| 31. |
- Jeppsson, Sofia
(författare)
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Retributivism and uncertainty : Why do we punish criminals?
- 2021
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Annan publikation (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Retributivism is the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others.
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| 32. |
- Larue, Louis, 1989
(författare)
-
A defense of reasonable pluralism in economics
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of economic methodology. - 1350-178X .- 1018-5070. ; 29:4, s. 294-308
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article aims to defend a novel account of pluralism in economics. First, it argues that what justifies pluralism is its epistemological benefits. Second, it acknowledges that pluralism has limits, and defends reasonable pluralism, or the view that we should only accept those theories and methods that can be justified by their communities with reasons that other communities can accept. Clearly, reasonable pluralism is an ideal, which requires economists of different persuasions to respect certain norms of communication while evaluating each other’s theories. The article ends with a discussion of the conditions under which reasonable communication becomes possible.
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| 33. |
- Larue, Louis, 1989
(författare)
-
John Searle's ontology of money, and its critics
- 2023
-
Ingår i: The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Money. Volume 2: Modern Thought / Joseph J. Tinguely (ed.). - Basingstoke : Palgrave-Macmillan. - 9783031541391 ; , s. 721-741
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- John Searle has arguably proposed one of the most influential contemporary accounts of social ontology. According to Searle, institutional facts are created by the collective assignment of a specific kind of function —status-function— to pre-existing objects. Thus, a piece of paper counts as money in a certain context because people collectively recognize it as money, and impose a status upon it, which in turn enables that piece of paper to deliver certain functions (means of payment, etc.). The first part of this essay presents Searle’s theory of social ontology and summarizes his views on money. The second part centers on criticisms of his views and compares his theory with its main competitors, including the theories of Tuomela, Guala and Hindriks, and Smit, Buekens and Duplessis. The conclusion attempts to see what may remain of Searle’s theory after careful examination.
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| 34. |
- Larue, Louis, 1989, et al.
(författare)
-
The ethics of alternative currencies
- 2022
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Ingår i: Business ethics quarterly. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1052-150X .- 2153-3326. ; 32:2, s. 299-321
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Alternative currencies are means of payment that circulate alongside—as an alternative or complement to—official currencies. While these currencies have existed for a long time, both society and academia have shown a renewed interest in their potential to decentralize the governance of monetary affairs and to bring people and organizations together in more ethical or sustainable ways. This article is a review of the ethical and philosophical implications of these alternative monetary projects. We first discuss various classifications of the currencies before analyzing the ethical challenges linked to the way they tackle social and environmental issues. We also examine the incentive-based and coercive mechanisms used by the currencies from an ethical perspective and debate the promises and perils of monetary decentralization and democracy. We conclude by identifying an agenda for future research.
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| 35. |
- Lundgren, Björn
(författare)
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Ethical machine decisions and the input-selection problem
- 2021
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Ingår i: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 199:3-4, s. 11423-11443
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article is about the role of factual uncertainty for moral decision-making as it concerns the ethics of machine decision-making (i.e., decisions by AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles, autonomous robots, or decision support systems). The view that is defended here is that factual uncertainties require a normative evaluation and that ethics of machine decision faces a triple-edged problem, which concerns what a machine ought to do, given its technical constraints, what decisional uncertainty is acceptable, and what trade-offs are acceptable to decrease the decisional uncertainty.
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| 36. |
- Milam, Per-Erik, 1982
(författare)
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Forgiveness
- 2022
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Ingår i: Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility / Dana Kay Nelkin, Derk Pereboom (eds.). - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780190679309 ; , s. 590-610
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The responsibility and forgiveness literatures have only recently begun to influence one another in a significant way. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a common model of forgiveness and some recent challenges to it, each of which highlights potential connections between forgiveness and responsibility. According to the Standard View, to forgive is to overcome one’s blame toward a culpable wrongdoer. One of the most compelling alternatives to this view is the Norm Changing View, which understands forgiving as the exercise of a normative power that changes what the offender owes the victim. Which of these views one prefers has implications for how one understands the various features of forgiveness, including who can forgive, the difficulty of forgiving, and the possibility of withdrawing forgiveness.
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| 37. |
- Milam, Per-Erik, 1982
(författare)
-
Forgiving and Ceasing to Blame
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment / Satne, P., Scheiter, K.M. (eds.). - Cham : Springer. - 9783030778064 ; , s. 143-164
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter argues that we forgive for reasons and that not just any rea- son is a reason to forgive. A complete account of forgiveness must explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not and the aim of this chapter is to offer such an explanation. I suggest that distinguishing between forgiving and ceas- ing to blame for the wrong kind of reasons helps to solve some perennial problems about forgiveness. And I argue that the only reason to forgive is an apparent change of heart on the part of the offender about their offence and the quality of will behind it. At the same time, ceasing to blame for the wrong kind of reason is not necessarily a bad thing to do. No less than forgiving, it can be a valuable and important way of responding to the moral conflicts that shape our shared moral lives.
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| 38. |
- Mindus, Patricia
(författare)
-
Dimensions of Citizenship
- 2014
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Ingår i: German Law Journal. - 2071-8322. ; 15:5, s. 735-750
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Maastricht Treaty (the “Treaty”) first introduced the status of EU citizenship. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, marked in 2013, was declared the European Year of the Citizen. Union citizenship has been understood as the world’s first post-national citizenship, although it is still complementary to national citizenships. EU citizens enjoy rights that have been expanded, modified, and reinterpreted in light of the EU integration process. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been a driving force in this process. This twentieth anniversary has provided the occasio for this special issue. Indeed, much has happened over the last two decades. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on the heels of German reunification, and afterwards, a series of EU treaties followed: The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, the aborted constitutionalization process and the Rome Treaty in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon. The Euro took over former national currencies in 2002; the enlargement process led to today’s twenty-eight Member States. But the ratio of this special issue is based on other events as linked to the 2008 financial crisis, bailouts, the fiscal compact, and similar measures. In a nutshell, the timeliness of this volume is linked to the current financial disarray. Since prognosis presupposes diagnosis, no further words are necessary as to the importance of this task. It is (almost) self-evident that before taking action and preparing for the future, one needs to address the very first question: Nosce te ipsum...
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| 39. |
- Mindus, Patricia
(författare)
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Realism Today: : On Dagan’s Quest Beyond Cynicism and Romanticism in Law
- 2015
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Ingår i: International Journal for the Semiotics of Law. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0952-8059 .- 1572-8722. ; 28:2, s. 401-422
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper explores the contribution by the contemporary legal realist Hanoch Dagan. Dagan’s brand of realism defines law on the basis of its institutions or social practices, not of its norms or rules. The paper first provides a critical overview of this realist theory of law: It is not synonymous with the predictive theory of law, with Leiter’s theory of judges, or Frank’s “breakfast theory”. By focusing on the role of judges and the methodology of legal reasoning, we discover that the core difference between realism and positivism lies in the claim that law is affected by a strong form of indeterminacy, stemming from the plurality of legal sources, not from the open texture of legal language as expressed in rules; and we are also able to distinguish this form of realism from contemporary movements in legal theory, such as critical legal studies and law & economics. The normative dimension of realism is also addressed: This theory of law develops a specific concept of justice, on the ground of a cognitivist theory of value.
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| 40. |
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