| 1. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water : Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms
- 2013
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Ingår i: Theoria. - : Wiley. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 79:3, s. 242-261
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ` Putnam-Kripke' view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are metaphysically necessary (if true). I suggest that this is wholly in line with Putnam's earlier, Quine-inspired writings on general terms, and his preoccupation with the philosophy of science. Moreover, I argue that the picture of general terms that emerges from Putnam's writings is more plausible than that suggested by Kripke. However, contrary to Putnam, I also suggest that Putnam's later views on natural kinds and natural kind terms do not support standard Twin Earth externalism.
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| 2. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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Color Terms and Semantic Externalism
- 2012
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Ingår i: Croatian Journal of Philosophy. - 1333-1108 .- 1847-6139. ; 12:36, s. 399-420
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper discusses whether the color terms should be given an externalist semantics. In the literature on the semantics of color terms externalism is standardly taken for granted, and Twin Earth style arguments play a central role. This is notable given that few people would claim that semantic externalism applies across the board, to all types of terms. Why, then, should the color terms belong with this group of terms? I argue that the standard externalist strategies, introduced by Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, do not apply to these terms: The color terms do not function like natural kind terms, and the idea of semantic reliance on others does not apply to them. I conclude that the externalist arguments fail and that a version of internalism, more properly called 'individualism', applies to the color terms.
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| 3. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity
- 2018
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Ingår i: Inquiry. - 0020-174X .- 1502-3923. ; 61:7, s. 755-766
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard's preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving oughts'. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis - a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.
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| 4. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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EXTENDED BELIEF AND EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE
- 2014
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Ingår i: Philosophical Issues. - : Wiley. - 1533-6077 .- 1758-2237. ; 24:1, s. 460-481
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism
- 2007
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Ingår i: PHilosophy Compass. ; 2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.
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| 8. |
- Wikforss, Åsa
(författare)
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Semantic Intuitions and the Theory of Reference
- 2017
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Ingår i: Teorema. - 0210-1602. ; 36:3, s. 95-116
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Experiments on the semantic intuitions of lay speakers concerning proper names have suggested that there is great variation in these intuitions, across individuals and across cultures. How should the semanticist respond to these results? Machery et. al. (2011) suggest three ways of accommodating the variation in intuitions: Deny that intuitions are reliable guides to reference; adopt referential pluralism and grant that names refer differently; or deny the value of non-expert intuitions. Philosophers of language have tended to endorse either the first option, arguing that the type of intuitions tested by Machery et. al. (2004) do not provide real evidence for the theory of reference, or the third option, arguing that lay speaker intuitions are not sufficiently reliable when it comes to semantics. I argue, instead, that the intuitions tested do have evidential value and that the third option need be taken more seriously: referential pluralism. In particular, I address Marti's criticisms of Machery et. al. and her claim that the intuitions tested lack evidential value since they are meta-linguistic [Marti (2009), (2013)]. I argue that the intuitions tested are not meta-linguistic in a problematic way and that they do provide reasons to accept referential pluralism.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Are Natural Kind Terms Special?
- 2010
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Ingår i: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. - New York : Routledge. - 9780415873666 ; , s. 64-84
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less straightforward than assumed - in particular, it is far from clear what it might mean to say that a kind term is rigid. Strikingly, however, these worries have not done much to undermine the confident assumption that natural kind terms form a special semantic category. In the paper I try to shake that confidence. I argue that although natural kind terms are no doubt important (for instance, from an explanatory point of view), we are certainly not warranted in concluding that they form a separate, semantic category among the kind terms.
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| 11. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Are there understanding-assent links?
