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- Munthe, Christian, 1962, et al.
(författare)
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The Return of Lombroso? Ethical Aspects of (Visions of) Preventive Forensic Screening
- 2015
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Ingår i: Public Health Ethics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1754-9973 .- 1754-9981. ; 8:3, s. 270-283
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The vision of legendary criminologist Cesare Lombroso to use scientific theories of individual causes of crime as a basis for screening and prevention programmes targeting individuals at risk for future criminal behaviour has resurfaced, following advances in genetics, neuroscience and psychiatric epidemiology. This article analyses this idea and maps its ethical implications from a public health ethical standpoint. Twenty-seven variants of the new Lombrosian vision of forensic screening and prevention are distinguished, and some scientific and technical limitations are noted. Some lures, biases and structural factors, making the application of the Lombrosian idea likely in spite of weak evidence are pointed out and noted as a specific type of ethical aspect. Many classic and complex ethical challenges for health screening programmes are shown to apply to the identified variants and the choice between them, albeit with peculiar and often provoking variations. These variations are shown to actualize an underlying theoretical conundrum in need of further study, pertaining to the relationship between public health ethics and the ethics and values of criminal law policy.
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- Munthe, Christian, 1962
(författare)
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Om krishantering i offentlig verksamhet
- 2022
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Ingår i: Tidskriften Alba. - 1403-5448. ; :2022-08-25
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- På bara några år har samhällets beredskap att mota undan, mildra och hantera allvarliga hot och påfrestningar seglat upp som ett huvudtema i svensk samhällsdebatt. Det gäller förstås den högaktuella situationen föranledd av den drastiska upptrappningen av Rysslands krig mot Ukraina. Men det gäller i lika hög grad pandemin, förorsakad av sjukdomen Covid-19. Sedan tidigare har ljus riktats mot samhällets svårigheter att hantera stora flyktingströmmar (som de kommande decennierna kan förväntas bli mångdubbelt större i klimatförändringarnas spår) och systemfel i styrning och finansiering av rättsväsende, skola och sjukvård. Pågående och växande strukturella hot som antibiotikaresistens, klimatförändringar, svårbekämpad organiserad brottslighet och bristfällig försörjning av material, infrastruktur och kompetens för samhällets centrala funktioner har uppmärksammats gång på gång. Men den svenska offentliga samhällsdiskursen fortsätter att vara dålig på att artikulera beredskapsfrågan som ett övergripande perspektiv på politik och samhälle, så även de politiska partierna. Man förlorar sig i än den ena, än den andra specifika detaljfrågan och politiken är mestadels reaktiv snarare än preventiv. Men debattklimatet håller på att förskjutas och i den här krönikan vill jag bidra till den utvecklingen utifrån min utsiktspunkt som forskare om moral- och samhällsfilosofi, beslutsfattande under osäkerhet, folkhälsoarbete, leveranssäkerhet och antibiotikaresistens. Min poäng är att olika beredskapstankar och -diskussioner hakar i varandra på väsentliga sätt. Detta beror på att de vilar på en gemensam grund av etiska normer och värderingar som handlar om moraliskt och politiskt ansvar och – förstås – olika synsätt på vilka dessa normer och värderingar är. Om dessa görs tydligare ökar förutsättningarna att sambandet mellan en rad skilda beredskapsdebatter tydliggörs. Därmed kan också en grund skönjas för ett sammanhållet synsätt på hur samhällets värdering av beredskap bör se ut och hur de kostnader som beredskapen ofrånkomligen kräver – samhällsekonomiskt, politiskt och etiskt – kan berättigas.
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- Dodig Crnkovic, Gordana, 1955, et al.
(författare)
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Natural Computing/ Unconventional Computing and its Philosophical Significance
- 2012
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Ingår i: Entropy. - : MDPI AG. - 1099-4300. ; 14:12, s. 2408-2412
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- For the Turing year 2012, AISB (The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour) and IACAP (The International Association for Computing and Philosophy) merged their annual symposia/conferences to form the AISB/IACAP World Congress. The congress took place 2–6 July 2012 at the University of Birmingham, UK. The Congress was inspired by a desire to honour Alan Turing, and by the broad and deep significance of Turing's work to AI, the philosophical ramifications of computing, and philosophy and computing more generally. The Congress was one of the events forming the Alan Turing Year. The Congress consisted mainly of a number of collocated Symposia on specific research areas, together with six invited Plenary Talks. All papers other than the Plenaries were given within Symposia. This format is perfect for encouraging new dialogue and collaboration both within and between research areas. This volume forms the proceedings of one of the component symposia. We are most grateful to the organizers of the Symposium for their hard work in creating it, attracting papers, doing the necessary reviewing, defining an exciting programme for the symposium, and compiling this volume. We also thank them for their flexibility and patience concerning the complex matter of fitting all the symposia and other events into the Congress week
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- Svensson, Frans
(författare)
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Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics
- 2015
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Ingår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0960-8788 .- 1469-3526. ; 23:2, s. 277-296
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.
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- Åhman, Henrik
(författare)
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The aesthetic turn : Exploring the religious dimensions of digital technology
- 2016
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Ingår i: Approaching Religion. - 1799-3121. ; 6:2, s. 156-163
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The arena for developing digital technology has undergone an aesthetic turn, broadening the focus from a functionalist approach producing centralized systems in the 1970s and 1980s to an increased awareness of the aesthetic aspects of the individual user’s interaction with technology in the 1990s and 2000s. Within the academic research fields studying digital technology (e.g. Human-Computer Interaction and Interaction Design) the aesthetic turn has resulted in a shift from a strong emphasis on user behaviour to an increased interest in aesthetic perspectives on the role of the designer, the design process, and the design material. Within these fields, aesthetics has often been interpreted as belonging to the realm of the individual; personal experiences such as pleasure, engagement, and emotions have been emphasized in both technology development and technology research. Aesthetics is not, however, only an individual phenomenon but also has relational and structural components that need to be acknowledged. Structural aspects of aesthetics condition the possibilities for individuals interacting with digital technology. Thus, the tension between individual and relational aspects of aesthetics in digital technology also reflects a tension between freedom and limitation; between change and permanence; between destabilizing and stabilizing forces. Such a broadened understanding of aesthetics offers a model of digital technology that roughly corresponds to Mark C. Taylor’s definition of religion. Taylor argues that religion is constituted by, on the one hand, a figuring moment characterized by structural stability and universality, and, on the other hand, a disfiguring moment characterized by disruption, particularity, and change. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the aesthetic turn and Taylor’s definition of religion to illustrate similarities between the two, suggesting possible religious dimensions of digital technology and how that can inform our understanding of people’s interaction with digital technology.
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