| 1. |
- Wierup, Martin, et al.
(författare)
-
Tackling antibiotic resistance from a food safety perspective in Europe
- 2011
-
Bok (refereegranskat)abstract
- Antibiotics have revolutionized the treatment of infectious diseases. But their use and misuse have resulted in the development and spread of antibiotic resistance. This is now a significant health problem: each year in the European Union alone, over 25 000 people die from infections caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Antibiotic resistance is also a food safety problem: antibiotic use in food animals -for treatment, disease prevention or growth promotion - allows resistant bacteria and resistance genes to spread from food animals to humans through the food-chain. This publication explores the options for prevention and containment of antibiotic resistance in the food-chain through national coordination and international cooperation, including the regulation and reduction of antibiotic use in food animals, training and capacity building, surveillance of resistance trends and antibiotic usage, promotion of knowledge and research, and advocacy and communication to raise awareness of the issues. This publication is primarily intended for policy-makers and authorities working in the public health, agriculture, food production and veterinary sectors, and offers them ways to take a holistic, intersectoral, multifaceted approach to this growing problem.
|
|
| 2. |
- Keeling, Linda, et al.
(författare)
-
Scientific Opinion on bluetongue monitoring and surveillance
- 2011
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732. ; 9, s. 2192-
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Following a request from the Commission, the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare was asked to deliver a Scientific Opinion on: 1) the expected prevalence (design prevalence) under different circumstances, and, 2) an updated scientific assessment of the size of the relevant geographical area for the purpose of monitoring and surveillance programmes for bluetongue. A systematic literature review and a review of monitoring and surveillance data from European Union Member States was performed in order to estimate the prevalences observed in the Member States. The prevalences observed in areas that have been infected for several years were slightly lower than the design prevalence of 2 % currently used for monthly testing of sentinel animals, but much lower than the design prevalences of 20 % and 10 % for annual surveys in populations of unvaccinated and vaccinated ruminants, respectively. Currently there is no scientific evidence that suggests an optimal size of the relevant geographic unit for BTV monitoring and surveillance, since it depends on many factors, including the goal of the surveillance programmes. Early warning based on passive surveillance will take place irrespective of the size of the geographical unit but, when based on active surveillance, it is best targeted at regions considered at risk for introduction, using small geographical units, a high sampling frequency and sample size. For estimating the impact of interventions on the prevalence of infected animals, smaller areas result in more precise estimates of the prevalence and also take better account of local differences. For establishing freedom from infection, smaller areas result in lower design prevalence for a region as a whole and take better account of local differences in infection dynamics.
|
|
| 3. |
- Keeling, Linda, et al.
(författare)
-
Scientific Opinion on bluetongue serotype 8
- 2011
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732. ; 9, s. 2189-
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- To answer a question from the European Commission on the potential special characteristics of bluetongue virus (BTV) serotype 8 (BTV-8) compared to other serotypes and their possible impact on the epidemiology of the disease, a systematic literature review was carried out by a working group established by the Animal Health and Welfare Panel. Currently, three special features can be assigned to BTV-8, which are the ability to cause serious disease in cattle and goats, the ability to be transmitted transplacentally, and the ability to contaminate semen. The transplacental transmission and the contamination of semen are also observed for several serotypes of modified live virus (MLV) vaccines and for some cell culture/egg passaged strains. These two features may have an impact on the epidemiology of the disease, since they may increase the ability of BTV-8 to survive the winter period, for example, when pregnant cows are infected in late autumn and give birth to viraemic offspring in the next vector season, or, through infecting the recipient dam via artificial insemination (AI) with frozen contaminated semen. Furthermore, the chance of BTV-8 spread may be increased either through movement of seropositive but virus negative pregnant animals, which may give birth to viraemic calves, or through natural mating or AI using BTV-8 contaminated semen by transmission from semen to receiving dam. The current legislation provides effective measures to ensure that all dams are immune to BTV before insemination or mating, so there is no subsequent risk of transplacental infection of their offspring. Furthermore, pregnant animals are effectively restricted in their movement. More research is needed to determine whether oral transmission and/or transmission through embryo transfer are more likely to occur for BTV-8 than for other BTV serotypes.
|
|
| 4. |
- Keeling, Linda, et al.