- 2010
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Ingår i: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication. - Kansas : New Prairie Press. - 1944-3676. ; 5, s. 1-17
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 12. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Concepts and Communication : Comments on Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas
- 2015
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Ingår i: Analysis. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 75:1, s. 110-121
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- At the center of Gauker's book stands two inter-connected theses: First, that concepts are dependent on language; second, that this requires rejecting the traditional idea that linguistic communication involves a transmission of thoughts. I argue that we cannot afford to reject the traditional conception of communication and that Gauker's alternative ‘cooperative' conception is unsatisfactory. However, I also argue that Gauker is wrong to suggest that the language dependency thesis of concepts is incompatible with the traditional view of communication.
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| 13. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Davidson and Wittgenstein : A Homeric Struggle?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Wittgenstein and Davidson on language, thought, and action. - New York : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107093768 - 9781316145364 ; , s. 46-68
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- P.F. Strawson famously contrasts two approaches to the question of what it is for words to have meaning: That of communication-intention theorists and that of formal semantics theorists. According to Strawson the later Wittgenstein and Davidson end up on opposite sides in this struggle since Wittgenstein, unlike Davidson, takes conventions to be essential to meaning. Several contemporary Wittgenstein scholars agree, among them Hans-Johann Glock and Meredith Williams. They suggest that Wittgenstein puts forth an essentially social picture of language, with the shared conventions at the center, while Davidson defends an individualistic picture that ultimately fails to account for the public nature of language. I shall argue that this description is importantly mistaken: Davidson and Wittgenstein both subscribe to the idea that meaning is determined by use, rather than by conventions, and they both take meaning to be essentially public and tied to its role in communication.
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| 14. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Faktaresistensen – en farsot
- 2017
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Ingår i: Kristianstadsbladet. - 1103-9523. ; :25 november
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 15. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Incomplete Understanding of Concepts
- 2017
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Ingår i: Oxford handbooks online. - : Oxford University Press.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective.
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| 16. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Introduktion
- 2018
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Ingår i: Klassrumspsykologi. - Stockholm : Natur och kultur. - 9789127822597
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Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 17. |
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| 18. |
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| 19. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Rädslan för kunskap
- 2014
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Ingår i: SANS. - Stockholm : Fri Tanke. - 2000-9690. ; 3, s. 26-27
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 20. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Självkännedom - på egen risk.
- 2011
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Ingår i: Forskning & Framsteg. - 0015-7937. ; :6, s. 44-47
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 21. |
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| 22. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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The insiginificance of transparency
- 2015
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Ingår i: Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107063501 ; , s. 142-164
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 23. |
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| 24. |
- Wikforss, Åsa, 1961-
(författare)
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Vem bryr sig om fakta?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Modern psykologi. - 2000-4087. ; :8, s. 30-33
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 25. |
- Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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The Truth Norm and Guidance : a Reply to Steglich-Petersen
- 2010
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Ingår i: Mind (Print). - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-4423 .- 1460-2113. ; 119:475, s. 757-761
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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| 26. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Against Belief Normativity
- 2013
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Ingår i: The Aim of Belief. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199672134 ; , s. 80-99
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.
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| 27. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Against Content Normativity
- 2009
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Ingår i: Mind (Print). - 0026-4423 .- 1460-2113. ; 118, s. 31-70
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 28. |
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| 29. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, et al.
(författare)
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Meaning Normativism : Against the Simple Argument
- 2015
-
Ingår i: Organon F. - 1335-0668. ; 22, s. 63-73
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.
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| 30. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780199657889 ; , s. 575-599
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported.
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| 31. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, et al.
(författare)
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Still No Guidance : Reply to Steglich-Petersen
- 2015
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Ingår i: Theoria. - : Wiley. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 81:3, s. 272-279
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In a recent article in this journal, AsbjOrn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the no-guidance argument. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour and (2) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth norm can guide behaviour turns out to be too wide to be recognizable as an intuitive notion of norm guidance. Moreover, it remains unclear how the truth norm could possibly provide an answer to the question whether it - rather than some other, possible norm for belief - is valid.
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| 32. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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The Normativity of Meaning and Content
- 2009
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Ingår i: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. - Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information.
