| 21. |
- Brax, David, 1979
(författare)
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Hatbrottslagstiftning i Sverige och i Europa
- 2014
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Ingår i: Förhoppningar och farhågor - Sveriges första 20 år i EU. - Göteborg : University of Gothenburg. - 9189608364 ; , s. 181-196
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 22. |
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| 23. |
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| 24. |
- Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955
(författare)
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Cognitive Architectures Based on Natural Info-Computation
- 2022
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Ingår i: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics. - Cham : Springer. - 2192-6255 .- 2192-6263. ; , s. 3-13, s. 3-13
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- At the time when the first models of cognitive architectures have been proposed, some forty years ago, understanding of cognition, embodiment and evolution was substantially different from today’s. So was the state of the art of information physics, information chemistry, bioinformatics, neuroinformatics, computational neuroscience, complexity theory, self-organization, theory of evolution, as well as the basic concepts of information and computation. Novel developments support a constructive interdisciplinary framework for cognitive architectures based on natural morphological computing, where interactions between constituents at different levels of organization of matter-energy and their corresponding time-dependent dynamics, lead to complexification of agency and increased cognitive capacities of living organisms that unfold through evolution. Proposed info-computational framework for naturalizing cognition considers present updates (generalizations) of the concepts of information, computation, cognition, and evolution in order to attain an alignment with the current state of the art in corresponding research fields. Some important open questions are suggested for future research with implications for further development of cognitive and intelligent technologies.
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| 25. |
- Dodig Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955
(författare)
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Cognitive revolution, virtuality and good life
- 2013
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Ingår i: AI and Society. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0951-5666 .- 1435-5655. ; 28:3, s. 319-327
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We are living in an era when the focus of human relationships with the world is shifting from execution and physical impact to control and cognitive/informational interaction. This emerging, increasingly informational world is our new ecology, an infosphere that presents the grounds for a cognitive revolution based on interactions in networks of biological and artificial, intelligent agents. After the industrial revolution, which extended the human body through mechanical machinery, the cognitive revolution extends the human mind/cognition through information-processing machinery. These novel circumstances come with new qualities and preferences demanding new conceptualizations. We have some work ahead of us to establish value systems and practices extended from the real to the increasingly virtual/info-computational. This paper first presents a current view of the virtual versus the real and then offers an interpretation framework based on an info-computational understanding of cognition in which agency implies computational processing of informational structures of the world as an infosphere. The notion of "good life" is discussed in light of different ideals of well-being in the infosphere, connecting virtuality as a space of potential and alternative worlds for an agent for whom the reality is a space of actual experiences, in the sense of Deleuze. Even though info-computational framework enables us to see both the real world and the diversity of virtual worlds in terms of computational processes on informational structures, based on a distinct layered cognitive architecture of all physical agents, there is clear difference between potential worlds of the virtual and actual agent's experiences made in the real. Info-computationalism enables insight into the mechanisms of infosphere and elucidates its importance as cognitively predominant environment and communication media. The conclusion is that by cocooning ourselves in an elaborate info-computational infrastructure of the virtual, we may be increasingly isolating ourselves from the reality of direct experience of the world. The biggest challenges of the cognitive revolution may not be technological but ethical. They are about the nature of being human and its values. © 2012 Springer-Verlag London Limited.
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| 26. |
- Endörfer, Richard, 1989, et al.
(författare)
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What’s the Point of Efficiency? On Heath’s Market Failures Approach
- 2022
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Ingår i: Business Ethics Quarterly. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1052-150X .- 2153-3326. ; 34:1, s. 35 - 59
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article reviews and criticizes Joseph Heath’s market failures approach (MFA) to business ethics. Our criticism is organized into three sections. First, we argue that, even under the ideal assumptions of perfect competition, when markets generate Pareto-efficient distributions, Heath’s approach does not rule out significant harms. Second, we show that, under nonideal conditions, the MFA is either too demanding, if efficiency is to be attained, or not sufficiently demanding, if the goal of Pareto efficiency is abandoned. Finally, we argue that Heath’s appeal to regulations and specific moral requirements as a remedy for market failures is unlikely to safeguard efficiency and exposes a number of general worries regarding the moral force of the MFA. We end this article with a constructive suggestion on how to adjust the MFA to avoid these problems while preserving its contractualist and Paretian spirit.
