| 11. |
- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Attributional biases about the origins of preferences in a group-decision situation.
- 2007
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Attributional bias between groups has been shown to exist when group-boundaries are composed of attitudes that are self-defining (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). We wanted to see if attributional bias between groups would exist when the attitude issue separating the groups was not self-defining. Further, we wanted to see whether a decision of the issue would affect attributional bias. This was done in an experiment where participants, high-school students, read about a hypothetical situation where a decision was to be made. The decision would affect the school’s students, but was not considered self-defining. The participants stated their preferred outcome of the decision. Outcome was manipulated to be either concordant or discordant with participants´ preferences. Further, decision-making form varied so that in one condition, participants were informed that in-group authorities (student representatives) had made the final decision, and in the other condition, the decision was made by out-group authorities (the principal and teachers). Results showed that attributional bias was present when attitude issue was not self-defining. When outcome supported preferred alternative, attributional bias was stronger. Being part of the winning side, that is the high-status group, provides self-validation and increases self-esteem (Tyler, 1994 ). This interpretation is supported by further analysis showing that high self-esteem was related to more attributional bias. Attributional bias was stronger when the decision was made by in-group authorities as compared to out-group authorities. When in-group members make a decision, attributional bias may increase as a function of in-group identification, which provides information about self-worth (Smith & Tyler, 1997).
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Biased attributions regarding the origins of preferences in a group decision situation
- 2010
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Ingår i: European Journal of Social Psychology. - : Wiley. - 0046-2772 .- 1099-0992. ; 40:2, s. 270-281
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The current research investigated biases in attributions of the origins of others’ preferences in a group decision situation. In two experiments, students indicated their preferred alternative in a decision on an important issue in their school, and then explained the bases for preferences of those agreeing and disagreeing with them. Results showed that participants saw preferences of those who agreed as more rationally and less externally based than of those who disagreed. This effect increased with perceived issue importance, when the decision was made by in-group representatives, when the decision outcome was concordant with their own preference (Study 1), and, on the externality dimension, when their representatives were in the majority when deciding on an important issue (Study 2). Findings have important implications for our understanding of the tolerance of others and acceptance of group decisions, and ultimately, how group members behave and interact.
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| 14. |
- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Defending or challenging the status quo : Effects of position on biased perceptions of opponents
- 2009
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Ingår i: Proceedings of 21st Annual Convention of the Association for Psychological Science, San Francisco, 2009. ; , s. 215-215
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- People want to maintain status quo. Most prior research concern groups with real status differences. Pro/con status quo position may itself carry status information. Three studies explored the effects of pro/con status quo position on biased perceptions of others. Challengers were more biased, regardless of real status differences. Supporting summary The default ideological position is status quo maintaining (Skitka et al. 2002). Most prior research concerns groups with real status differences, such as majority/minority status (Jost et. al., 2004). In general, people tend to ascribe more favourable reasons for the attitude position of those who agree vs. disagree with oneself (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002, Reeder et al., 2004), but perceptions of others may vary as a function of power position, such that the powerful are more biased than the powerless (Guinote et al, 2002). It has been argued that defenders of the status quo perceive a greater sense of power than challengers (De Dreu et al, 2008), and thus defenders should be more biased than challengers. However, as challengers are opposing the default position, they may experience threat, which has been shown to increase biases (Stephan et. al., 2002) and a need to justify own position. Thus, it seems possible that pro/con status quo position may carry status information separate from real intergroup status differences. In three studies, we explored how defenders and challengers of the status quo perceive those who agreed and disagreed with their position, trying to separate the effects of pro/con status quo position from status position (e. g. majority/minority). In Study 1, participants stated own preferred alternative on a controversial issue (whether wearing religious symbols should be prohibited in schools or not) and rated the origins of preferences of those who agreed and disagreed. Challengers of the status quo were more biased than defenders, such that they ascribed more favourable origins of preferences of those who agreed as opposed to disagreed with them than did defenders. In reality, though, challengers were in minority. Hence, in Study 2, majority/minority status of pro/con status quo position was manipulated, such that participants were informed about the majority/minority status of their own preference position in one of several randomly assigned attitude issues (e.g., gay couples’ right to child adoption, prohibition of religious symbols in schools). Results showed that majority/minority information did not affect biases, but pro/con status quo position did, such that challengers were again more biased than defenders. Again, in reality, challengers were in fact in minority. Thus, in a final study, challengers were in reality in majority (on the issue of whether teachers’ should be allowed to confiscate students’ disturbing cell phones during class hours). Again, challengers were more biased even though they in reality were in majority. To conclude, it seems that real status differences are not needed for biased perceptions of others, but rather perceived status differences implied by pro/con status quo position is decisive. This is an important finding as it implies that people who want to change the current situation may feel threatened and hence refrain from expressing their attitudes, although their opinion may actually be shared by a majority. This could have deteriorating effects for an evolving society, where people feel powerless over their situation. Future research should examine what characteristics may be prevalent among those who actually express their challenging opinions.
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| 15. |
- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
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Status Quo Change: Bias Differences Between Pro and Con Positions
- 2009
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Ingår i: XIth annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Tampa, February 5-7, 2009.
