| 1. |
-
- 2019
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
|
|
| 2. |
- Nordén, Anna, 1981, et al.
(författare)
-
Divergence in Stakeholders’ Preferences: Evidence from a Choice Experiment on Forest Landscapes Preferences in Sweden
- 2015
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A great deal of biodiversity can be found in private forests, and protecting it requires taking into consideration the preferences of key stakeholders. In this study, we examine and compare the valuation of forest attributes across the general public, private non-industrial forest owners and forest officials in Sweden by conducting a choice experiment. Our results indicate that citizens have a positive valuation of biodiversity protection. Moreover, their valuation is statistically higher than those of forest owners, implying that there is room for compensation. Interestingly, our results suggest that both forest owners and forest officials have a strong orientation towards production, with higher valuation than the general public of the common management practice of similar age and clear felling. Even though the Swedish Forestry Act regards production and environmental goals as equally important, we find that forest officials prefer management practices that promote production rather than biodiversity protection.
|
|
| 3. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
-
Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives: Losses from Excluded Individuals Can Counter Gains from Those Selected
- 2013
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Incentives conditioned on socially desired acts such as donating blood, departing conflict or mitigating climate change have increased in popularity. Many incentives are targeted, excluding some of the potential participants based upon characteristics or prior actions. We hypothesize that pro-sociality is reduced by exclusion, in of itself (i.e., fixing prices and income), and that the rationale for exclusion influences such 'behavioral spillovers'. To test this, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of a subsidy to donations when participants are fully informed about why they are selected, or not, for the subsidy. We study the effects of introducing different selection rules upon changes in donations. Selecting for the subsidy those who initially acted less pro-social (i.e., gave little to start) increased donations, while random subsidies and rewarding greater pro-sociality did not. Yet a selection rule which targets lower prior pro-sociality also intentionally excludes the people who donated more initially, and only that rule reduced donations by the excluded. This shows a tradeoff between losses from excluded participants and gains from selected.
|
|
| 4. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
-
Do Entrance Fees Crowd Out Donations for Public Goods? Evidence from a Protected Area in Costa Rica
- 2014
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper, we investigate how different levels of entrance fees affect donations for a public good, a natural park. To explore this issue, we conducted a s tated preference study focusing on visitors’ preferences for donating money to raise funds for a protected area in Costa Rica given different entrance fee levels. The results reveal that there is incomplete crowding - out of donations when establishing an en trance fee.
|
|
| 5. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
-
Effects of Exclusion from a Conservation Policy: Negative Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives
- 2013
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A critical issue in the design of incentive mechanisms is the choice of whom to target. For forests, the leading schemes: [i] target locations with high ecosystem-service density; [ii] target additionality, i.e., locations where conservation would not occur without the incentive; or, at least effectively, [iii] reward previous private choices to conserve forest. We use a field experiment to examine the changes in contributions to forest conservation when we introduce each of those three selection rules. For individuals who are selected, we find that targeting additionality (rule [ii]) is the only scheme to increase contributions. However that selection rule intentionally excludes those who contributed most previously and it is the only one to generate significant 'behavioral leakage', i.e., negative spillovers or falling contributions by those who are excluded (and face no price or income changes). Our results demonstrate a tradeoff in targeting and a challenge for optimal policy design.
|
|
| 6. |
- Alpizar, F., et al.
(författare)
-
Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-4870 .- 1872-7719. ; 59, s. 87-98
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|
|
| 7. |
- Alpizar, Francisco, 1974, et al.
(författare)
-
Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Environmental & Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 67:1, s. 181-202
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical. We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects' initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.
|
|
| 8. |
- Klemedtsson, Åsa Kasimir, 1956, et al.
(författare)
-
Climate mitigation scenarios of drained peat soils
- 2014
-
Ingår i: European Geosciences Union General Assembly 2014 Vienna, Austria, 27 April – 02 May 2014.
