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Träfflista för sökning "åsa wikforss ;pers:(Wikforss Åsa 1961)"

Sökning: åsa wikforss > Wikforss Åsa 1961

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2.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Are Natural Kind Terms Special?
  • 2010
  • Ingår i: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. - New York : Routledge. - 978-0-415-87366-6 ; s. 64-84
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less straightforward than assumed - in particular, it is far from clear what it might mean to say that a kind term is rigid. Strikingly, however, these worries have not done much to undermine the confident assumption that natural kind terms form a special semantic category. In the paper I try to shake that confidence.  I argue that although natural kind terms are no doubt important (for instance, from an explanatory point of view), we are certainly not warranted in concluding that they form a separate, semantic category among the kind terms.
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3.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Are there understanding-assent links?
  • 2010
  • Ingår i: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication. - Kansas : New Prairie Press. - 1944-3676. ; 5, s. 1-17
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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4.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Color Terms and Semantic Externalism
  • 2012
  • Ingår i: Croatian Journal of Philosophy. - 1333-1108. ; 12:36, s. 399-419
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • The paper discusses whether the color terms should be given an externalist semantics. In the literature on the semantics of color terms externalism is standardly taken for granted, and Twin Earth style arguments play a central role. This is notable given that few people would claim that semantic externalism applies across the board, to all types of terms.  Why, then, should the color terms belong with this group of terms? I argue that the standard externalist strategies, introduced by Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, do not apply to these terms: The color terms do not function like natural kind terms, and the idea of semantic reliance on others does not apply to them. I conclude that the externalist arguments fail and that a version of internalism, more properly called ‘individualism’, applies to the color terms. 
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5.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Concepts and Communication : Comments on Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas
  • 2015
  • Ingår i: Analysis. - 0003-2638. ; 75:1, s. 110-121
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • At the center of Gauker's book stands two inter-connected theses: First, that concepts are dependent on language; second, that this requires rejecting the traditional idea that linguistic communication involves a transmission of thoughts. I argue that we cannot afford to reject the traditional conception of communication and that Gauker's alternative ‘cooperative' conception is unsatisfactory. However, I also argue that Gauker is wrong to suggest that the language dependency thesis of concepts is incompatible with the traditional view of communication.
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6.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Davidson and Wittgenstein : A Homeric Struggle?
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Wittgenstein and Davidson on language, thought, and action. - New York : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107093768 - 9781316145364 ; s. 46-68
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • P.F. Strawson famously contrasts two approaches to the question of what it is for words to have meaning: That of communication-intention theorists and that of formal semantics theorists. According to Strawson the later Wittgenstein and Davidson end up on opposite sides in this struggle since Wittgenstein, unlike Davidson, takes conventions to be essential to meaning. Several contemporary Wittgenstein scholars agree, among them Hans-Johann Glock and Meredith Williams. They suggest that Wittgenstein puts forth an essentially social picture of language, with the shared conventions at the center, while Davidson defends an individualistic picture that ultimately fails to account for the public nature of language. I shall argue that this description is importantly mistaken: Davidson and Wittgenstein both subscribe to the idea that meaning is determined by use, rather than by conventions, and they both take meaning to be essentially public and tied to its role in communication.
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7.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Faktaresistensen – en farsot
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Kristianstadsbladet. - 1103-9523. ; :25 november
  • Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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8.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Incomplete Understanding of Concepts
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Oxford handbooks online.
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective.
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9.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Introduktion
  • 2018
  • Ingår i: Klassrumspsykologi : från teori till praktik. - Stockholm : Natur och kultur. - 9789127822597
  • Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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10.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • När den falska berättelsen (nästan) tog över
  • 2018
  • Ingår i: Snabbtänkt : Reflektioner från valet 2018 av ledande forskare. - Sundsvall : Mid Sweden University, DEMICOM. - 978-91-88025-99-9 ; s. 14-14
  • Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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11.
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12.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Rädslan för kunskap
  • 2014
  • Ingår i: SANS. - Stockholm : Fri Tanke. - 2000-9690. ; 3, s. 26-27
  • Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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13.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Självkännedom - på egen risk.
  • 2011
  • Ingår i: Forskning & Framsteg. - 0015-7937. ; :6, s. 44-47
  • Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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14.
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15.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • The insiginificance of transparency
  • 2015
  • Ingår i: Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107063501 ; s. 142-164
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)
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16.
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17.
  • Wikforss, Åsa, 1961- (författare)
  • Vem bryr sig om fakta?
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Modern psykologi. - 2000-4087. ; :8, s. 30-33
  • Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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18.
  • Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al. (författare)
  • Against Belief Normativity
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: The Aim of Belief. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 978-0-19-967213-4 ; s. 80-99
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)abstract
    • Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.
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19.
  • Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al. (författare)
  • Against Content Normativity
  • 2009
  • Ingår i: Mind (Print). - 0026-4423. ; 118, s. 31-70
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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20.
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21.
  • Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al. (författare)
  • Reasons for Belief and Normativity
  • 2018
  • Ingår i: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. - Oxford University Press. - 9780199657889 ; s. 575-599
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)
22.
  • Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al. (författare)
  • The Normativity of Meaning and Content
  • 2009
  • Ingår i: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. - Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information.
  • Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt)
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23.
  • Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin, 1966-, et al. (författare)
  • Aiming at Truth : On the Role of Belief
  • 2013
  • Ingår i: Teorema. - 0210-1602. ; 32:3, s. 137-162
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.
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26.
  • Häggqvist, Sören, 1962-, et al. (författare)
  • Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms Myth and Reality
  • 2018
  • Ingår i: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. - 0007-0882. ; 69:4, s. 911-933
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics.
27.
  • Rattan, Gurpreet, et al. (författare)
  • Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?
  • 2017
  • Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - 0279-0750. ; 98:2, s. 271-294
  • Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
    • Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson’s challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson’s arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson’s elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson’s larger metaphilosophical conclusions – according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy – may be in order.
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