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- Zlatev, Jordan, et al.
(författare)
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Introduction : Cognitive semiotics comes of age
- 2016
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Ingår i: Meaning, Mind and Communication : Explorations in Cognitive Semiotics - Explorations in Cognitive Semiotics. - 9783653049480 - 9783631657041 ; , s. 9-28
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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- Zlatev, Jordan, et al.
(författare)
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From body to mouth (and body)
- 2010
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Ingår i: Evolution Of Language, Proceedings. - 9789814295215 ; , s. 527-528
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)
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- Mendoza-Collazos, Juan, et al.
(författare)
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The Origins and Evolution of Design : A Stage-Based Model
- 2021
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Ingår i: Biosemiotics and Evolution : The Natural Foundations of Meaning and Symbolism - The Natural Foundations of Meaning and Symbolism. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2199-3076 .- 2199-3068. - 9783030852641 - 9783030852672 - 9783030852658 ; 6, s. 161-173
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Within a broader definition of design, as the conception and planning of everything that is artificial, the place of tools is central. With the help of cognitive semiotics in general and Donald’s theory of the evolution of the human mind in particular, we propose a stage model for the evolution of design, consisting of four stages: Proto-design, Simple design, Complex design, and Advanced design, some of which are further divided into substages. We argue that nonhuman animals are capable of Proto-design, but it is only with the advent of stone tool technology in hominins that we witness Simple design. The stages are individuated based on evidence from archaeology and cognitive science, but also on the particular semiotic resources that are novel for each stage: mimesis-based gestures, speech, drawings, and polysemiotic communication. The model suggests both continuities and relative discontinuities in the evolution of design, and more generally, in human bio-cultural evolution.
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- Sonesson, Göran
(författare)
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Nothing human is foreign to me - except some of it : From the semiotic tradition to cognitive semiotic by the way of phenomenology
- 2021
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Ingår i: Degrés. - 0376-8163. ; :186-187, s. 1-23
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cognitive semiotics is understood here to consist in the merger of the two great transdisciplinary endeavours (re)emerging in the middle of the last century, semiotics and cognitive science, the common core of which may consist in the phenomenological perspective, in both Husserl’s and Peirce’s sense of the term. We explore and revise Louis Prieto’s characterization of the semiotic sciences, tracing it back to Giambattista Vico’s famous axiom, in order to account for the methodological plurality of the approach. This is then illustrated by an overview of our earlier both phenomenological and experimental elucidation of the mirror image as a pictorial sign.
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- Sonesson, Göran
(författare)
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On Mimicry, Signs and Other Meaning-Making Acts. : Further Studies in Iconicity
- 2019
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Ingår i: Biosemiotics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1875-1342 .- 1875-1350. ; 12:1, s. 99-114
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an earlier paper, I set out to apply to animal mimicry the definition of the sign, and, more specifically, of the iconic sign, which I originally elaborated in the study of pictures, and which was then extended by myself and others to language, gesture, and music. The present contribution, however, while summarizing some of the results of those earlier studies, is dedicated to the demonstration that animal mimicry, as well as phenomena of the human Lifeworld comparable to it, are in a sense the opposite of signs. It has often been observed, not only within speech act philosophy, but also by the semiotician Luis Prieto, that as sign can only function as such once it is recognized to be a sign. Animal mimicry, camouflage, and the like, in contrast, only work as such, to the extent that they are not perceived as signs. Unlike what speech act philosophy claims, nevertheless, the “difference which makes a difference” is not the recognition of a purpose attributed to the subject producing the sign. A footprint, for example, has to be recognized as a sign in order to function as such. Nevertheless, to the extent that a purpose is attributed to the subject setting the sign, it may be considered a sign, but one that hides its nature, a fake footprint. Mimicry and camouflage, however, are similar to such “natural meanings” as footprints in entertaining a different relation to the agent initiating the act and the agent perceiving it. Classical studies of mimicry distinguish its varieties according to what is rather vaguely called function. In this paper, we will investigate whether these classifications can be recuperated from a semiotic point of view, or whether a semiotically valid classification should start from scratch.
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