(författare)
-
Scientific Opinion on Epizootic Ulcerative Syndrome
- 2011
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732. ; 9, s. 2387-
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The AHAW panel conducted an assessment of the risk of entry, release, spread and possible impact of epizootic ulcerative syndrome (EUS) in Europe. The risk of entry is linked to the probability of infection in the source region and the frequency of imports. A greater risk of entry was associated with the importation of ornamental fish into closed ornamental facilities (COF). COF, as defined by EU legislation, are pet shops, garden centres, garden ponds, commercial aquaria or wholesalers keeping ornamental aquatic animals without any direct contact with natural waters; or equipped with an effluent treatment system. The release of pathogens from COF could occur through the sale of live fish to hobbyists, insufficient effluent treatment or unintentional contact with natural waters. Assuming regular entry and release the long-term lack of reporting of EUS is a apparent contradiction. The following scenarios could explain it: i) Fish in European waters have never been exposed to the pathogen because the survival of released zoospores is too short, ii) EUS does not establish, but the pathogen fades out after entry into the EU, due to unfavourable conditions, iii) Ecological or epidemiological circumstances are not favourable for disease expression, iv) EUS is endemic and regularly misdiagnosed. The insufficient data from monitoring of aquaculture fish or wild stocks in Europe preclude confirmation or estimation of the likelihoods of these scenarios. The impact of EUS on EU aquaculture, would range from no impact, if there was no spread, to low impact if there was spread without disease, low incidence or weak disease patterns. However, if endemic the impact may change in the future if conditions such as climate, water quality or availability of susceptible species, either in aquaculture or in natural water bodies, become favourable for initiating epidemics and disease expression.
|
|
| 5. |
- Keeling, Linda, et al.
(författare)
-
Scientific Opinion on monitoring for the emergence of possible new pandemic strains of influenza in animals
- 2011
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732. ; 9, s. 2109-
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Following the emergence in 2009 of the new pandemic H1N1 influenza virus, which contained gene segments from pig, bird and human influenza viruses, it was apparent that a better scientific understanding is required of influenza viruses to protect public and animal health. The latest scientific data on biological properties of the virus, transmissibility, host susceptibility and epidemiology has been evaluated in order to identify factors that could be monitored in animals and that would suggest a risk of emergence of a new pandemic influenza strains. Virological studies and animal models have highlighted the importance of individual virus proteins but virulence and transmissibility are polygenic effects and no single genetic marker can be reliably associated with increased pathogenicity or transmissibility. It was concluded that current monitoring of the influenza gene pool in humans has been able to provide an alert for the emergence of new human influenza strains of public health significance. In contrast, there is an incomplete view of the influenza virus strains circulating among pigs and birds at the global level. Interpretation of the origins and pandemic potential of influenza viruses do require knowledge of the influenza gene pools in both pigs and birds, as well as other animal species. It is recommended that there should be long term support for a passive monitoring network in pigs and birds in order to promote greater understanding of the evolution of influenza viruses at the global level. Maximum benefit can only be obtained by applying an integrated approach involving the medical and veterinary networks including development of harmonised tools and approaches, exchange of virus strains and sequence data and enhancing the coordination and dissemination of the findings from the human, swine and avian networks.
|
|
| 6. |
- Keeling, Linda, et al.
(författare)
-
Scientific Opinion on Q fever
- 2010
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732. ; 8
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Following a request from the European Commission, a scientific opinion was prepared by EFSA's Animal Health and Welfare Panel to determine the magnitude, distribution, impact and significance of infection and disease in domestic ruminants and humans, risk factors for the maintenance (in domestic ruminant populations) and spillover (from these populations to humans) of Coxiella burnetii (the causative agent of Q fever), and control options in domestic ruminant populations. A range of approaches were used, including an assessment of monitoring/surveillance data, the development of a simple conceptual model, a critical review of available literature, and several country case studies. Control options for C. burnetii infection in small ruminants were qualitatively assessed. Infection is endemic in domestic ruminants in most, if not all, EU member states, however, disease is rare and impact is limited. In the EU, Q fever is a zoonotic disease with limited public health impact, except under certain epidemiological circumstances and for particular risk groups. Human cases are often associated with proximity to small ruminants (particularly at parturition or during abortions) and dry, windy weather. Currently, there is no clear evidence of an association between bacterial genotypes/isolates and virulence. A number of longer-term options to control C. burnetii infection in domestic ruminants were identified; these should be considered in those situations where the public health risk is considered unacceptable. Some additional options were not considered sustainable for long-term control, but may have a role in the face of an outbreak. Persistent environmental contamination may confound animal-based control efforts. Vaccination should be considered a long-term control option, noting that effectiveness may not be observed in the short-term. Antibiotic treatment of animals is not recommended. There is no conclusive evidence that the consumption of milk and milk products containing C. burnetii has resulted in clinical Q fever in humans.
|
|
| 7. |
- Wierup, Martin, et al.
