| 31. |
- Käll, Jannice, et al.
(författare)
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Rättens automatisering
- 2021
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Ingår i: AI, Digitalisering och Rätten. - 9789144137858 ; , s. 28-44
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 32. |
- Liljefors, Max, et al.
(författare)
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War and Algorithm
- 2019
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Bok (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- New military technologies are animated by fantasies of perfect knowledge, lawfulness, and vision that contrast sharply with the very real limits of human understanding, law, and vision. Thus, various kinds of violent acts are proliferating while their precise nature remains unclear. Especially manmachine ensembles, guided by algorithms, are operating in ways that challenge conceptual understanding. War and Algorithm looks at the increasing power of algorithms in these emerging forms of warfare from the perspectives of critical theory, philosophy, legal studies, and visual studies. The contributions in this volume grapple with the challenges posed by algorithmic warfare and trace the roots of new forms of war in the technological practices and forms of representation of the digital age. Together, these contributions provide a first step toward understanding and resisting our emerging world of war.
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| 33. |
- Marques Pedro, Guilherme, 1984-
(författare)
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The Human Right to Leave: But Whereto?
- 2022
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- While all persons — with a few exceptions — are allowed to leave any country regardless of nationality, not all persons are allowed to enter any country of their choosing; and only citizens enjoy, in principle, the right to enter their country of nationality, which most often, and by necessity, is a restricted number of countries, since some of them prohibit multiple nationality. One claim that is frequently made in contemporary migration-related literature, and that much migration-related philosophical debate presupposes in one way or another, yet remains unexplored, is the claim that the right to leave a state – enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 – does not entail a right to enter another state. This claim is typically made in relation or conjunction with another (set of) claims: that this alleged state of affairs is wrong somehow, or vice versa, that it is not. This dissertation deals with both claims and offer a first systematic study of these. On the one hand, the aforementioned descriptive claim has caught the attention of many observers who have, for the most part, taken it as a fairly undisputed description of current international law. I defend the view I call descriptive legal symmetrism, according to which there already is a form of symmetry between entry and exit rights, albeit not the one that most scholars set out to look for. On the other hand, in the context of the normative set of claims made by some authors concerning whether this alleged state of affairs is either immoral or unlawful (or both) in that it would expose the migrant to moral injustice and a protection gap in the contemporary human rights regime (namely, that of having, after leaving a country, nowhere to go), I submit that the object of disagreement in the normative legal debate concerns whether or not we ought to use the law to enforce what I call ‘Proposition A’: ‘it is permitted that any person leaves any country (besides justified exceptions), therefore it is obligatory that all states permit entry (besides justified exceptions)’. I conclude that much of the debate focuses on matters that, albeit interesting in their own right, might not be what is at stake. I hope to contribute to the normative discussion by sorting out the different positions, illustrating their truth-making conditions, and stressing where a position depends on problematic assumptions.
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| 34. |
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| 35. |
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| 36. |
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| 37. |
- Noll, Gregor, 1964
(författare)
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AI, digitalisering och den transnationella rätten
- 2024
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Ingår i: Folkrätten i svensk rätt. - Lund : Studentlitteratur. - 9789144159508 ; , s. 433-446
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Artificiell intelligens (AI) och digitalisering har inneburit en maktförskjutning från politiska och rättsliga organ till företag som bemästrar teknologin och som byggt upp oligopolliknande strukturer runt den. Som vid tidigare teknikskiften är juridiken sen med att reagera på denna normativa utmanare, och att skapa nya, anpassade rättsnormer i den internationella sfären tar tid. Den röda tråd som går genom detta kapitel är frågan om AI och digitalisering kan regleras på ett adekvat sätt med den transnationella rättens medel. Med ’den transnationella rätten’ menas här folkrätten, EU-rätten och, i relevanta fall, nationella rättssystem. Kapitlet belyser varför det är svårt att lagstifta internationellt om AI och redogör för ett folkrättsligt försök att ta fram lex specialis för AI och digitalisering, nämligen regleringen av så kallade lethal autonomous weapons systems – dödliga autonoma vapensystem. Vidare redovisas EU:s och Europarådets försök att ta fram ramlagstiftning för AI. I kapitlet ställs också frågan vilken roll domstolarna har avseende AI och digitalisering.
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| 38. |
- Noll, Gregor
(författare)
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Analogy at war: proportionality, equality and the law of targeting
- 2013
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Ingår i: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. - 0167-6768. ; 43, s. 205-230
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This text is an inquiry into how the international community is understood in and through international law. My prism for this inquiry shall be the principle of proportionality in international humanitarian law, relating expected civilian losses to anticipated military advantage. To properly understand proportionality, I have to revert to the structure of analogical thinking in the thomistic tradition. Proportionality presupposes a third element to which civilian losses and military advantage can be related. In a first reading, I develop how this tradition of thought might explain the difficulties contemporary IHL doctrine has in understanding proportionality. If military commanders misconceive the third element as the sovereignty of their own state, they will invariably apply the proportionality principle in a paternalistic manner. This would obviate the most rudimentary idea of equality among states and do away with the common of an international community. In a second reading, I shall explore whether this third element could instead be thought of as a demos, while retaining the existing framework of analogical thinking. My argument is that this secularizing replacement is possible. Practically, its consequence would be a radical change in the task of the responsible military commander determining proportionality. That commander would now need to rethink civilians endangered by an attack as a demos whose potentiality must be preserved.
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| 39. |
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| 40. |
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