-
Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The national inventory reports (NIR) submitted to the UNFCCC show Sweden – which as many other countries has wetlands where parts have been drained for agriculture and forestry purposes, – to annually emit 12 million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalents, which is more GHG’es than industrial energy use release in Sweden. Similar conditions can be found in other northern countries, having cool and wet conditions, naturally promoting peat accumulation, and where land use management over the last centuries have promoted draining activities. These drained peatland, though covering only 2% of the land area, have emissions corresponding to 20% of the total reported NIR emissions. This substantial emission contribution, however, is hidden within the Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry sector (LULUCF) where the forest Carbon uptake is even larger, which causes the peat soil emissions become invisible. The only drained soil emission accounted in the Swedish Kyoto reporting is the N2O emission from agricultural drained organic soils of the size 0.5 million tonnes CO2e yr-1. This lack of visibility has made incentives for land use change and management neither implemented nor suggested, however with large potential. Rewetting has the potential to decrease soil mineralization, why CO2 and N2O emissions are mitigated. However if the soil becomes very wet CH4 emission will increase together with hampered plant growth. By ecological modeling, using the CoupModel the climate change mitigation potential have been estimated for four different land use scenarios; 1, Drained peat soil with Spruce (business as usual scenario), 2, raised ground water level to 20 cm depth and Willow plantation, 3, raised ground water level to 10 cm depth and Reed Canary Grass, and 4, rewetting to an average water level in the soil surface with recolonizing wetland plants and mosses. We calculate the volume of biomass production per year, peat decomposition, N2O emission together with nitrate and DOC/POC leakage. Based on the modelling results a cost benefit analysis is performed (economics), guiding to the design of environmental policies needed for land use change to come true.
|
|
| 9. |
- Nordén, Anna, 1981
(författare)
-
Essays on Behavioral Economics and Policies for Provision of Ecosystem Services
- 2013
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Forests provide key ecosystem services such as clean water, timber, habitat for fisheries, carbon sequestration, pollination, and biodiversity. However, many of these services are being lost or degraded at a furious pace, brought about by human activity. For instance, deforestation and forest degradation are measured to account for around 12% of all CO2 emissions, making it the second largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere after fossil fuel combustion (Werf et al. 2009). This has led communities, governments, and international organizations to increase their efforts to protect forests. Among such efforts, the use of monetary incentives to promote or reward private behavior that is associated with environmental objectives is becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument (Pattanayak et al. 2010, Ferraro 2011). For instance, payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs aim to increase the provision of ecosystem services by offering direct compensation to landowners for the opportunity costs of more environmentally friendly land management practices (e.g., low impact agriculture or conservation of natural ecosystems). PES programs have been widely promoted as more cost-effective and institutionally less demanding than traditional conservation policies such as establishment of protected areas. Yet despite this, the few rigorous impact evaluations done so far show that the impact of PES programs has been modest (for a recent review see Pattanayak et al. 2010). This raises concerns that “easy fixes,” like PES, may not solve the planetary problems we are facing. Further, PES may suffer the fate of many interventions that stumble in reaching their objectives because people do not always behave as expected. Cardenas et al. (2000), for instance, experimentally show that introducing an incentive to reduce timber extraction from common forest land led to more forest extraction compared with a case with no incentive. This so-called crowding-out effect has been found in studies, both in psychology and economics, where external incentives sometimes lead to less pro-social behavior1 once the voluntary act is shifted to a market-based relationship (for a review of experimental as well as nonexperimental studies see Bowles 2008). At present, few attempts to understand the behavioral issues of forest conservation polices are undertaken. This five-paper thesis attempts to contribute to the understanding of people’s behavioral responses to forest conservation policies. The first paper examines determinates of the impact of payment for ecosystem services (PES) and the role of behavioral aspects. The second and third papers experimentally examine behavioral responses to incentives for voluntary contributions to forest conservation, where some stakeholders are excluded in favor of others. The fourth paper investigates the relationship between participation in PES programs and type of payment (i.e., cash or in-kind). The fifth and last paper examines the effect of introducing fixed entrance fees on voluntary donations to a protected area. For abstracts of each paper, please see the thesis.
|
|
| 10. |
- Nordén, Anna, 1981, et al.
(författare)
-
Evaluation of the Impact of Forest Certification on Environmental Outcomes in Sweden
- 2016
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Voluntary forest certification is an increasingly popular tool allowing producers who meet stringent environmental standards to label their products in the marketplace and potentially achieve greater market access and receive higher prices for their products. The voluntary nature of certification programs implies, however, that it is difficult to determine the effects of forest certification due to selection bias. This paper contributes to the impact evaluation of forest certification by estimating the effects of certification of non-industrial private forest owners in Sweden – one of the countries with the largest total area of certified forests. We rely on official forest inventory data at the plot level, information on certification status, and standard impact evaluation methods to identify the causal effect of certification on three environmental outcomes: environmentally important areas preserved during the felling, number of trees and high stumps left after the felling, and area set aside for conservation purposes. Moreover, we analyze the effect of the two most important certification schemes: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). Our results indicate that certification has not improved any of these outcomes. Furthermore, we find no differences between the FSC and PEFC schemes. Our findings suggest that for forest certification to have an effect, the standards should be tightened and the monitoring and enforcement of forest certification schemes strengthened.
|
|
