Sökning: onr:"swepub:oai:gup.ub.gu.se/247931" >
The Emperor's cloth...
The Emperor's clothes and the Pied Piper: Bureaucracy and scientific productivity
-
Fernandez-Carro, R. (författare)
-
- Lapuente, Victor (författare)
- Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Statsvetenskapliga institutionen,Department of Political Science
-
(creator_code:org_t)
- 2015-10-19
- 2016
- Engelska.
-
Ingår i: Science and Public Policy. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0302-3427 .- 1471-5430. ; 43:4, s. 546-561
- Relaterad länk:
-
https://gup.ub.gu.se...
-
visa fler...
-
https://doi.org/10.1...
-
visa färre...
Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- For some scholars, bureaucratic contracts (i.e. low-powered and highly regulated) mitigate problems of time inconsistency between public employees who have undertaken costly asset-specific investments, and potentially opportunistic governments. For others, bureaucratic contracts exacerbate information asymmetries between bureaucratic experts and political dilettantes. This paper aims to reconcile these views by proposing two testable propositions: while bureaucratic impartiality has a positive effect because it reduces time inconsistency problems in the relationship between principals (governments) and agents (public employees), a bureaucratic career has, on the contrary, a negative effect because it reduces incentives. We test these hypotheses with three samples of countries (worldwide, OECD and EU) using scientific productivity as a proxy for public employees' performance that can be compared across countries. The results show how, controlling for levels of development and investment, proxies for bureaucratic impartiality show a significant positive effect on scientific productivity while the existence of bureaucratic careers significantly diminishes scientists' performance. © The Author 2015.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Statsvetenskap -- Studier av offentlig förvaltning (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Political Science -- Public Administration Studies (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- Bureaucracies
- Bureaucratic careers
- Bureaucratic impartiality
- Principal's moral hazard
- Principal-agent
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
Hitta via bibliotek
Till lärosätets databas