| 61. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal taxation and asymmetric information in an economy with second-hand trade
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal income and commodity taxation in a two-type overlapping generations model, where used durable goods are traded in a second-hand market. As second-hand transactions are difficult to observe, we assume that the government is unable to directly control second-hand transactions via commodity taxation. A basic question is how the government in this case may use the second-hand market as a channel for relaxation of the self-selection constraint. We show how the appearance of a second-hand market for used durable goods affects the optimal use of labor income and capital income taxation as well as the optimal use of commodity taxation on new durable goods.
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| 62. |
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| 63. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal taxation, global externalities and Labor mobility
- 2003
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 87:12, s. 2749-2764
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.
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| 64. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Optimal Taxation, Redistribution, and Environmental Externalities
- 2017
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Ingår i: International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics. - : Umeå University. - 1932-1465 .- 1932-1473. ; 11:3, s. 233-308
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper surveys research on optimal redistributive taxation in economies with environmental externalities. A major question is whether externality correction only motivates an adjustment of the tax policy rule for the externality-generating activity, or whether the marginal value of the externality directly enters the policy rules for other tax instruments as well. In a static benchmark model with an atmospheric consumption externality, where the government uses a mix of a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes, we show that Sandmo’s (1975) additivity property applies. This means that externality correction leads to an additional term (measuring the marginal value of the externality) in the commodity tax formula for the externality generating good, while the policy rules for commodity taxation of clean goods and marginal income taxation take the same form as in the absence of any externality. We also extend this benchmark model to capture a number of scenarios (such as non-atmospheric externalities, border trade in the externality generating good, and competition between governments in a multi-country framework), where the additivity property no longer applies. We end by examining an intertemporal model of optimal taxation with a stock-externality, allowing us to integrate the study of optimal redistributive taxation with literature on environmental economics and policy based on dynamic models.
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| 65. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Outsourcing and optimal nonlinear taxation : a note
- 2009
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - Amsterdam : North-Holland. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 102:2, s. 135-137
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper concerns optimal taxation and outsourcing. If the government has a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the policy rules for marginal income taxation remain as in the standard model. Otherwise, outsourcing contributes to a more progressive income tax structure.
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| 66. |
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| 67. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Paternalism against Veblen: Optimal Taxation and Non-respected Preferences for Social Comparisons
- 2018
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Ingår i: American Economic Journal-Economic Policy. - : American Economic Association. - 1945-7731 .- 1945-774X. ; 10:1, s. 39-76
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper compares optimal nonlinear income tax policies of welfarist and paternalist governments, where the latter does not respect individual preferences regarding relative consumption. Consistent with previous findings, relative consumption concerns typically induce a welfarist government to increase the marginal tax rates to internalize positional externalities. Remarkably, the optimal marginal tax rules are often very similar in the paternalist case, where such externalities are not taken into account. We identify several cases where the marginal tax rules are indeed identical between the governments. Numerical simulations show that marginal and average tax levels and the overall redistribution are often also similar.
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| 68. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
-
Positional concerns in an OLG model : optimal labor and capital income taxation
- 2010
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Ingår i: International Economic Review. - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0020-6598 .- 1468-2354. ; 51:4, s. 1071-1095
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two-type OLG model when individuals' relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low-ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within-generation and upward comparisons.
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| 69. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Positional Preferences and Efficiency in a Dynamic Economy
- 2020
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Based on an endogenous growth model, this paper characterizes the conditions under which positional preferences do not give rise to intertemporal distortions as well as derives an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. In our model, individuals can be positional both in terms of their consumption and wealth, the relative concerns partly reflect comparisons with people in other countries, and we distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a paternalist government that does not respect positional preferences. We also extend the analysis to a multi-country framework and show that Nash-competition among local paternalist governments leads to a global social optimum, whereas Nash-competition among local welfarist governments does not.
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| 70. |
- Aronsson, Thomas, 1963-, et al.
(författare)
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Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
- 2023
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Ingår i: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 61, s. 311-337
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.
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