| 1. |
- Millroth, Philip, et al.
(författare)
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Preference or Ability : Exploring the Relations between Risk Preference, Personality, and Cognitive Abilities
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. - : John Wiley & Sons. - 0894-3257 .- 1099-0771. ; 33:4, s. 477-491
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Key issues in the behavioral sciences are if there exist stable risk preferences that generalize across domains and if these are best measured by revealed risk preference (RRP) in behavioral decision tasks or by surveys eliciting stated risk preference (SRP). We applied network analysis to data from a representative Swedish sample to investigate the relations between RRP, SRP, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities, using in total over 70 measurements. The results showed that different measures of RRP were poorly intercorrelated and formed a community together with measures of numerical and cognitive abilities. Measures of SRP were weakly correlated with measures of RRP and identified in a distinctly separate community, along with personality characteristics and gender. The ensuing analyses provided support for a model suggesting that RRPs are contaminated by demands on numerical and cognitive abilities. RRPs may thus suffer from poor construct validity, whereas SRPs may better capture people's everyday risk preferences because they are related to more stable traits.
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| 2. |
- Forsgren, Mattias, et al.
(författare)
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Further perceptions of probability : In defence of associative models
- 2023
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Ingår i: Psychological review. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0033-295X .- 1939-1471. ; 130:5, s. 1383-1400
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Extensive research in the behavioral sciences has addressed people’s ability to learn stationary probabilities, which stay constant over time, but only recently have there been attempts to model the cognitive processes whereby people learn—and track—nonstationary probabilities. In this context, the old debate on whether learning occurs by the gradual formation of associations or by occasional shifts between hypotheses representing beliefs about distal states of the world has resurfaced. Gallistel et al. (2014) pitched the two theories against each other in a nonstationary probability learning task. They concluded that various qualitative patterns in their data were incompatible with trial-by-trial associative learning and could only be explained by a hypothesis-testing model. Here, we contest that claim and demonstrate that it was premature. First, we argue that their experimental paradigm consisted of two distinct tasks: probability tracking (an estimation task) and change detection (a decision-making task). Next, we present a model that uses the (associative) delta learning rule for the probability tracking task and bounded evidence accumulation for the change detection task. We find that this combination of two highly established theories accounts well for all qualitative phenomena and outperforms the alternative model proposed by Gallistel et al. (2014) in a quantitative model comparison. In the spirit of cumulative science, we conclude that current experimental data on human learning of nonstationary probabilities can be explained as a combination of associative learning and bounded evidence accumulation and does not require a new model.
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| 3. |
- Gruber, Michael
(författare)
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Dyslexics' phonological processing in relation to speech perception
- 2003
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The general aim of this thesis was to investigate phonological processing skills in dyslexic children and adults and their relation to speech perception. Dyslexia can be studied at various levels: at a biological, cognitive and an environmental level. This thesis mainly looks at environmental and cognitive factors. It is a commonly held view that dyslexia is related to problems with phonological processing, that is, dyslexics have problems dealing with the sound structure of language. The problem is for example seen in tasks where the individual has to manipulate sound segments in the spoken language, read non-words, rapidly name pictures and digits, keep verbal material in short-term memory, and categorize and discriminate sound contrasts in speech perception. To fully understand the dyslexic’s problems we have to investigate both children and adults since the problems might change during the lifespan as a result of changes in the language system and compensatory mechanisms in the poor reader. Research indicates that adult dyslexics can reach functional reading proficiency but still perform poorly on tasks of phonological processing. Even though they can manage many everyday reading situations problems often arise when adult dyslexics enter higher education. The phonological problems of dyslexics are believed to be related to the underlying phonological representations of the language. The phonological representations have been hypothesized to be weakly specified or indistinct and/or not enough segmented. Deviant phonological representations are believed to cause problems when the mapping of written language is to be made to the phonological representations of spoken language during