| 61. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
-
Marginalkostnad för luftfartens infrastruktur
- 2017
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Huvudsyftet med denna studie är att skatta marginalkostnaderna för luftfartens infrastruktur, men då det inte finns någon enhetlig definition om vad som är kostnadsbasen för infrastrukturen, det vill säga vad som bör ingå i en marginalkostnadsberäkning, så ingår också ingår också en diskussion kring vilka kostnader som bör inkluderas i en marginalkostnadsberäkning i forskningsfrågan. Ett ytterligare syfte med studien är att relatera de framtagna marginalkostnaderna till dagens prissättning och undersöka huruvida luftfarten betalar sina samhällsekonomiska kostnader.Med hjälp av kostnadsdata från Arlanda och från Luftfartsverket skattas marginalkostnaden för utnyttjandet av (relevant) flygplatsinfrastruktur och för infrastrukturen för operativ flygtrafikledning. Den empiriska ansats som använts för att analysera kostnadsposterna är en regressionsanalys, med justering för månadsspecifika variationer i resmönster, då flygplatsdelen undersöks, samt med hänsyn till regionala skillnader för flygplatser, då flygtrafikledning i tornen undersöks.Det finns en del osäkerheter i studien, men med bakgrund av detta indikerar resultaten att den genomsnittliga marginalkostnaden för infrastrukturen ligger kring 13 kr per passagerare och 1 168 kr per startat flygplan. Motsvarande skattning för flygtrafikledningen är även den osäker, med resultat som indikerar en marginalkostnad på 373 kr per flygning. Vidare förefaller det som att finansieringen av den statliga luftfartsinfrastrukturen inte enbart skulle kunna ske med intäkterna från marginalkostnadsbaserade avgifter.
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| 62. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim, 1966-
(författare)
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Multi-unit common value auctions : theory and experiments
- 2012
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Research on auctions that involve more than one identical item for sale was,almost non-existing in the 90’s, but has since then been getting increasing attention. External incentives for this research have come from the US spectrum, sales, the European 3G mobile-phone auctions, and Internet auctions. The policy relevance and the huge amount of money involved in many of them have helped the theory and experimental research advance. But in auctions where values are equal across bidders, common value auctions, that is, when the value depends on some outside parameter, equal to all bidders, the research is still embryonic.This thesis contributes to the topic with three studies. The first uses a Bayesian game to model a simple multi-unit common value auction, the task being to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue from three auction formats; the discriminatory, the uniform and the Vickrey auction. The second study conducts an economic laboratory experiment on basis of the first study. The third study comprises an experiment on the multi-unit common value uniform auction and compares the dynamic and the static environments of this format.The most salient result in both experiments is that subjects overbid. They are victims of the winner’s curse and bid above the expected value, thus earning a negative profit. There is some learning, but most bidders continue to earn a negative profit also in later rounds. The competitive effect when participating in an auction seems to be stronger than the rationality concerns. In the first experiment, subjects in the Vickrey auction do somewhat better in small groups than subjects in the other auction types and, in the second experiment, subjects in the dynamic auction format perform much better than subjects in the static auction format; but still, they overbid.Due to this overbidding, the theoretical (but not the behavioral) prediction that the dynamic auction should render more revenue than the static fails inthe second experiment. Nonetheless, the higher revenue of the static auction comes at a cost; half of the auctions yield negative profits to the bidders, and the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in this format. Besides, only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.The bottom line is that the choice between the open and sealed-bid formats may be more important than the choice of price mechanism, especially in common value settings.
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| 63. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim
(författare)
-
Multi-unit common value auctions : an experimental comparison between the static and the dynamic uniform auction
- 2012
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It is still an open question whether the dynamic or the static format should be used in multi-unit settings, in a uniform price auction. The present study conducts an economic experiment in a common value environment, where it is found that it is more a question of whether the auctioneer wants to facilitate price discovery, and thereby lessen the otherwise pervasive overbidding, or if only the revenue is important. The experiment in the present paper provides evidence that the static format gives a significantly greater revenue than the dynamic auction, in both small and large group sizes. But a higher revenue comes at a cost; half of the auctions in the static format yield negative profits to the bidders, the winner’s curse is more severely widespread in the static auction, and only a minority of the bidders use the equilibrium bidding strategy.
