| 1. |
- Blease, Charlotte, et al.
(author)
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Patients, clinicians and open notes : information blocking as a case of epistemic injustice
- 2022
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In: Journal of Medical Ethics. - : BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. - 0306-6800 .- 1473-4257. ; 48:10, s. 785-793
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In many countries, including patients are legally entitled to request copies of their clinical notes. However, this process remains time-consuming and burdensome, and it remains unclear how much of the medical record must be made available. Online access to notes offers a way to overcome these challenges and in around 10 countries worldwide, via secure web-based portals, many patients are now able to read at least some of the narrative reports written by clinicians (’open notes’). However, even in countries that have implemented the practice many clinicians have resisted the idea remaining doubtful of the value of opening notes, and anticipating patients will be confused or anxious by what they read. Against this scepticism, a growing body of qualitative and quantitative research reveals that patients derive multiple benefits from reading their notes. We address the contrasting perceptions of this practice innovation, and claim that the divergent views of patients and clinicians can be explained as a case of epistemic injustice. Using a range of evidence, we argue that patients are vulnerable to (oftentimes, non-intentional) epistemic injustice. Nonetheless, we conclude that the marginalisation of patients’ access to their health information exemplifies a form of epistemic exclusion, one with practical and ethical consequences including for patient safety.
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| 2. |
- Parthemore, Joel, 1964-, et al.
(author)
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Artefactual ethics as opportunity to rethink “natural” ethics
- 2023
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In: Proceedings of the AISB Convention 2023. - : The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour. - 9781713879466 - 9781908187857 ; , s. 107-112
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper argues that, within the ethics community, the wider philosophical establishment and society in general, people have been far too quick to let themselves and, all too often, each other off the hook, at the same time as setting impossibly high standards for artefactual moral agents to meet, such that the artefactual agents should be guaranteed to make no mistakes. If artefacts are ever to be considered candidates for moral agency, then they should be held to no higher (and, at the same time, not significantly lower) a standard than what human beings can achieve. Meanwhile, the prospects of artefactual moral agency invite the opportunity for human moral agents to reconsider the standards they set for themselves and hold themselves to a higher standard.
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| 3. |
- Parthemore, Joel, 1964-, et al.
(author)
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Artefactual ethics as opportunity for rethinking “natural” ethics
- 2022
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In: Proceedings of the 17th SweCog Conference. - Skövde : University of Skövde. - 9789198366792 ; , s. 28-31
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper serves as introduction to a significantly longer paper in progress. It argues that, within the ethics community, the wider philosophical establishment and society in general, people have been far too lax about what to accept as morally “right” behaviour – far too quick to let themselves and, all too often, each other off the hook. By drawing comparisons to artefactual behaviour and the objections people raise to calling that behaviour the morally acceptable behaviour of authentic moral agents, this paper lays out a framework by which human ethics and meta-ethics can more fruitfully be approached. An earlier paper of ours (Parthemore and Whitby, 2014) argued that, for an action to be morally right, one must have a convergence of the right motivations, the right means, and the right consequences. The underlying insight is that deontological, virtue-ethics-based, and consequentialist accounts all have their necessary role to play, but each tends to get too focused on itself and its merits to the loss of the bigger picture; while utilitarian accounts, as perhaps the most prominent division within consequentialism, face the further problem of failing to allow for those occasions where the needs of the few, or the one, outweigh the needs of the many, as Ursula K. LeGuin (1973) so devastatingly addressed. Although the requirement to align motivations, means, and consequences may seem impossibly onerous, it need not be, provided one is prepared to allow that moral behaviour is far more difficult to achieve, either for artefacts or human beings, than it might seem at first glance. Mistakes will be made. Perhaps it matters more to take responsibility for those mistakes than to assure oneself, despite reasonable argument to the contrary, that one has avoided them. It is time to hold artefactual and natural agent alike to a higher standard
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| 4. |
- MacGregor, Oskar
(author)
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WADA's Whereabouts Requirements and Privacy