reading acquisition. In Paper 1 adults’ phonological processing and reading habits were investigated in order to increase our understanding of how the reading problems develop into adulthood and what the social consequences are. The results showed that adult dyslexics remained impaired in their phonological processing and that they differed substantially from controls in their choices regarding higher education and also regarding reading habits. Paper 2 reviews research that has used the sine wave speech paradigm in studies of speech perception. The paper also gives a detailed description of how sine wave speech is made and how it can be characterized. Sine wave speech is a course grained description of natural speech lacking phonetic detail. In Paper 3 sine wave speech varying with regard to how much suprasegmental information it contains is employed. Results showed that dyslexics were poorer at identifying monosyllabic words but not disyllabic words and a sentence, plausibly because the dyslexics had problems identifying the phonetic information in monosyllabic words. Paper 4 tested dyslexics’ categorization performance of fricative-vowel syllables and the results showed that dyslexics were less consistent than controls in their categorization indicating poorer sensitivity to phonetic detail. In all the results of the thesis are in line with the phonological deficit hypothesis as revealed by adult data and the performance on task of speech perception. It is concluded that dyslexic children and adults seem to have less well specified phonological representations.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Hansson, Patrik
(författare)
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Overconfidence and Format Dependence in Subjective Probability Intervals: Naive Estimation and Constrained Sampling
- 2005
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Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A particular field in research on judgment and decision making (JDM) is concerned with realism of confidence in one’s knowledge. An interesting finding is the so-called format dependence effect which implies that assessment of the same probability distribution generates different conclusions about over- or underconfidence bias depending on the assessment format. In particular,expressing a belief about some unknown quantity in the form of a confidence interval is severely prone to overconfidence as compared to expressing the belief as an assessment of a probability. This thesis gives a tentative account of this finding in terms of a Naïve Sampling Model (NSM;Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2004), which assumes that people accurately describe their available information stored in memory but they are naïve in the sense that they treat sample properties as proper estimators of population properties. The NSM predicts that it should be possible to reducethe overconfidence in interval production by changing the response format into interval evaluation and to manipulate the degree of format dependence between interval production and interval evaluation. These predictions are verified in empirical experiments which contain both general knowledge tasks (Study 1) and laboratory learning tasks (Study 2). A bold hypothesis,that working memory is a constraining factor for sample size in judgment which suggests that experience per se does not eliminate overconfidence, is investigated and verified. The NSM predicts that the absolute error of the placement of the interval is a constant fraction of interval size, a prediction that is verified (Study 2). This thesis suggests that no cognitive processing bias(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) over and above naivety is needed to understand and explain the overconfidence bias in interval production and hence the format dependence effect.
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| 6. |
- Hansson, Patrik, 1976-, et al.
(författare)
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The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0278-7393 .- 1939-1285. ; 34:5, s. 1027-1042
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naïve sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations.
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| 7. |
- Henriksson, Maria P., et al.
(författare)
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What is Coded into Memory in the Absence of Outcome Feedback?
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory and Cognition. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0278-7393 .- 1939-1285. ; 36:1, s. 1-16
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Although people often have to learn from environments with scarce and highly selective outcome feedback, the question of how non-feedback trials are represented in memory and affect later performance has received little attention in models of learning and decision making. In this article, the Generalized Context Model (R. M. Nosofsky, 1986) is used as a vehicle to test contrasting hypotheses about the coding of non-feedback trials. Data across 3 experiments with selective decision-contingent and selective outcome-contingent feedback provide support for the hypothesis of constructivist coding (E. Elwin, P. Juslin, H. Olsson, & T. Enkvist, 2007), according to which the outcomes on non-feedback trials are coded with the most likely outcome, as inferred by the individual. The relation to sampling-based approaches to judgment, and the adaptive significance of constructivist coding, are discussed.
