| 31. |
- Gerlee, Philip, 1980, et al.
(författare)
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Scientific Models : Red Atoms, White Lies and Black Boxes in a Yellow Book
- 2016
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A zebrafish, the hull of a miniature ship, a mathematical equation and a food chain - what do these things have in common? They are examples of models used by scientists to isolate and study particular aspects of the world around us. This book begins by introducing the concept of a scientific model from an intuitive perspective, drawing parallels to mental models and artistic representations. It then recounts the history of modelling from the 16th century up until the present day. The iterative process of model building is described and discussed in the context of complex models with high predictive accuracy versus simpler models that provide more of a conceptual understanding. To illustrate the diversity of opinions within the scientific community, we also present the results of an interview study, in which ten scientists from different disciplines describe their views on modelling and how models feature in their work. Lastly, it includes a number of worked examples that span different modelling approaches and techniques. It provides a comprehensive introduction to scientific models and shows how models are constructed and used in modern science. It also addresses the approach to, and the culture surrounding modelling in different scientific disciplines. It serves as an inspiration for model building and also facilitates interdisciplinary collaborations by showing how models are used in different scientific fields. The book is aimed primarily at students in the sciences and engineering, as well as students at teacher training colleges but will also appeal to interested readers wanting to get an overview of scientific modelling in general and different modelling approaches in particular.
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| 32. |
- Gerlee, Philip, 1980, et al.
(författare)
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Scientific Models
- 2016
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A zebrafish, the hull of a miniature ship, a mathematical equation and a food chain - what do these things have in common? They are examples of models used by scientists to isolate and study particular aspects of the world around us. This book begins by introducing the concept of a scientific model from an intuitive perspective, drawing parallels to mental models and artistic representations. It then recounts the history of modelling from the 16th century up until the present day. The iterative process of model building is described and discussed in the context of complex models with high predictive accuracy versus simpler models that provide more of a conceptual understanding. To illustrate the diversity of opinions within the scientific community, we also present the results of an interview study, in which ten scientists from different disciplines describe their views on modelling and how models feature in their work. Lastly, it includes a number of worked examples that span different modelling approaches and techniques. It provides a comprehensive introduction to scientific models and shows how models are constructed and used in modern science. It also addresses the approach to, and the culture surrounding modelling in different scientific disciplines. It serves as an inspiration for model building and also facilitates interdisciplinary collaborations by showing how models are used in different scientific fields. The book is aimed primarily at students in the sciences and engineering, as well as students at teacher training colleges but will also appeal to interested readers wanting to get an overview of scientific modelling in general and different modelling approaches in particular.
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| 33. |
- Dodig Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955, et al.
(författare)
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Natural Computing/ Unconventional Computing and its Philosophical Significance
- 2012
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Ingår i: Entropy. - : MDPI AG. - 1099-4300. ; 14:12, s. 2408-2412
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- For the Turing year 2012, AISB (The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour) and IACAP (The International Association for Computing and Philosophy) merged their annual symposia/conferences to form the AISB/IACAP World Congress. The congress took place 2–6 July 2012 at the University of Birmingham, UK. The Congress was inspired by a desire to honour Alan Turing, and by the broad and deep significance of Turing's work to AI, the philosophical ramifications of computing, and philosophy and computing more generally. The Congress was one of the events forming the Alan Turing Year. The Congress consisted mainly of a number of collocated Symposia on specific research areas, together with six invited Plenary Talks. All papers other than the Plenaries were given within Symposia. This format is perfect for encouraging new dialogue and collaboration both within and between research areas. This volume forms the proceedings of one of the component symposia. We are most grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for their hard work in creating it, attracting papers, doing the necessary reviewing, defining an exciting programme for the symposium, and compiling this volume. We also thank them for their flexibility and patience concerning the complex matter of fitting all the symposia and other events into the Congress week
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| 34. |
- Samuelsson, Lars, 1975-, et al.
(författare)
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A Counterfactual Argument for Environmentalists to Endorse Non-Instrumental Value in Nature
- 2021
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Ingår i: Abstract Book. - Aten : Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER). - 9789605984045 ; , s. 27-28
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Environmentalists care about nature. Often, they reason and act as if they consider nature to be valuable for its own sake, i.e., to have non-instrumental value (often referred to as intrinsic value). Yet, there is a rather widespread reluctance, even among environmentalists, to explicitly ascribe such value to nature. One important explanation for this is probably the thought that such value, at least when attached to nature, is mysterious in one way or another. Anthropocentrists within environmental ethics have argued that the idea of non-instrumental value in nature is problematic in various ways (see Samuelsson, 2010a, for references), and some so called environmental pragmatists have maintained that a focus on non-instrumental value in nature among environmentalists is counter-productive (see Samuelsson, 2010b, for a critical account of such environmental pragmatism). In addition, Bryan Norton‘s influential convergence hypothesis states that from a practical point of view it makes no or little difference whether we ascribe noninstrumental value to nature, given the depth and variety of instrumental value that it possesses (Norton, 1991, 237-43).Several environmental ethicists have provided replies to this pessimistic outlook on the prospects for non-instrumental value in nature (e.g., Callicott, 1995; McShane, 2007). In this paper we add to this list of replies by providing a counter-factual argument, applying to anyone who genuinely cares about nature, for ascribing non-instrumental value to it. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, something like the convergence hypothesis, relying on nature‘s instrumental value for preservational purposes is risky business for environmentalists. We can easily imagine a scenario where some crucial instrumental value that is in fact (now) possessed by some preservation-worthy natural entity (such as a species or a diverse and unique ecosystem) is absent. Yet, even under such circumstances, environmentalists would generally want to preserve this entity. In other words, the convergence hypothesis can only be contingently true, and once we acknowledge this fact it becomes clear that giving up on the non-instrumental value of nature means losing an important source for providing arguments to the effect that we ought to preserve certain natural entities.In the paper we develop this argument, go through some possible replies to it and briefly consider the theoretical costs that might be involved in ascribing non-instrumental value to nature. We argue that with respect to most accounts of such value, whatever theoretical costs one might claim to be involved in ascribing such value to nature, these costs are not higher than the costs of ascribing it to anything else.
