| 1. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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A Distinction in Value - Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake
- 2005
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Ingår i: Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. ; , s. 115-130
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or a person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, cherishing, etc.
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| 2. |
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, et al.
(författare)
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Tropic of Value
- 2005
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Ingår i: Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. ; , s. 213-228
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (1999), we defended the following claims: (i) Not only states of affairs, or facts, but also concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake); (ii) The final value of a concrete object need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not be exclusively based on the internal (non-relational) properties of its bearer; (iii) The final value of a concrete object is not reducible to the value of some states of affairs that involve the object in question. Our arguments for (i) – (iii) have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars (so-called tropes) rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive (if one is prepared to allow for the existence of tropes), it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, et al.
(författare)
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Subjectivism and Objectivism
- 2003
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Ingår i: Patterns of Value; Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis. - 1404-3718. ; 1
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Strandberg, Caj, 1968, et al.
(författare)
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Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation
- 2007
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 35:2, s. 1-22
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, et al.
(författare)
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Good and Good-for
- 2017
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Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Oxford, UK : John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. - 9781444367072
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 10. |
- Höög, Victoria, et al.
(författare)
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The Philosophers on the Market Square. Philosophical Modernism from Vienna to Uppsala
- 2006
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Ingår i: Hommage á Wlodek : philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz. ; , s. 1-16
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Abstract: The logical empiricists in Vienna and their Swedish counterparts in Uppsala shared a scientific ethos that underlined the philosophical academics as representatives for universalism, disinterest, professional loyalty, organized scepticism and public interest. Rudolf Carnap, Axel Hägerström and Ingemar Hedenius regarded themselves as intellectuals, offering their philosophical tools to society. However, when the scientific ethos was articulated by Robert Merton in 1942, the circumstances had drastically changed. The European tradition was left behind. However, the claim is that neither the professionalism, nor the specialized epistemology in analytical philosophy necessarily alienated the philosopher from the public. The gap occurred when the epistemology ceased to be cultural meaningful, as a part of the spirit of the time. The modernistic spirit promoted the ethos of intellectuality. In the 1960s a new ethos took over: the philosophers as purely academic professional experts, in US and Sweden.
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