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The default ideological position is status quo maintaining (Skitka et. al., 2002), and people typically perceive more self-interest in arguements undermining rather than maintaining the status quo (O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). However, it is not known how people pro status quo change perceive those disagree rather than agree with themselves. In three studies the current research explored how individuals pro and con a status quo change on a controversial issue (e. g., gay couples’ right to child adoption, prohibition of religious symbols in schools) perceived the externality and rationality of preferences among those who agreed and disagreed with their own preference (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). In all three studies, individuals pro- as compared to con a status quo change showed more bias, that is more perceived externality and less rationality behind preferences of those disagreeing rather than agreeing with themselves. Individuals pro status quo change were more biased when a decision on the target issue was made that concorded rather than discorded with their own preference, whereas those against a change showed more bias with a discordant decision outcome. Because status quo is default position, people who challenge it take a risk, possibly inducing threat feelings which should increase biases (Stephan et. al., 2002). A concordant decision outcome in this situation may have a validating function, boosting self-enhancement and increase biases (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
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| 16. |
- Bäck, Emma, et al.
(författare)
-
The role of issue importance in biased biases regarding the origins of preferences
- 2008
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Ingår i: Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Albuquerque, 2008.
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Konferensbidrag (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Important issues seem to elicit attributional biases regarding origins of attitudes, such that people holding the same attitude as oneself (ingroup) is seen as more rational and less externally influenced than people holding an opposing attitude (outgroup) (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). The current research examines the role of issue importance for such biases in three studies. In Study 1, students read about pros and cons of prohibiting religious symbols in Swedish schools. They stated their preferred alternative, issue importance, and rated origins of preferences for the ingroup and outgroup. Issue importance was related to biases. This relation was tested in two follow-up studies where high school students read about a hypothetical decision situation where their school was to decide whether to prohibit religious symbols or not. In both studies, participants stated preferred decision alternative and issue importance. Decision outcome was manipulated to concord or discord with participants’ preferences. In Study 2, decision-making form varied so the decision was made by the student council, school authorities or by voting. In Study 3, the student council of participants’ own and an adjacent school were going to make the decision together. School size and composition principle of the student council varied. Results showed that biases varied with target group and issue importance in both studies. In Study 2, biases also varied with decision-making form and outcome, although this was not replicated in Study 3. Importance seems to be decisive for biases, and decision-making form and outcome may under some circumstances influence biases.
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| 17. |
- Cancino-Montecinos, Sebastian, et al.
(författare)
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A General Model of Dissonance Reduction : Unifying Past Accounts via an Emotion Regulation Perspective
- 2020
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Ingår i: Frontiers in Psychology. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1664-1078. ; 11
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cognitive dissonance has been studied for more than 60 years and many insightful findings have come from this research. However, some important theoretical and methodological issues are yet to be resolved, particularly regarding dissonance reduction. In this paper, we place dissonance theory in the larger framework of appraisal theories of emotion, emotion regulation, and coping. The basic premise of dissonance theory is that people experience negative affect (to varying degrees) following the detection of cognitive conflict. The individual will be motivated to alleviate these emotional reactions and could do so by reducing dissonance in some manner. We argue that detection of dissonance will follow the same principles as when people interpret any other stimuli as emotionally significant. Thus, appraisal theory of emotion, which argues that emotions are generated via the cognitive evaluation of surrounding stimuli, should be applicable to the dissonance-detection process. In short, we argue that dissonance-reduction strategies (attitude change, trivialization, denial of responsibility, etc.) can be understood as emotion-regulation strategies. We further argue that this perspective contributes to reconciling fragmented (and sometimes contrary) viewpoints present in the literature on dissonance reduction. In addition to proposing the general model of dissonance reduction, we illustrate at the hand of empirical data how research on dissonance reduction can be performed without relying on experimental paradigms that focus on a specific reduction strategy.
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| 18. |
- Cancino-Montecinos, Sebastian, et al.
(författare)
-
Cognitive dissonance leads to an abstract mindset
- 2016
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Ingår i: Book of abstract. ; , s. 38-38
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study investigated the effects of cognitive dissonance on abstract thinking. According to action-identification theory, whenever people try to understand a situation in a new way, they activate an abstract mindset. Based on this premise, dissonance was hypothesized to put people in an abstract mindset. The induced compliance paradigm, in which participants are asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay under either low choice (producing little dissonance) or high choice (producing more dissonance), was employed. Results showed that dissonance did in fact activate a more abstract mindset, and this effect was more pronounced for participants having a more concrete mindset to begin with. This suggests that increasing abstraction, as a reaction to cognitive conflict, is a way for people to resolve inconsistencies.
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| 19. |
- Cancino-Montecinos, Sebastian, et al.
(författare)
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Dissonance and abstraction : Cognitive conflict leads to higher level of construal
- 2017
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Ingår i: 18th General Meeting of The European Association of Social Psychology. - : European Association of Social Psychology. ; , s. 123-123
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Konferensbidrag (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This study investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on abstraction. Results revealed that an abstract mindset was in fact activated when participants experienced cognitive conflict. This suggest that cognitive conflicts are closely related to increased abstraction.
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| 20. |
- Cancino-Montecinos, Sebastian, et al.
(författare)
-
Dissonance and abstraction : Cognitive conflict leads to higher level of construal
- 2018
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Ingår i: European Journal of Social Psychology. - : Wiley. - 0046-2772 .- 1099-0992. ; 48:1, s. 100-107
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This study investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on abstract thinking. According to action-identification theory, an ambiguous and unfamiliar situation might propel an individual to a more abstract mindset. Based on this premise, cognitive conflict was hypothesized to put people in an abstract mindset. The induced compliance paradigm, in which participants are asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay under either low choice (producing little dissonance) or high choice (producing more dissonance), was employed. Results showed that an abstract mindset was in fact activated in the induced compliance paradigm, and this effect was more pronounced for participants having a more concrete mindset to begin with. The results suggest that the experience of cognitive conflict is closely related to increased abstraction.
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