| 1. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Model of Income Insurance
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Tax and Public Finance. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0927-5940 .- 1573-6970. ; 20:6, s. 938-960
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we treat an individual's health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is assumed that the individual is either able or unable to work. A continuous treatment of an individual's health sheds new light on the role of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in the traditional, dichotomous models. In particular, we show that moral hazard is not necessarily outright fraud, but a gradual adjustment of the willingness to work, depending on preferences and the conditions stated in the insurance contract. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims, and it clarifies the conditions for the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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| 2. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance
- 2010
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Fenomenet Piketty
- 2014
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - Stockholm : Nationalekonomiska föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; :7, s. 11-19
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 6. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Hur avveckla hyreskontrollen?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - 0345-2646. ; 44:7, s. 17-28
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Vad som fordras för en någorlunda väl fungerande marknad för hyreslägenheter är ett omfattande reformpaket som bl a innefattar en gradvis avveckling av hyreskontrollen, ett ökat stöd till låginkomsttagare (eventuellt i form av riktade hyressubventioner) och en mindre byråkratisk byggnadslagstiftning. En viktig fördel med att locka tillbaka privata investerare till marknaden för nybyggda hyresfastigheter är att den offentliga sektorn därmed frigör resurser för investeringar i offentligt finansierad infrastruktur och i anläggningar för sociala tjänster, som utbildning, sjukvård och äldrevård.
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| 7. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Investment, Rational Inattention, and Delegation
- 2017
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no investment made. In "sweet" conditions, investment is made "blindly", i.e. without acquiring costly information. In intermediate, "normal" conditions, the decision-maker acquires information and conditions the investment decision upon the information obtained. We investigate if the investor can benefit from employing an agent when the agent’s effort and information is private. Not even in the case of a risk neutral agent will the principal perfectly align the agent’s incentives with her own at the moment of investment (had the principal known the agent’s private information). Optimal contracts for risk neutral agents not only reward good investments but also punishes bad investments. Such contracts include three components: a fixed salary, stocks and options.
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| 8. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Lärdomar av finanskrisen
- 2010
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk debatt. - Stockholm : Nationalekonomiska Föreningen. - 0345-2646. ; :4
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 9. |
- Lindbeck, Assar
(författare)
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Nationalekonomi : vad är det?
- 2012
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Ingår i: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademiens årsbok. - Stockholm : Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien. ; , s. 103-112
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 10. |
- Lindbeck, Assar, et al.
(författare)
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Pay Schemes, Bargaining, and Competition for Talent
- 2015
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper provides a framework for analysis of remuneration to agents whose task is to make well-informed decisions on behalf of a principal, with managers in large corporations as the most prominent example. The principal and agent initially bargain over the pay scheme to the latter. The bargaining outcome depends both on competition for agents and on the relative bargaining power of the two parties, given their outside options, thus allowing for the possibility that the agent may be the current CEO who may have considerable power. Having signed a contract, the agent chooses how much effort to make to acquire information about the project at hand. This information is private and the agent uses it in his subsequent decision whether or not to invest in a given project. In model A the agent’s effort to acquire information is exogenous, whereas in model E it is endogenous. Model A lends no support for other payment schemes than flat salaries is weak. Model E contains a double moral hazard problem; how much information to acquire and what investment decision to make. As a consequence, the equilibrium contracts in model E involve both bonuses and penalties. We identify lower and upper bounds on these, and study how the bonus and bonus rate depend on competition and bargaining power. We also analyze the nature of contracts when the agent is overconfident.
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