(författare)
-
Biosafety considerations and risk reduction strategy for a new veterinary faculty building and teaching hospital in Sweden
- 2020
-
Ingår i: Infection Ecology & Epidemiology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 2000-8686. ; 10
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Introduction: This paper describes a hazard- and risk-based strategy and recommendations on relevant biosafety levels in facility design of a new veterinary faculty building including a veterinary medical teaching hospital. Both animal and human health were considered.Materials and methods: Agents listed in the regulatory frameworks on animal and human health were identified as the main potential hazards. Suggestions on biosafety level and facility design were based on the official risk grouping of those agents, the associated risk management procedures, and biosafety experiences from previous faculty buildings.Results and Discussion: It was suggested that VHC should not be designed for work with agents requiring facilities at biosafety levels 3 and 4, and that actions in cases of accidental exposure to notifiable infections should follow the regulatory requirements. Facilities requiring biosafety level 2 were identified from risk scenarios and transmission routes. Experiences from the first five years of operation revealed good prevention of spread of infection from patients in isolation facilities and successful elimination of Salmonella and MRSA from the large animal clinic.Conclusion: In order to avoid costly construction mistakes, an overall biosafety strategy should be formulated and used as guidance for architects and other relevant stakeholders designing facilities for the animal health sector. Regulatory requirements on infectious diseases must be complied with.
|
|
| 8. |
- Algers, Bo, et al.
(författare)
-
Animal health safety of fresh meat derived from pigs vaccinated against classic swine fever
- 2009
-
Ingår i: EFSA Journal. - : Wiley. - 1831-4732.
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Classical swine fever (CSF) is a disease that has been causing major socio-economic damages in the EU during the last decades. Although considerable progress has been made in the eradication and prevention of the disease, the threat for an epidemic still exists. The measures to control and eradicate CSF are laid down in Community legislation (Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC) and are based on stamping-out when CSF is confirmed on pig holdings. Emergency vaccination with 'conventional' live attenuated vaccine or marker vaccine can be used as an additional tool to control and eradicate the disease. In order to support and to improve the control and eradication measures as regards CSF in domestic pigs, EFSA was requested by the Commission to provide scientific advice on the safety of fresh meat (freedom from field virus) derived from vaccinated pigs. Specifically, two terms of reference were given: a) what is the risk that wild-type CSF virus is present in fresh meat obtained from pigs vaccinated in an emergency situation during an outbreak?; and b) what are the sampling schemes and testing procedures needed to detect field virus in fresh meat derived from such vaccinated pigs? Two types of vaccines are currently authorised in the EU for CSF: - A modified live vaccine (MLV, C-strain), which is safe and efficacious, inducing early protection; - An E2 subunit vaccine (E2subV, marker), safe, allowing serological DIVA, but with lower efficacy than MLV. The usefulness of emergency vaccination in order to limit disease spread and avoid excessive culling and economic damages remains to be evaluated. Very limited data related to the presence of CSFV in fresh meat have been generated after the implementation of a non-vaccination strategy. Therefore, a simulation modelling approach was developed to assess the risk of emergency vaccination on the safety of meat compared to the current control of CSF in domestic pigs without vaccination. CSFV is relatively stable in fresh meat and resists the maturation process in meat. Depending on the strain virulence, the age and breed, infected pigs die rapidly or may recover or can develop chronic infections. Viraemia is variable in duration and degree but it is always linked to the spread of virus to other body tissues including skeletal muscles (meat). The risk scenario includes two events that must happen before an infected animal is slaughtered and infected meat released: an infected herd has to escape clinical diagnosis before lifting of restrictions and during the final screening such a herd is not detected due to sample selection or false negative laboratory tests. Three scenarios were evaluated through the model: 1. Stamping-out of CSF detected as infected herds, standstill and pre-emptive culling. 2. Stamping-out of CSF detected as infected herds, standstill and emergency vaccination assuming a rapid protection. 3. Same as 2 but assuming a slower protection and DIVA property. It was concluded from the model that none of the strategies could reduce the risk to absolute zero. Lifting of restrictions can only occur after a certain time span (longer than the viraemic period of infected animals) after the last outbreak, thus the number of virus-positive animals in vaccinated infected herds at lifting will be very small. The model indicated that there is a lower risk of virus in fresh meat after emergency vaccination around outbreaks compared to the conventional strategy including pre-emptive culling, provided that control measures are adjusted to the applied vaccine and test systems. Adjustments may for instance include size of vaccination area, sampling schemes and timing of lift-up of restrictions. Any non-compliance of control measures will increase the risk of infectious animals remaining after lift-up. Chronically infected pigs are a potential hazard for fresh meat. However, in the risk assessment it was assumed that chronically infected pigs will be identified either by clinical signs and/or laboratory tests. Clinical diagnosis is unreliable and laboratory confirmation is needed. Highly sensitive and specific diagnostic assays are available to diagnose CSF. Agent detection tests are more suitable during early stages of infection. A positive rRT-PCR diagnosis indicates that an animal has been infected with the wild type or MLV virus but it is not necessarly still infectious. Antibody detection tests are mainly suitable for monitoring and surveillance purposes, but not for early diagnosis of suspect cases. Concerning the efficiency of the monitoring scheme, it is directly related to the diagnostic systems applied (organ sample, sensitivity, specificity) and to the number of samples taken. In case of selecting samples for rRT-PCR based on fever measurement in vaccinated animals, the sample size should be corrected. In terms of overall efficiency, rRT-PCR for virus detection and ELISA-systems for antibody investigation are the tests of choice. Vaccinated animals, that at an appropriate lift-up time are tested rRT-PCR negative for the wild type virus, can be considered as “zero risk” animals. If only a few animals become infected in a herd, which is possible especially when vaccination is applied, sampling and testing only a proportion of the animals may result in not detecting such an outbreak
|
|
| 9. |
- Sternberg Lewerin, Susanna, et al.
