| 11. |
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| 12. |
- Forsberg, Niklas, 1972-
(författare)
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Philosophy, Literature and the Inheritance of Language
- 2004
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation investigates the extent to which philosophical assumptions are inherited when we learn language. The topic is approached through an investigation into the importance of literature in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. In chapter 1 it is argued that Derrida’s interest in literature is best seen as an attempt to make room for a thinking that is not controlled by limitations inherent in the language inherited. Chapter 2 describes how the question of literature is related to Derrida’s overall deconstructive philosophical project. In Derrida’s view, our philosophical problems and metaphysical thinking as such are dependent upon a particular understanding of the linguistic sign. Chapter 3 describes why a literature that is based on and formed by a traditional conception of meaning is not going to be useful for Derrida in his deconstructive philosophy, since that notion contains, in Derrida’s view, a reinforcement of traditional metaphysical assumptions.Chapter 4 describes Derrida’s alternative understanding of “literature” and situates this notion in his “quasi-transcendental” philosophy. It is argued that, in Derrida’s philosophy, the question of “literature” must be understood as intertwined with these three things: the transcendental/empirical distinction, Derrida’s attempt to re-think phenomenology and his conception of language. In chapter 5 Derrida’s view of language is examined. It is argued that Derrida’s notion of the sign is more restricted in scope than Derrida claims and that he has overestimated the importance of certain linguistic conceptions of language. It is argued that Derrida’s interest in “literature”, as a response to philosophical assumptions inherent in language, is dependent upon a much too detached view of language that fails to do justice to ordinary facts about language use and about language acquisition. Chapter 6 contains a summary and an elaboration of my own position.
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| 13. |
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| 14. |
- Gustavsson, Michael, et al.
(författare)
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The Subject of Autobiography
- 2001
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Ingår i: Omnium-gatherum: Philosophical essays dedicated to Jan Österberg on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. - Uppsala : Uppsala university. ; , s. 279-286
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 15. |
- Hasselberg, Ylva, 1967-, et al.
(författare)
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Conclusion : On the Verge of Breakdown
- 2013
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Ingår i: Transformations i Research, Higher Education and the Academic Market. - Dordrecht : Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. - 9789400752498
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 16. |
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| 17. |
- Hållén, Elinor
(författare)
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A Different Kind of Ignorance : Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge
- 2011
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self-deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self-deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self-deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self-knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects.
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| 18. |
- Jansson Boström, Erik, 1985-
(författare)
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Max Weber och idealtypernas nödvändighet
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis has two aims: first, to investigate Max Weber’s account of “objective validity” in the cultural sciences; second, to elaborate a more concrete version of this position using Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later remarks on language.Chapter 1 introduces Weber’s idea of objective validity and proposes that in order to understand Weber’s idea of ideal types, we need to re-evaluate Weber’s understanding of the term Bedeutung in “The ‘Objectivity’ of knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”.Chapter 2 presents Weber’s notion of ideal types and raises a number of problems to be dealt with in the following chapters. The central questions are i) why Weber thinks that ideal types are sometimes necessary in order to reach objective validity, and ii) under which circumstances this might be the case. The chapter argues that the answer to the last question is that Weber thinks that ideal types are necessary for objectivity within a specific kind of study of meaning (Bedeutung) within the cultural sciences. Chapter 3, in turn, focuses on why ideal types are necessary within this kind of cultural science by taking a closer look at how to understand Weber’s concept of given reality and the connection between meaning, concepts, reality and values in the methodological writings that constitute “Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics”.In chapter 4, the central issue of objective validity can finally be addressed. The investigation shows that what Weber says about objective validity does not cohere with what follows from his arguments concerning the relation between meaning, given reality, values and concepts. I conclude that Weber fails to provide a clear and consistent account of what objectivity could mean in the cultural sciences. This also means that Weber fails to clarify the necessity of formulating ideal types.These deficiencies notwithstanding, I argue, Weber succeeds in formulating cogent arguments concerning the relationship between given reality, values and concepts. In chapter 5, I use Wittgenstein’s later remarks on language to develop a clear and consistent conceptualization of ideal types, and propose an account of what objectivity can mean in the cultural sciences and how it can be realized.
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| 19. |
- Johansson, Anders, 1968-, et al.
(författare)
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Kritikens läge : En intervju av Leila Brännström
- 2011
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Ingår i: Fronesis. - Stockholm : Tidskriftsföreningen Fronesis. - 1404-2614. ; :36-37, s. 20-37
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 20. |
- Kristensen, Kasper, 1985-
(författare)
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Spinoza on Ethical Cultivation : An Analysis of Vulnerability, Empowerment, and Early Modern Cultura Animi
- 2023
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This dissertation concerns Benedict Spinoza’s (1632–1677) account of ethical life, emphasising the role of techniques and exercises for achieving greater power to control one’s thoughts, emotions, and actions. The study aims to show that Spinoza offers a much more coherent and ambitious ethical theory than what is commonly acknowledged, involving both theoretical and practical considerations.The primary focus of the dissertation is to trace the influence of the early modern cultura animi (cultivation of the soul) tradition on Spinoza’s moral philosophy and to explore the novel use to which he puts it. Chapter One relates the central aims of Spinoza’s philosophy to a conception of philosophy as the art of living, connecting the Renaissance humanist revival of cultura animi tradition to Spinoza’s own attempt to construct a scientific ethics. Chapter Two analyses how Spinoza’s theories of imagination, judgment, and emotions explain the deep-rooted habits and prejudices that present key obstacles to ethical progress. Taking this diagnosis of human nature as a point of departure, Chapter Three explores the difficulties involved in trying to attain adequate knowledge and argues that Spinoza constructs his philosophical method to remedy the natural weakness of human understanding. Chapter Four explains Spinoza’s account of the central moral concepts of good and evil, articulating and defending an objectivist reading of his value theory. Chapter Five considers the extent to which a rational understanding of good and evil can alter habits and guide action given that passions are often more powerful than reason. Building on the weakness of reason to control the passions, Chapter Six shows that spiritual exercises are necessary components in Spinoza’s proposed remedy insofar as they fortify rational understanding by producing firm habits of character. The concluding discussion underlines that Spinoza’s ethical cultivation should not be seen as a linear process that secures stable happiness. Rather, people are and remain subject to the power of illusory beliefs and passions, and the ethical struggle is ongoing. By cultivating understanding, modifying one’s desires, reforming vicious habits and performing virtuous actions, however, the individual can learn to live with his or her vulnerability more happily and virtuously.
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