- 2015
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In: Routledge Handbook of Drugs and Sport. - London : Routledge. - 9780415702782 - 9781134464128 ; , s. 310-321
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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| 5. |
- Rosén, Julia
(author)
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What did you expect? : A human-centered approach to investigating and reducing the social robot expectation gap
- 2024
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- We live in a complex world where we proactively plan and execute various behaviors by forming expectations in real time. Expectations are beliefs regarding the future state of affairs and they play an integral part of our perception, attention, and behavior. Over time, our expectations become more accurate as we interact with the world and others around us. People interact socially with other people by inferring others' purposes, intentions, preferences, beliefs, emotions, thoughts, and goals. Similar inferences may occur when we interact with social robots. With anthropomorphic design, these robots are designed to mimic people physically and behaviorally. As a result, users predominantly infer agency in social robots, often leading to mismatched expectations of the robots' capabilities, which ultimately influences the user experience. In this thesis, the role and relevance of users' expectations in first-hand social human-robot interaction (sHRI) was investigated. There are two major findings. First, in order to study expectations in sHRI, the social robot expectation gap evaluation framework was developed. This framework supports the systematic study and evaluation of expectations over time, considering the unique context where the interaction is unfolding. Use of the framework can inform sHRI researchers and designers on how to manage users’ expectations, not only in the design, but also during evaluation and presentation of social robots. Expectations can be managed by identifying what kinds of expectations users have and aligning these through design and dissemination which ultimately creates more transparent and successful interactions and collaborations. The framework is a tool for achieving this goal. Second, results show that previous experience has a strong impact on users’ expectations. People have different expectations of social robots and view social robots as both human-like and as machines. Expectations of social robots can vary according to the source of the expectation, with those who had previous direct experiences of robots having different expectations than those who relied on indirect experiences to generate expectations. One consequence of these results is that expectations can be a confounding variable in sHRI research. Previous experience with social robots can prime users in future interactions with social robots. These findings highlight the unique experiences users have, even when faced with the same robot. Users' expectations and how they change over time shapes the users’ individual needs and preferences and should therefore be considered in the interpretation of sHRI. In doing so, the social robot expectation gap can be reduced.
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| 6. |
- MacGregor, Oskar
(author)
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Zapped! : Why Brain Stimulation Does Not Equal Performance Enhancement
- 2022
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In: Is Neurodoping Different?.
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Conference paper (other academic/artistic)abstract
- If a technology being used by elite athletes to gain a competitive edge marks some sort of coming of age for said technology, then I suppose electrical and magnetic brain stimulation has now, it would seem, finally come of age. Gone are the days of debilitating One-Flew-Over-The-Cuckoo's-Nest-style electroshock jolts, replaced by sleek and sexy marketing for low-current "cognitive enhancement" devices, promising everything from improved focus to - as revealed by a quick traipse through Google and Reddit - increased creativity and intelligence, as well as helping you both win competitions and quit smoking while you're at it! And with this development, an attendant fear of its misuse, for creating unfair advantages - not least among elite athletes, with their federations' obsessive focus on (certain specific forms of) fairness - to the point that the journal Neuroethics recently dedicated a special issue to this topic of "neurodoping". But, perhaps not too surprisingly, reality doesn't really live up to the hype. While various individual studies can be found to support the view that brain stimulation might enhance performance, this takes place against a broad backdrop of serious issues within empirical neuroscience and psychology more generally, relating to all manner of problems with sample sizes, methods, assumptions, etc., along with some plain old ignorance about how to properly deal with all of these. In this talk, I will therefore give the briefest of introductions as to why essentially all existing claims about the purportedly performance-enhancing effects of transcranial electric stimulation (TES) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) are claiming far too much, far too soon. As far as we really know, based on what robust evidence actually exists today, "neurodoping" of this sort gives no more a competitive advantage than does rubbing your lucky rabbit's foot.