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| 64. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim
(författare)
-
Multi-unit common value auctions : a laboratory experiment with three sealed-bid mechanisms
- 2012
-
Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study addresses a discrete common value environment with independent (one-dimensional) private signals, where the seller offers two identical units and the buyers have (flat) demand for both. Each session is conducted with2, 3 or 4 buyers. Three auction formats are used: the discriminatory, uniformand Vickrey auctions which are all subjected to a variation in the number of bidders and to repeating bid rounds on each subject. The main findings are that there are no significant differences between the uniform and the discriminatory auction in collecting revenue, while the Vickrey auction comes out as inferior. More bidders in the auction result in a greater revenue and level out the performance across the mechanisms. Demand reduction is visible in the experiment, but it is not as prominent as anticipated. Moreover, subjects come closer to equilibrium play over time. Finally, the winner’s curse is less severe than what is reported for inexperienced bidders in other studies.
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| 65. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim
(författare)
-
Optimal taxation of intermediate goods in the presence of externalities : A survey towards the transport sector
- 2004
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper surveys the literature on optimal taxation with emphasis on intermediate goods, or, more specific, freight (road) transport. There are two models frequently used, first, the one emanated from Diamond & Mirrlees' (1971) paper, where the production efficiency lemma made it clear that intermediate goods was not to be taxed. And, second, the Ramsey-Boiteux model where a cost-of-service regulation imposes a budget constraint for the regulated firm. In the latter model, in contrast to the first, freight transports (intermediate goods) are to be taxed in the Ramsey tradition, and thus trades the production efficiency lemma against a budget restriction. The paper also discusses welfare effects due to environmental tax reforms, with emphasis to what has become to known as the double dividend hypothesis. Finally, administrative costs in the context of optimal taxation is touched upon, a subject that is to a large degree repressed in optimal tax theory.
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| 66. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim
(författare)
-
Optimal taxation of intermediate goods in the presence of externalities : A survey towards the transport sector
- 2006
-
Rapport (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- The paper surveys the literature on optimal taxation with emphasis on intermediate goods, or, more specific, freight (road) transport. There are two models frequently used, first, the one emanated from Diamond & Mirrlees' (1971) paper, where the production efficiency lemma made it clear that intermediate goods was not to be taxed. And, second, the Ramsey-Boiteux model where a cost-of-service regulation imposes a budget constraint for the regulated firm. In the latter model, in contrast to the first, freight transports (intermediate goods) are to be taxed in the Ramsey tradition, and thus trades the production efficiency lemma against a budget restriction. The paper also discusses welfare effects due to environmental tax reforms, with emphasis to what has become to known as the double dividend hypothesis. Finally, administrative costs in the context of optimal taxation is touched upon, a subject that is to a large degree repressed in optimal tax theory.
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| 67. |
- Ahlberg, Joakim
(författare)
-
Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions : a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Portuguese economic journal. - Lissabon : Springer. - 1617-9838. ; 8:1, s. 3-14
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose in this paper a discrete bidding model, both on quantities and in pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. Both the value and the signals are drawn from a known discrete affiliated joint distribution. The relevant task for the paper is to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller's revenue between the three auction formats. We find that, among the three auction formats below with two players, the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, where the discriminatory auction becomes second and the uniform auction last. We also find that, in equilibrium, bidders bid the same amount on both items in the discriminatory auction; a phenomenon we do not notice in either of the other two auction formats. There, different amount of demand reduction is encountered.
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| 68. |
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| 69. |
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| 70. |
- Ahlström, Christer, et al.
(författare)
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A gaze-based driver distraction warning system and its effect on visual behaviour
- 2013
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Ingår i: IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems (Print). - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). - 1524-9050 .- 1558-0016. ; 14:2, s. 965-973
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Driver distraction is a contributing factor to many crashes; therefore, a real-time distraction warning system should have the potential to mitigate or circumvent many of these crashes. The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of a real-time distraction detection algorithm called AttenD. The evaluation is based on data from an extended field study comprising seven drivers who drove on an average of 4351 ± 2181 km in a naturalistic setting.Visual behavior was investigated both on a global scale and on a local scale in the surroundings of each warning. An increase in the percentage of glances at the rear-view mirror and a decrease in the amount of glances at the center console were found. The results also show that visual time sharing decreased in duration from 9.94 to 9.20 s due to the warnings, that the time from fully attentive to warning decreased from 3.20 to 3.03 s, and that the time from warning to full attentiveness decreased from 6.02 to 5.46 s. The limited number of participants does not allow any generalizable conclusions, but a trend toward improved visual behavior could be observed. This is a promising start for further improvements of the algorithm and the warning strategy.
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