. What we find and systematise is a myriad of arguments for and against OCII, some of them referring to the eroded public unemployment insurance and others pointing towards sharp competition between unions to keep or to recruit new members.
|
|
| 3. |
|
|
| 4. |
|
|
| 5. |
|
|
| 6. |
- Lapidus, John, 1973
(författare)
-
An odd couple: individual wage setting and the largest Swedish trade union
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Labor history. - 0023-656X. ; 56:1, s. 1-21
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The demise of the solidaristic wage policy, followed by the introduction of individual wage setting, is one of many similar changes in the Swedish welfare regime in recent decades. These changes were often demanded by employers and then eventually accepted and implemented by parts of the labour movement, i.e. Social Democracy and its related trade unions. Ever since its introduction in 1993, however, individual wage setting has created much controversy withinKommunal(the Swedish Municipal Workers' Union), the largest trade union in Sweden. In this light, it is interesting to examine the arguments that convinced a majority of the delegates at the decision-making congresses. Two main arguments in favour of individual wage setting have been put forward by union leaders, namely that the new wage system is appreciated by members and that increased wage dispersion increases productivity, which in turn leads to higher wages. This article reviews these arguments. It is found that member surveys suffer from flaws in methodology and that the productivity argument is ill-founded. The reason for the insistence on individual wage setting must be sought elsewhere.
|
|
| 7. |
|
|
| 8. |
|
|
| 9. |
|
|
| 10. |
|
|