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 33. |
- Glüer, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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What is knowledge resistance?
- 2022
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Ingår i: Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments. - London : Routledge. - 9780367629281 - 9780367629250 - 9781003111474 ; , s. 29-48
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We provide a characterization of knowledge resistance in terms of resistance to available evidence and a philosophical guide to the concepts central to empirically investigating it: knowledge, evidence, and rationality. Knowledge requires true, justified belief, so we emphasize the importance of focusing on factual judgements the truth of which can be investigated by empirical methods. We understand evidence in terms of probabilification, and discuss its content and its testimonial nature in the central cases. We propose that knowledge resistance always involves epistemic irrationality. An important psychological mechanism resulting in such irrationality is motivated reasoning, and politically motivated reasoning has been proposed as the main explanation of fact polarization. We discuss challenges to the detection of motivated reasoning, stressing the rationalizing role of prior belief. When priors line up with motivations, these two factors are difficult to disentangle. But even where polarization results from differences in prior belief, there might be irrationality, for instance in the form of unjustified beliefs about which sources of evidence are trustworthy. Therefore, we propose to not only investigate knowledge resistance in a narrow sense, involving a direct, epistemically irrational response to evidence subjects have, but also in a wider sense, resulting for instance from selective exposure.
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| 34. |
- Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Aiming at Truth : On the Role of Belief
- 2013
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Ingår i: Teorema. - 0210-1602. ; 32:3, s. 137-162
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.
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| 35. |
- Harouny, Jonathan Egeland, 1992-
(författare)
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification
- 2020
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- There are many important dimensions of epistemic evaluation, one of which is justification. We don’t just evaluate beliefs for truth, reliability, accuracy, and knowledge, but also for justification. However, in the epistemological literature, there is much disagreement about the nature of justification and how it should be understood. One of the controversies that has separated the contemporary epistemological discourse into two opposing camps has to do with the internalism-externalism distinction. Whereas internalists defend certain core assumptions about justification from the pre-Gettier tradition, externalists generally think that the traditional conception is untenable and should be replaced.In this compilation thesis, I argue for, defend, and develop a particular brand of internalism, both in general and with respect to specific sources of justification. In papers 1 and 2, I defend a couple of well-known arguments for mentalism and accessibilism. Moreover, I also point out how prominent versions of these theses are vulnerable to serious problems (e.g., about over-intellectualization and vicious regresses). Part of my goal in the first couple of papers is to figure out what commitments the internalist should take on in order to avoid the externalist's objections, while at the same time receiving support from considerations that have motivated internalism in the past. In papers 3 and 4, I start from the assumption that mentalism is true and attempt to answer the following questions: 1) which non-factive mental states can play a justification-conferring role with respect to empirical belief? And 2) why does this set of states play the epistemic role it does? In response to question 1, I argue that all and only one's beliefs and perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. In response to question 2, I argue that one's beliefs and perceptual experiences are one's strongly representational states, and that strongly representational states necessarily provide support to certain empirical propositions. Having done so, I then defend mentalism about scientific evidence from a couple of prominent objections in the recent literature. Lastly, in papers 5 and 6, I argue for a particular brand of internalism about testimonial and memorial justification and show how that position has a dialectical advantage over its main competitors.
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| 36. |
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| 37. |
- Häggqvist, Sören, et al.
(författare)
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Externalism and a posteriori semantics
- 2007
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Ingår i: Erkenntnis. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0165-0106 .- 1572-8420. ; 67:3, s. 373-386
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual’s external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub ‘a posteriori semantics.’ The suggestion is that not only does a term’s meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind: The term may have a standard externalist semantics (if it picks out a natural kind) or a more descriptivist one (if it does not). Knowing which semantics applies will therefore require detailed empirical knowledge. This move has also been employed in cases where a singular term, such as a name, fails to have a reference. We argue that a posteriori semantics is inherently implausible, since the type of semantics common terms should be given ought not to be conditional on details of chemistry or physics. A number of difficulties for the position—‘metaphysical,’ epistemological, and methodological—are articulated. Finally, we suggest that a posteriori semantics misconstrues the way in which semantics is empirical.