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| 35. |
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| 36. |
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| 37. |
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| 38. |
- Skånberg Dahlstedt, Ami, 1967
(författare)
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Walking in Suriashi as a Radical and Critical Art of Inquiry
- 2023
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Ingår i: Walking as Critical Inquiry. - Cham : Springer. - 9783031299902 ; , s. 151-173
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter contributes to the discussion on moving in and through site-specific and urban space; at the cusp between higher dance education and everyday life, creating a post-Certauian tear through space and time as a call for agency. It draws from my Ph.D. research Suriashi as Experimental Pilgrimage in Urban and Other Spaces, where I propose an experience of society from within a Japanese practice called suriashi, which translates as sliding foot. Suriashi is a specific gender codified walking technique in classical Japanese dance and theatre, and an important method for acting on stage. Gender is constructed physically through the positioning and moulding of the body. The original practice is performed in the dance studio or on stage. My research asks whether suriashi also could be a method for agency to act, as being active, or to activate, and temporally alter spaces outside the theatre; i.e. the practical application of this artistic practice outside the theatrical context. This relocation brings a traditional form into new configurations, connecting to everyday practices and sites of resistance and performance. It also contributes to the burgeoning field of walking arts practice, bringing a Japanese dance-based practice into a dialogue with debates and practices of Western dancing and walking. Suriashi performed in urban spaces was able to unfold and identify new relations between aesthetic practice and politics, between movements and monuments in the city as a way to critique the unequal distribution of power, and by looking for new ways to protest/resist peacefully. I assess this from three of my many experiments with slow suriashi walkings. The first one is Suriashi Intervention, performed at Gothenburg Culture Festival in August 2016. This experiment did two things: it engendered the city’s unacknowledged dance archive, while performing critique of the unequal distribution of funding of the arts. The second experiment is an ‘invisible’ suriashi performed by the then Hong Kong-based scholar Ching-yuen Cheung during the violent protests at Yuen Long Station in Hong Kong in July 2019. It showed how artistic methods are necessary when democracy collapses. The third experiment regards introducing suriashi as methodology to master students of Contemporary Performative Arts at University of Gothenburg. Here, suriashi unveiled important issues regarding art in urban spaces, necessary for the art student. To further contextualize, I interlace my arguments through positionings by sociologist Doreen Massey.
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| 39. |
- Svensson, Frans
(författare)
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Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics
- 2015
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 23:2, s. 277-296
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.
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| 40. |
- Åhman, Henrik
(författare)
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The aesthetic turn : Exploring the religious dimensions of digital technology
- 2016
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Ingår i: Approaching Religion. - 1799-3121. ; 6:2, s. 156-163
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The arena for developing digital technology has undergone an aesthetic turn, broadening the focus from a functionalist approach producing centralized systems in the 1970s and 1980s to an increased awareness of the aesthetic aspects of the individual user’s interaction with technology in the 1990s and 2000s. Within the academic research fields studying digital technology (e.g. Human-Computer Interaction and Interaction Design) the aesthetic turn has resulted in a shift from a strong emphasis on user behaviour to an increased interest in aesthetic perspectives on the role of the designer, the design process, and the design material. Within these fields, aesthetics has often been interpreted as belonging to the realm of the individual; personal experiences such as pleasure, engagement, and emotions have been emphasized in both technology development and technology research. Aesthetics is not, however, only an individual phenomenon but also has relational and structural components that need to be acknowledged. Structural aspects of aesthetics condition the possibilities for individuals interacting with digital technology. Thus, the tension between individual and relational aspects of aesthetics in digital technology also reflects a tension between freedom and limitation; between change and permanence; between destabilizing and stabilizing forces. Such a broadened understanding of aesthetics offers a model of digital technology that roughly corresponds to Mark C. Taylor’s definition of religion. Taylor argues that religion is constituted by, on the one hand, a figuring moment characterized by structural stability and universality, and, on the other hand, a disfiguring moment characterized by disruption, particularity, and change. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the aesthetic turn and Taylor’s definition of religion to illustrate similarities between the two, suggesting possible religious dimensions of digital technology and how that can inform our understanding of people’s interaction with digital technology.
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