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| 7. |
- Lagerstedt, Erik
(author)
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Perceiving agents : Pluralism, interaction, and existence
- 2024
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Perception is a vast subject to study. One way to approach and study it might therefore be to break down the concept into smaller pieces. Specific modes of sensation, mechanisms, phenomena, or contexts might be selected as the proxy or starting point for addressing perception as a whole. Another approach would be to widen the concept, and attempt to study perception through the larger context of which it is a part. I have, in this thesis, attempted the latter strategy, by emphasising an existential perspective, and examine the role and nature of perception through that lens.The larger perspective of broadening the scope does not specifically allow for better answers, but rather different kinds of answers, providing complementary ways of exploring what it means to be an artificial or natural agent, and what consequences that can have for the access to, as well as representation, processing, and communication of information. A broader stance can also facilitate exploration of questions regarding larger perspectives, such as the relation between individual agents, as well as their place in larger structures such as societies and cyber-physical systems.In this thesis I use existential phenomenology to frame the concept of perception, while drawing from theories in biology and psychology. My work has a particular focus on human-robot interaction, a field of study at a fascinating intersection of humans designing, using, and communicating with something human-made, partially human-like, yet distinctly non-human. The work is also applied to some aspects of the traffic domain which, given the increasing interest in self-driving vehicles, is partially another instance of complex and naturalistic human-robot interaction.Ultimately, I argue for a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to the understanding of perception, and its related concepts. To understand a system of agents as they interact, it is not only necessary to acknowledge their respective circumstances, but take serious the idea that none of the agents’ constructed worlds are more or less real, they might only be more or less relevant in relation to specific contexts, perspectives, or needs. Such an approach is particularly relevant when addressing the complexities of the increasingly urgent sustainability challenges.
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| 8. |
- Lowe, Robert, et al.
(author)
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Affective-associative two-process theory: a neurocomputational account of partial reinforcement extinction effects
- 2017
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In: Biological Cybernetics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0340-1200 .- 1432-0770. ; 111:5-6, s. 365-388
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE) is an experimentally established phenomenon: behavioural response to a given stimulus is more persistent when previously inconsistently rewarded than when consistently rewarded. This phenomenon is, however, controversial in animal/human learning theory. Contradictory findings exist regarding when the PREE occurs. One body of research has found a within-subjects PREE, while another has found a within-subjects reversed PREE (RPREE). These opposing findings constitute what is considered the most important problem of PREE for theoreticians to explain. Here, we provide a neurocomputational account of the PREE, which helps to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings of within-subjects experimental conditions. The performance of our model demonstrates how omission expectancy, learned according to low probability reward, comes to control response choice following discontinuation of reward presentation (extinction). We find that a PREE will occur when multiple responses become controlled by omission expectation in extinction, but not when only one omission-mediated response is available. Our model exploits the affective states of reward acquisition and reward omission expectancy in order to differentially classify stimuli and differentially mediate response choice. We demonstrate that stimulus-response (retrospective) and stimulus-expectation-response (prospective) routes are required to provide a necessary and sufficient explanation of the PREE versus RPREE data and that Omission representation is key for explaining the nonlinear nature of extinction data.
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| 9. |
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| 10. |
- Pylkkänen, Paavo
(author)
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The quantum epoché
- 2015
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In: Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology. - : Elsevier. - 0079-6107 .- 1873-1732. ; 119:3, s. 332-340
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The theme of phenomenology and quantum physics is here tackled by examining some basic interpretational issues in quantum physics. One key issue in quantum theory from the very beginning has been whether it is possible to provide a quantum ontology of particles in motion in the same way as in classical physics, or whether we are restricted to stay within a more limited view of quantum systems, in terms of complementary but mutually exclusive phenomena. In phenomenological terms we could describe the situation by saying that according to the usual interpretation of quantum theory (especially Niels Bohr's), quantum phenomena require a kind of epoche (i.e. a suspension of assumptions about reality at the quantum level). However, there are other interpretations (especially David Bohm's) that seem to re-establish the possibility of a mind-independent ontology at the quantum level. We will show that even such ontological interpretations contain novel, non-classical features, which require them to give a special role to “phenomena” or “appearances”, a role not encountered in classical physics. We will conclude that while ontological interpretations of quantum theory are possible, quantum theory implies the need of a certain kind of epoche even for this type of interpretations. While different from the epoche connected to phenomenological description, the “quantum epoche” nevertheless points to a potentially interesting parallel between phenomenology and quantum philosophy.
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