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| 38. |
- Häggqvist, Sören, 1962-, et al.
(författare)
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Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms : Myth and Reality
- 2018
-
Ingår i: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0007-0882 .- 1464-3537. ; 69:4, s. 911-933
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics.
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| 39. |
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| 40. |
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| 41. |
- Packalén, Sara, 1983-
(författare)
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Content and Composition : An essay on tense, content, and semantic value
- 2016
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A remarkable thing about natural language is that we can use it to share our beliefs and thoughts about the world with other speakers of our language. In cases of successful communication, beliefs seem to be transferred from speakers to hearers by means of the hearer recovering the contents of the speaker’s utterances. This is so natural to us that we take it for granted in our everyday life, and rarely stop to think about how it's is possible. Nevertheless, it's a phenomenon that calls for explanation. It is natural to expect that natural language semantics has a key explanatory role to play here. In order to understand this role, we must relate the semantic values assigned to sentences by semantic theories with the contents of our speech acts. The simplest possible relation would be identity; the meaning of a sentence is simply the belief expressed by an assertion of the sentence in a given context of utterance. However, a number of problem cases in the literature suggest that this cannot be the case. This dissertation offers a critical assessment of the arguments for distinguishing the semantic value of a sentence from its so-called assertoric content, focusing on problems arising from the analysis of tense and temporal expressions. I conclude that they are indeed distinct, and offer a constructive account of how they must be related in order to allow for an explanation of communicative success.
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| 42. |
- Rattan, Gurpreet, et al.
(författare)
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Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?
- 2017
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Ingår i: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. - : Wiley. - 0279-0750 .- 1468-0114. ; 98:2, s. 271-294
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson’s challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson’s arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson’s elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson’s larger metaphilosophical conclusions – according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy – may be in order.
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| 43. |
- Salvén, Håkan, et al.
(författare)
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”Gymnasieelever bör studera filosofi”
- 2023
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Ingår i: Svenska dagbladet. - 1101-2412. ; :2023-04-16
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Filosofin har en särställning när det handlar om att stärka elevernas skydd mot desinformation och att utveckla deras kritiska tänkande. Därför bör ämnet vara obligatoriskt för elever på de teoretiska programmen i Gymnasiet.
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| 44. |
- Spectre, Levi, 1967-
(författare)
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Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness : A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles
- 2009
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The principle of epistemic closure is the claim that what is known to follow from knowledge is known to be true. This intuitively plausible idea is endorsed by a vast majority of knowledge theorists. There are significant problems, however, that have to be addressed if epistemic closure – closed knowledge – is endorsed. The present essay locates the problem for closed knowledge in the separation it imposes between knowledge and evidence. Although it might appear that all that stands between knowing the truth of the premises of a valid inference and knowledge of its conclusion is inferring it from the premises, the evidence for each of the premises may jointly count against the conclusion. The intuitive view regarding inferred knowledge says one thing, the evidence says another. One epistemological framework that seems to have the resources to resolve this tension endorses the view that knowledge always requires conclusive evidence. A second framework resolves the tension by limiting the scope of the closure principle. Only inferences drawn directly from propositions contained in the scope of a single knowledge operator are considered closed. The aim of the present essay is to revive the unpopular third option, the idea that knowledge is open. The essay proceeds by arguing that in different ways the two former frameworks only succeed in relocating the problem, not in resolving it. The first framework, the infallibilist view, relocates the problem to a sharp separation between knowledge of the occurrences of events from knowledge of their chance of occurring, a separation leading to several significant additional problems. The fallibilist view, the second framework, in endorsing closure neglects to take into full account the ways in which evidence fails to be transitive. For instance, evidence can count in favor of a conjunction while counting against each of its conjuncts. This fact, which is argued for in the essay on probabilistic as well as non-probabilistic grounds, is used as the foundation of an argument against closed knowledge that can be used as a way to understand several of the most fundamental challenges of epistemology. Not only can an open knowledge view that is based on open evidence resolve all these problems in a simple and natural way, it can also respond to formidable challenges that significantly hinder other open knowledge views. There are good reasons, then, to view both knowledge and evidence as open.