(författare)
-
The cost-benefit of salmonella control in Swedish pigs
- 2011
-
Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Analysis of the costs and benefits of salmonella control pre-harvest in the pork production has been performed on EU level. As optimal measures to begin salmonella control in pig production in a high prevalence situation are not known, estimates of the costs for initiating such a control include large uncertainties. However the costs for running a salmonella control program can be estimated in countries where such programs are in place. In Sweden, the cost of the control is shared by the tax payers and the producers. A thorough analysis of the cost-benefit of the program has been requested by various stakeholders. Pending this, a quick calculation based on previously published and unpublished data was made. These data included the cost of: i) human illness due to salmonella from Swedish pigs, ii) eradication of salmonella from infected pig farms, iii) surveillance in pigs and pig products, iv) preventive measures in the feed sector. The total yearly cost of salmonella control in Swedish pigs was estimated to 1.1-1.2 million Euro (average based on the past 6 years) and the current yearly cost of human salmonellosis due to pigs was estimated to 0.013 million Euro. These costs were compared to expected costs without a salmonella control program under several "what if"-scenarios. For example, if the human sero-prevalence would become equal to that in Denmark and the proportion of cases due to pigs increased to 15% (EU-estimate), the cost of human salmonellosis due to pigs would increase to 2.8 million Euro. Under these assumptions, the saved costs exceed the cost of salmonella control in Swedish pigs. Other levels of sero-prevalence and estimates for the proportion of cases attributable to pigs were also investigated. Under exceptional circumstances, such as the large feed-borne outbreak in 2003, the costs may exceed the benefits.
|
|
| 10. |
- Wierup, Martin
(författare)
-
Antimicrobial resistance in Scandinavia after termination of antimicrobials for growth promotion
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Ecology and Animal Health. ; :2, s. 222-227
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), antimicrobial growth promoters (AGP) were gradually introduced during the 1960s for use in chicken, beef and pig production. In the early 1970s there were doubts in Sweden about the growth-promoting effect in calves (Johnson and Jacobsson, 1973). The risk of antibiotic resistance was also discovered (Wierup et al., 1975). As a result, the use of AGP in calf and beef production had more or less come to an end before 1986, when all use of AGP was banned. All antimicrobials were then re-classified as veterinary medicines in Sweden and were available only by veterinary prescription. About ten years later, when the risks of antibiotic resistance were increasingly apparent in other countries and in the EU, AGP were gradually removed in the other Scandinavian countries too (Grave et al., 2006). These precautionary actions taken by the Scandinavian countries were a major incentive in the EU and internationally for a focus on the use of antibiotics and in particular AGP. A WHO risk assessment on the use of antimicrobials in food animals identified areas of concern in 1997 (WHO, 1997). Later, the WHO published global principles and strategies for the containment of antimicrobial resistance (WHO, 2000; WHO 2001a), as well as on monitoring the use of antimicrobials in food animals for the protection of human health (WHO, 2001b). In the EU, the Scientific Steering Committee of the European Commission (1999) adopted an opinion and recommendations on antimicrobial resistance, with special focus on the usage of antimicrobials for growth promotion, which resulted in the EU ban from July 1 1999 on the use of bacitracin, avoparcin, spiramycin, tylosin and virginiamycin as AGP. A total EU ban on the use of all antibiotics for growth promotion was introduced in 2006. The OIE and individual countries and organisations also focused on the subject. This chapter describes the usage of antimicrobials and the resistance pattern following the ban on AGP in the Scandinavian countries.
|
|
