| 111. |
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| 112. |
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| 113. |
- Noll, Gregor, 1964, et al.
(författare)
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Visions
- 2019
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Ingår i: War and algorithm / Edited by Max Liljefors, Gregor Noll and Daniel Steuer. - London/New York : Rowman & Littlefield International. - 9781786613646 ; , s. 191-204
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 114. |
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| 115. |
- Noll, Gregor, 1964
(författare)
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War by Algorithm: The End of Law?
- 2019
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Ingår i: War and algorithm / Edited by Max Liljefors, Gregor Noll and Daniel Steuer. - London/New York : Rowman & Littlefield International. - 9781786613646 ; , s. 75-104
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is not possible to subject algorithmic forms of warfare to the law, be it the law of war or any other form of law. This is so because subjection to the law presupposes a monotheistically structured process for its incarnation. As I have shown, there cannot be such a process in the case of weapons systems that fuse human and artificial intelligence. If we want to know how such a system works in practice, we need to test it on the scale relevant for its future use. As I have shown, this is impossible. For that reason, we cannot know whether it will operate in conformity with the law.
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| 116. |
- Noll, Gregor
(författare)
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Weaponising neurotechnology: International humanitarian law and the loss of language
- 2014
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Ingår i: London Review of International Law. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 2050-6325 .- 2050-6333. ; 2:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the past years, research on military applications of neuroscience has grown in sophistication. We may expect that future neuroweapons will be advertised as resting on the most objective form of human cognition, leading to greater accuracy in targeting and better compliance with the law than traditional weapons. Are states using weapon systems that draw on neuroscience capable of applying IHL to that use? Only at the price of a decision review system so fundamental as to eradicate the temporal advantages neuroweapons are designed to create. I argue that the application of contemporary IHL presupposes that cognition is embodied in one single human being and coupled to language. Neuroweapons spread cognition across humans and machines combined, and largely eliminate the cognitive role of language. Both traits render the distinction between superior and subordinate unstable, therewith disrupting the premises of responsibility under IHL. By consequence, it is impossible to assess whether future uses of these weapons are lawful under IHL.
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| 117. |
- Noll, Gregor, et al.
(författare)
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What Moves Law?
- 2017
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Ingår i: The Law of International Lawyers. Reading Martti Koskenniemi. - : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107193185 - 9781108147620 ; , s. 20-38
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this text, I will attempt to understand the relation between metaphysical assumption and argumentative movement in Martti Koskenniemi’s work. I shall try to elaborate the particular form it takes, and think about the implications of that form along the way.Koskenniemi rejects the translation of universal justice into the concrete practice of norms and institutions. He works in a radically Pauline tradition of thought. The Pauline tradition explains why he is so popular, while the radical spin explains the scepticism he meets. Karl Barth, the Swiss theologian, once set out an analogy of faith (analogia fidei) as a counterposition to the Catholic analogy of being. It is in hope alone that international lawyers participate in the coming community. Barth thought theology without religion; Koskenniemi thinks redemption without creation.
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| 118. |
- Noll, Gregor
(författare)
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Why human rights fail to protect undocumented migrants
- 2010
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Ingår i: European Journal of Migration and Law. - 1388-364X. ; 12:2, s. 241-272
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this article, I depart from the factual difficulties of undocumented migrants to access a state’s protection mechanisms for avowedly universal human rights. I relate this aporia to two competing conceptions of territorial jurisdictions. Drawing on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Migrant Workers Convention, I separate the sphere of the political community (the polis) and that of the household (the oikos) in developing a political theory of undocumented migration. It rests two central tenets: one is a tributary transaction between sending state and host state, in the course of which the undocumented migrant worker is offered without conditions attaching, yet with the hope of remittances flowing in return. This offering relates to the oikos, which makes available a limited degree of protection under labour law. The second is a contractual form of submission by the undocumented migrant worker, which is structurally analogous to the master-slave relationship developed in Hobbes’ defense of war slavery. This is related to the polis, which denies all meaningful political activity to the undocumented migrant (as reflected in the denied right to found labour unions). Finally, drawing on Werner Hamacher’s work, I analyse how human rights are intrinsically related to a position of privacy, which escalates into a form of isolation under the structures producing undocumented migrants.
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| 119. |
- Noll, Gregor
(författare)
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Why refugees still matter: a response to James Hathaway
- 2007
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Ingår i: Melbourne Journal of International Law. - 1444-8602. ; 8, s. 536-547
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a 2007 article, Hathaway relaunched his proposal of a multilateral refugee protection system based on the idea of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. The 2007 article and an earlier, similar article of 1997 both observe that the proposed system will not provide a back door to ‘permanent immigration’ for refugees.In the proposals, all remaining migration movements are subjected to the control of the multilateral regime: movement from the country of origin to the first country of arrival, resettlement in a third country and repatriation.In my critique of the proposals, I shall proceed in three steps, moving from the identification of concrete obligations over systemic questions to an examination of the idea of international law that the proposals reflect. Each step is based on a concern with Hathaway’s proposal:• The proposals are contradictory: they cannot uphold a logical account of international legal obligations while simultaneously ensuring the stability of the proposed system and the human right to leave any country.• The proposals are insufficiently attentive to the dynamics of human rights law: they disregard the migration incentives lawfully produced by differences in human rights obligations amongst states.• The proposals are illiberal: they abandon Kant’s ‘conditions of general hospitality’ upon which cosmopolitan peace is premised.
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