| 31. |
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| 32. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Hur avveckla hyreskontrollen?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - 0345-2646. ; 44:7, s. 17-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Vad som fordras för en någorlunda väl fungerande marknad för hyreslägenheter är ett omfattande reformpaket som bl a innefattar en gradvis avveckling av hyreskontrollen, ett ökat stöd till låginkomsttagare (eventuellt i form av riktade hyressubventioner) och en mindre byråkratisk byggnadslagstiftning. En viktig fördel med att locka tillbaka privata investerare till marknaden för nybyggda hyresfastigheter är att den offentliga sektorn därmed frigör resurser för investeringar i offentligt finansierad infrastruktur och i anläggningar för sociala tjänster, som utbildning, sjukvård och äldrevård.
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| 33. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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ICT and Household-Firm Relations
- 1999
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper discusses how ICT and emerging electronic commerce in consumer products influence the relative efficiency in production of households and firms, resulting in changes in the division of tasks between these two types of agents. Increased information and competence of households, in combination with stiffer competition among firms, will also increase the power of households relative to firms, at least in a long-term perspective with free entry firms. Households will also get more powerful channels to influence firms directly, i.e., beside the indirect influence via market transactions. We point out that this will result in various counter-reactions by firms, including increased differentiation of products and prices. Finally, we briefly consider various limitations and obstacles to electronic commerce in a long-term perspective.
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| 34. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
-
Improving the Performance of the European Social Model : The Welfare State over the Life Cycle
- 2003
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The achievements of social-welfare arrangements in Western Europe are well known: considerable income security, relatively little poverty and, in some countries, ample supply of social services. But there are also well-known weaknesses and hence considerable scope for improvement. Three types of weaknesses are considered in this paper: social-welfare arrangements are often not financially robust to shocks; individuals make undesirable behavioural adjustments in response to welfare-state arrangements and their financing; and social-welfare arrangements are often poorly adapted to recent changes in socio-economic conditions and preferences of individuals. I discuss these weaknesses, and alternative methods to mitigate them, in the context of various types of welfare-state arrangements that the individual may encounter over the life cycle.
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| 35. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Improving the SGP : Taxes and Delegation Rather than Fines
- 2004
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an “economic-theory” perspective on optimal corrective measures with the “legalistic” perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss the advantages of replacing the Pact’s rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce.
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| 36. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behaviour
- 1997
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In a broad psychological perspective, both economic incentives and social norms may be regarded as giving rise to purposeful, or "rational" behavior. By this I simply mean that individuals act in accordance with expected reward or punishment, even though the form these take differs substantially in the two cases. Whereas economic incentives imply "material rewards", or favors that can be traded for such rewards including leisure, social norms imply "social rewards". The latter basically take the form of approval or disapproval from others and related feelings of pride or shame. Moreover, once a social norm has been internalized in an individual's own value system, behavior in accordance with, or against, the norm will also result in feelings of self-respect or guilt. All this suggests that not only economic incentives but also social norms may be analyzed by means of utility theory, as will be illustrated below. Many social norms may not have much to do with economic incentives (Elster, 1989). In some cases, it is, however, useful to study the interaction between them. Indeed, this is the basic message of the paper. My discussion to three norms of apparent importance for household behavior: (i) work norms; (ii) norms against wage underbidding; and (iii) saving and consumption norms. Thus, the paper deals with norms concering willingness to work, ability to get a job and the use of income.
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| 37. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Incentives in the Welfare-State : Lessons for would-be welfare states
- 1996
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper deals with economic incentives and welfare-state arrangements in OECD countries; it also offers some lessons for would-be welfare states. These arrangements differ, of course, among OECD countries. In particular, there is wide variation in the extent to which countries rely on four basic institutions - the state, the firm, the family and the market. Countries also differ in their reliance on (i) a common safety net, often in the form of flat-rate benefits tied to specific contingencies; (ii) means-tested benefits for low-income groups; and (iii) income protection, i.e., benefits that are tied to previous income. Another distinction between corporatist welfare states, where benefits are tied to labor contracts, and universal welfare states in which benefits are conditional on residence or citizenship. This distinction is blurred, however, by recent tendencies in corporatist welfare states to extend coverage to individuals who have very weak attachment to the labor market, and in universal welfare states to tie benefits to previous or contemporary work under the slogan "workfare" rather than "welfare".The degree of generosity of benefits is another important distinction. Of course, the lower the benefit levels, the stronger the incentives for citizens to opt for voluntary (market) solutions, in the form of private saving and private insurance arrangements.When considering incentive problems in connection with various types of welfare-state arrangements, this paper emphasizes what may be called "dynamic" issues, i.e., incentive effects that evolve over time. These also include endogenous changes in social norms among individuals and endogenous adjustments in political behavior. This approach also makes it necessary to broaden the analysis to fields outside conventionally defined "economic analysis".
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| 38. |
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| 39. |
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| 40. |
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