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| 27. |
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EU Citizenship: Twenty Years On : Special Issue German Law Journal
- 2014
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Maastricht Treaty (the “Treaty”) first introduced the status of EU citizenship. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, marked in 2013, was declared the European Year of the Citizen. Union citizenship has been understood as the world’s first post-national citizenship, although it is still complementary to national citizenships. EU citizens enjoy rights that have been expanded, modified, and reinterpreted in light of the EU integration process. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been a driving force in this process. This twentieth anniversary has provided the occasio for this special issue. Indeed, much has happened over the last two decades. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on the heels of German reunification, and afterwards, a series of EU treaties followed: The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, the aborted constitutionalization process and the Rome Treaty in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon. The Euro took over former national currencies in 2002; the enlargement process led to today’s twenty-eight Member States. But the ratio of this special issue is based on other events as linked to the 2008 financial crisis, bailouts, the fiscal compact, and similar measures. In a nutshell, the timeliness of this volume is linked to the current financial disarray. Since prognosis presupposes diagnosis, no further words are necessary as to the importance of this task. It is (almost) self-evident that before taking action and preparing for the future, one needs to address the very first question: Nosce te ipsum...
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| 28. |
- Francén, Ragnar, 1977
(författare)
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Moral Disagreement and Practical Direction
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - : Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - 1559-3061. ; 23:2, s. 273-303
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Whenever A judges that x-ing is morally wrong and B judges that x-ing is not morally wrong, we think that they disagree. The two standard types of accounts of such moral disagreements both presuppose that the class of moral wrong-judgments is uniform, though in different ways. According to the belief account, the disagreement is doxastic: A and B have beliefs with conflicting cognitive contents. This presupposes “belief-uniformity”: that the content of moral concepts is invariant in such a way that, whenever A believes that x-ing is morally wrong and B believes that x-ing is not morally wrong, their beliefs have mutually inconsistent contents. According to the attitude account, moral disagreements are non-doxastic: A and B have clashing practical attitudes. This presupposes “attitude-uniformity”: that moral judgments are always accompanied by, or consist of, desire-like attitudes. Consequently, neither account is available if both uniformity-claims are rejected – as e.g., various forms of content-relativism do. This paper presents a new non-doxastic account of deontic moral disagreement, consistent with the rejection of both uniformity-claims. I argue first, that even if deontic moral judgments are not desires, and are not always accompanied by desires, they have practical direction in the same sense as desires: they are attitudes that one can act in accordance or discordance with. Second: deontic moral disagreement can be understood as clashes in practical direction: roughly, A and B morally disagree if, and only if, some way of acting is in accordance with A’s judgment but in discordance with B’s.
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| 29. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise
- 2016
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 19:5, s. 1225-1240
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second one does not. It is argued that reasons require alternative possibilities, because reasons are action-guiding. A supposed reason to do the impossible, or to do what was inevitable anyway, could not fill this function. I discuss different interpretations of the claim that reasons are action-guiding, and show that according to one interpretation it is sufficient that the agent believes that she has several alternative options. According to other interpretations, the agent must really have alternative options, but only in a compatibilist sense. I suggest that an interpretation of action-guidance according to which reasons can only guide actions when we have several options open to us in an incompatibilist sense cannot be found. We should therefore assume that reasons and obligations are compatible with determinism.
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| 30. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Retributivism and uncertainty : Why do we punish criminals?
- 2021
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Annan publikation (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Retributivism is the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others.
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