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| 8. |
- Karlsson, Linnea
(författare)
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Additive Integration of Information in Multiple-Cue Judgment
- 2004
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Licentiatavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis investigates adaptive shifts between different cognitive processes in multiple-cue judgment tasks. At least two qualitatively and quantitatively different cognitive strategies can be identified: one process in which abstraction and integration of cue-criterion relations form the basis for the judgment (Einhorn, Kleinmutz & Kleinmutz, 1979) and one which is based onsimilarity comparisons between a probe and similar exemplars stored in memory (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky & Johanssen, 2000). Within the framework of a proposed model of judgment, Σ, these processes are regarded as complementary means to deal with a proposed capacity limitation of our cognitive architecture; in situations of unaidedabstraction and integration of information we are forced to handle pieces of information in an additive and linear manner. Predictions by Σ concern which of the two processes that will dominate judgments in different judgment tasks. In a judgment task where the underlying combination rule is additive and linear we are able to abstract and integrate information on how cues relate to a criterion and produce judgments that are consistent with the combination rule. In a judgment task where the underlying combination rule is multiplicative we are not able to abstract and integrate this information, and we are therefore induced to use a strategy of exemplar memory. Two studies test these predictions. In Study 1 the results confirm that in an additive judgment task cue abstraction was induced, while exemplar memory was induced in amultiplicative task. These results were replicated in Study 2, where a more complex judgment task was used. The results reported in this thesis provide tentative support for the idea of an adaptive division of labor between cue abstraction and exemplar memory as a function of the task, an ability we are equipped with to cope with a cognitive architecture only allowingelaboration of information in an additive and linear manner.
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| 9. |
- Karlsson, Linnea, 1979-, et al.
(författare)
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Exemplar-based inference in multi-attribute decision making : contingent, not automatic, strategy shifts?
- 2008
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Ingår i: Judgment and decision making. - : Cambridge University Press. - 1930-2975 .- 1930-2975. ; 3:3, s. 244-260
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several studies propose that exemplar retrieval contributes to multi-attribute decisions. The authors have proposed a process theory enabling a priori predictions of what cognitive representations people use as input to their judgment process (Sigma, for “summation”; P. Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, 2008). According to Sigma, exemplar retrieval is a back-up system when the task does not allow for additive and linear abstraction and integration of cue-criterion knowledge (e.g., when the task is non-additive). An important question is to what extent such shifts occur spontaneously as part of automatic procedures, such as error-minimization with the Delta rule, or if they are controlled strategy shifts contingent on the ability to identify a sufficiently successful judgment strategy. In this article data are reviewed thatdemonstrate a shift between exemplar memory and cue abstraction, as well as data where the expected shift does not occur. In contrast to a common assumption of previous models, these results suggest a controlled and contingent strategy shift.
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| 10. |
- Olsson, Anna-Carin, 1976-
(författare)
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Factors Shaping Process and Representation in Multiple-Cue Judgment
- 2004
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis investigates the cognitive processes and representations underlying human judgment in a multiple-cue judgment task. Several recent models as-sume that people have several qualitatively distinct and competing levels of knowledge representations (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994; Sloman, 1996). The most successful cognitive models in categorization and multiple-cue judgment are, respectively, exemplar-based models and cue abstraction models. The models are different in the computations and processes implied, but the structure of the task is similar. Study 1 investigated if the different theoretical conclusions in categorization and multiple-cue judgment derive from genuine differences in the processes, or are accidental to the different research methods. In Study 2, we expected learning in dyads to promote explicit cue abstraction as a consequence of verbalization (a social abstraction effect) and performance to improve due to the larger joint exemplar knowledge base (an exemplar pooling effect). In Study 3 we used the generalized model Sigma to illustrate how change in task environments (linear vs. nonlinear) can shape the knowledge representation that is used. We expected that people are not able to use cue ab-straction when judging objects with a non-linear structure between the visual cues (features) of the objects and the criterion, and therefore they are forced to use exemplar-based processes. Taken together, the results of these studies indicate that differences that characterize typical categorization and multiple-cue judgment tasks are conducive of qualitatively different cognitive processes, and that the task environment plays an important role for which cognitive processes are used in multiple cue judgments.
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