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| 45. |
- Strömbäck, Jesper, et al.
(författare)
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Introduction : Toward Understanding Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments
- 2022
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Ingår i: Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments. - London : Routledge. - 9781003111474 ; , s. 1-28
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This chapter introduces the themes of the book and provides an overview of key arguments and of the chapters in the book. Among other things, the chapter discusses the problem of knowledge resistance, outlines the purpose of the book, and provides a broad framework toward understanding knowledge resistance and its antecedents. This framework includes the transition from low- to high-choice media environments, an increase in the prevalence of mis- and disinformation, biased information processing, and factual belief polarization, and the linkage between misperceptions and knowledge resistance. Finally, it briefly introduces and discusses each of the chapters in the book.
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| 46. |
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| 47. |
- Strömbäck, Jesper, et al.
(författare)
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Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments
- 2022
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Bok (refereegranskat)abstract
- This book offers a truly interdisciplinary exploration of our patterns of engagement with politics, news, and information in current high-choice information environments. Putting forth the notion that high-choice information environments may contribute to increasing misperceptions and knowledge resistance rather than greater public knowledge, the book offers insights into the processes that influence the supply of misinformation and factors influencing how and why people expose themselves to and process information that may support or contradict their beliefs and attitudes.A team of authors from across a range of disciplines address the phenomena of knowledge resistance and its causes and consequences at the macro- as well as the micro-level. The chapters take a philosophical look at the notion of knowledge resistance, before moving on to discuss issues such as misinformation and fake news, psychological mechanisms such as motivated reasoning in processes of selective exposure and attention, how people respond to evidence and fact-checking, the role of political partisanship, political polarization over factual beliefs, and how knowledge resistance might be counteracted.This book will have a broad appeal to scholars and students interested in knowledge resistance, primarily within philosophy, psychology, media and communication, and political science, as well as journalists and policymakers.
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| 48. |
- Bosseldal, Ingrid, et al.
(författare)
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Åsa Wikforss, författare till Skola för bildning
- 2021
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Ingår i: Ögonblick : En vänbok till Anders Persson om människor och deras möten - En vänbok till Anders Persson om människor och deras möten. - Lund : Lund Studies in Educational Sciences, Lunds universitet. - 2002-6323. - 9789189213456 - 9789189213463 ; 16, s. 203-221
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 49. |
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| 50. |
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Praktik & Teori : Populärvetenskap
- 2005
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Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Innehåll: Sanna Camitz: Taktikval slår ut språken / Lotta Solding: Forskning+kommunikation=sant? / Kathrine Winkelhorn: Krönika - På den anden side af Bron / Sanna Camitz: Avhandlingen - När juridiken inte räcker till / Åsa Wikforss: Krönika - Professionaliseringen av ett ämne underlättar för kvinnorna i akademierna / Håkan Arvidsson: Tema - Humaniora bör lära av populärvetenskapen / Dick Kasperowski: Tema - Vilken populärvetenskap är vi mest betjänta av? / Annika de Ruvo och Sanna Camitz: Tema - VAR INTRESSANT! har varit min huvudparoll / Johan Helgesson: Tema - Populärvetenskap ska ge naturvetenskaplig bildning i samhället / Pernilla Ståhl: Porträttet - Jag vill forska kring sexualiserat våld i konflikter / Patrik Hall: Debatt - Varför profilera sig?
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