| 41. |
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| 42. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Inequality Aversion, Externalities, and Pareto-Efficient Income Taxation
- 2020
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper analyzes Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation taking into account externalities induced through individual inequality aversion, meaning that people have preferences for equality. In doing so, we distinguish between four different and widely used models of inequality aversion. The results show that empirically and experimentally quantified degrees of inequality aversion have potentially very strong implications for Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation. It also turns out that the type of inequality aversion (self-centered vs. non-self-centered), and the specific measures of inequality used, matter a great deal. For example, based on simulation results mimicking the disposable income distribution in the U.S., the preferences suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) imply monotonically increasing marginal income taxes, with large negative marginal tax rates for low-income individuals and large positive marginal tax rates for high-income ones. In contrast, the in many respects comparable model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) implies close to zero marginal income tax rates for all.
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| 43. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas : on international tax coordination and social comparisons
- 2015
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 131, s. 71-86
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent evidence suggests that social comparisons between people in different countries have become more important over time due to globalization. This paper deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an international setting, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared both with other domestic residents and people in another country. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to each other, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive globally Pareto-efficient tax policies in a cooperative framework, and conclude that there are potentially large welfare gains of international tax policy coordination.
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| 44. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas : Optimal Income Taxation and RelativeConsumption in a Multi-Country Economy
- 2013
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Recent empirical evidence suggests that between-country social comparisons have become more important over time. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation in a multi-country economy, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared with both other domestic residents and people in other countries. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to one another, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive a globally efficient tax structure in a cooperative framework. Nash competition typically implies lower marginal income tax rates than chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game, and cooperation typically leads to higher marginal income tax rates than the non-cooperative regimes.
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| 45. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Labor supply, tax base and public policy in Sweden
- 2010
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Ingår i: Reforming the welfare State. - Chicago : University of Chicago Press. - 9780226261911 - 9780226261928 ; , s. 127-158
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 46. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Maximum Likelihood Bunching Estimators of the ETI
- 2021
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We propose a maximum likelihood method to improve the bunching approach of estimating the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), and derive estimators for several model settings such as bunching with optimization frictions, notches, and heterogeneity in the ETI. Modelling optimization frictions explicitly, our estimators fit the data of several published studies very well. In the presence of a notch, the results can differ substantially from those obtained using the polynomial approach. If there is heterogeneity in the ETI, the elasticity among those who bunch exceeds the average elasticity in the population.
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| 47. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Mixed Taxation and Transboundary Externalities : A Model with Large Jurisdictions
- 2014
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Ingår i: Public Finance Review. - : Sage Publications. - 1091-1421 .- 1552-7530. ; 42:2, s. 254-282
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns income taxation and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.
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| 48. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Mixed taxation, public goods and transboundary externalities : a model with large jurisdictions
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market producer price of the externality-generating commodity. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation and public goods. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.
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| 49. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
National product related welfare measures in the presence of technological change, externalities and uncertainty
- 2011
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Ingår i: Green national accounting and sustainability. - Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing. - 9781848446915 - 1848446918 ; , s. 178-189
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The purpose of this paper is to discuss under what conditions welfare can be measured by observables related to the national product (or Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory). Under nonattributable technological or environmental change, welfare will depend on time itself, meaning that the Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory will be a biased measure of welfare. This result will also hold if we make the time dependence of welfare endogenous, by replacing technological change will externalities that are not internalized during optimization. On the other hand, if we take the externalities fully into account, then the Hamiltonian will represent the appropriate measure of welfare. Similar results also hold in the case of uncertainty, where we show that a ‘generalized’ Hamiltonian provides a welfare measure, and that the deterministic measures are special cases of their stochastic counterparts.
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| 50. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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On environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage
- 2003
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Ingår i: Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Springer. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 24:2, s. 183-196
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper addresses optimal taxation, when therelationship between the consumption of a`dirty' good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers. The main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty, measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable, affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good. Incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality, and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion, we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty. If, on the other hand, thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump-sum tax in addition to the commodity tax,it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty, evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion. A similarresult emerges, although for different reasons,if the lump-sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax.
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